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Oversight Committee Scored for Failing To Declare Coup Unconstitutional

914B0441A Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Sep 91 p 4

[Commentary by Doctor of Legal Sciences V. Gulyev, adviser to the RSFSR minister of justice, professor at the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in response to a reader's letter: "Unexercised Powers"]

[Text] "A speech by Chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee S. Alekseyev at the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet still failed to clarify what position the committee took during the putsch." (P. Sizov, Ufa).

Doctor of Legal Sciences A. Gulyev, adviser to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] minister of justice, professor at the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, comments.

We may say that the Constitutional Oversight Committee failed to perform its functions. While initially taking principled positions, the committee gradually became pro-presidential and pro-state. In particular, it "failed to notice" that some demands by the USSR president facilitated the emergence of an authoritarian regime, and that a number of his ukases dangerously expanded the powers of the KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs. The well-known Pugo got an unconstitutional law on the Soviet militia adopted, but the "constitutionalists" were silent.

In January, S. Alekseyev was principled enough to condemn the actions of the OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachment] in Vilnius, but after the suppression of the putsch, he stated that the committee is not endowed with adequate powers. This seems to be the case if we compare the Constitutional Oversight Committee to its analogs—Western constitutional and supreme courts. However, even the powers granted to the committee were sufficient to pronounce the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] acts unconstitutional. This was not done; the powers were not "exercised." It all came down to a group of members of the Constitutional Oversight Committee stating on 20 August that the committee would review the constitutionality of the GKChP acts... depending on the decisions of the Supreme Soviet session. Therefore, the relations between the Constitutional Oversight Committee and the GKChP were not marred by conflict.

Debate Continues on Constitutional Oversight Committee Coup Role

924B0010A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Sep 91
Single Edition p 2

[Article by S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee: "The Putsch and Legal Justice: Some Necessary Explanations Regarding the 'August 91' Article"]

[Text] In his article "August 91" (Pravda 18-19 September) A. Butenko, in an attempt to elucidate recent events and the situation in the country, made several observations that merit attention. It is only a pity that the author did not analyze the ideological basis of the putsch, the war-communism doctrine, and Bolshevism. As a prominent specialist on "scientific communism" and theoretician of "developed socialism," he might have expressed some well-founded and instructive opinions on this account with full knowledge of the subject. That, however, is absent from the article.

On the other hand, the article contains some fairly harsh arguments (which sometimes contain factual errors and incorrect judgments) on other problems, including the actions of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee. Professor Butenko, of course, is free to express any opinions, but as a person associated with scholarship and, to use his own words, "simply an educated person," he should have known the following.

1. The committee's statement was made not on 21 August, as the author claims, when events had already become perfectly clear, but on 19 August, on the very first day of the putsch, in fact, during its very first hours, when no documents, facts, or information were available other than the "official communiques" that were continuously being broadcast on the radio. And that statement by the committee members, which was addressed directly to both the people and the USSR Supreme Soviet, stated everything that was most essential from a legal standpoint. Even in the form—abbreviated by the TASS executives of that time—in which the statement by the members of the Constitutional Oversight Committee was, fortunately, broadcast over television that evening and published on the following day in the general, censored press (and the publication precisely in that press of a statement that opposed the conspirators was an extremely important idea of its authors), it informed the country about the constitutional attitude toward what was happening and, from every indication, undermined the putschists' very plan to "constitutionally formalize" the coup; and it permitted, for example, Minister N.N. Vorontsov to issue, with reference to our statement, a government telegram to subordinate organizations and institutions instructing them not to carry out the directives of the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

2. The Constitutional Oversight Committee is not an "immediate-reaction" institution but, in principle, a judicial body that is called on to assess, moreover, not specific events but laws and other normative documents; furthermore, it can operate only collectively, with a quorum, and in accordance with procedures established by the Constitution and law, which is what the committee did as soon as it was possible to gather the necessary quorum, which was indeed on 21 August. On that same day the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, with the participation of members of our committee, ruled the putschists' normative acts unconstitutional.

3. In connection with what has been said, a fundamental and urgent problem. It is being asked whether, in a complex situation and situations of crisis, formal prescriptions, laws, judicial procedures, and so forth just might not be all that important.

There is a question here, and it is a difficult and age-old question.

It is customary to think that, under conditions in which what is involved is life and death, the existence of the very system, or global disaster, governmental and administrative agencies, agencies of presidential authority, and other institutions may act at their own risk without paying much attention to existing law. Because of existing stereotypes, it is difficult to object to that, although, let us note, that was the very pretext under which the putschists acted, and it is well known that Bolshevism begins precisely with the abandonment of the principles of legality in the name of "higher interests," the "revolution," or the "people." Furthermore, generally speaking, law and legality are absolute institutions: If you deviate from them once or twice for the loftiest motives you can find, before you know it, a gap—at first narrow, but then inexorably widening—opens through which tyranny breaks in and totally destroys law and legality.

However, I repeat, there is a question here. And the events during the days of the putsch and certain acts by republic governing bodies and local authorities confirm that there is.

But with respect to the court and all agencies of legal justice at all levels—from the constitutional to the rayon court—there is no question here at all. A court of any rank remains a genuine court (without degenerating into a "military field tribunal," a "troika," or a tribune of revolutionary legal consciousness) only so long as it strictly and unswervingly follows the Constitution and the law and the procedures and powers established by them. Otherwise, the courts themselves become tools of uncontrolled politics and tyranny. And then the very phenomenon of the law disappears, and people have no reliable refuge left where they can take shelter from tyranny and lawlessness. It was with good reason that the Romans said: Let justice triumph, though the whole world may perish.

Many social scientists, who until just recently were defending and ennobling the totalitarian repressive system and the communist utopia and myths, are now starting to take extremely radical positions. The paradox is perfectly understandable. They need, however, to take into account the fact that the key criterion that distinguishes Bolshevism from democracy is the attitude toward law and legal justice and their values and specific features; to respect the institutions that implement the principles of law in society; and finally, simply to know about all this.

View From the Editors. We apologize to S. Alekseyev and the members of the Constitutional Oversight Committee for the "inaccuracies and improprieties" in A. Butenko's article "August 91." We would also like to explain that the assessments of any event by the authors of articles in today's renewed PRAVDA are not reduced, as was formerly the case, to any sort of common denominator. They may not and often do not coincide with the opinion of the newspaper's journalists. So we consider debate among authors to be a normal phenomenon; it can and should help illuminate the truth.

It may be that readers will in some respects disagree with the conclusions of S. Alekseyev. But in our view the chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee has raised an extremely important subject—the subject of the unswerving adherence to legality. Today, alas, opinions to the effect that at critical times a nontraditional approach to the requirements of the Constitution, laws, and so forth is permissible and even necessary are not uncommon. And one cannot even count the examples of an arbitrary treatment of legal norms. We are grateful to the author of the article "The Putsch and Legal Justice," who states his uncompromising stand on this account. Let us hope that other of our legal specialists, wherever they may be employed, will take a firm stand in defense of legality.

Text of Gorbachev Aide Chernyayev's 'Foros' Diary

924B0014A Text of Gorbachev Aide Chernyayev's 'Foros' Diary

[Article by A. Chernyayev: "Foros, August-91: President's Aide Anatoliy Chernyayev's Diary"]

[Text] A few preliminary explanations. I began making these entries on 21 August, when I was still being blockaded with the President. But I did not have time to finish them. In the text I shall indicate what was written there, on the spot, and what was written during the first days after arriving in Moscow.

The text, as the reader will notice, is "telegraphic" in places. Therefore a certain decipherment is needed. Olga is Olga Vasilyevna Lanina, an administrative aide in the President's secretariat. Tamara, or Toma, is Tamara Alekseyevna Aleksandrova, an administrative aide for myself as the President's aide. Shakh is Shakhnazarov. The initials M. S. and R. M. are obvious [M. S. is Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and R. M. is Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva]. "Yuzhnyy" [Southern] is a sanatorium about 12 km from the President's dacha, where Olga, Tamara, and I lived and where we drove during the day for lunch. We worked in an official area about 50 meters from the dacha.

When I was writing there, every half-hour I would turn on the Mayak [Beacon]; in between the news items there would be "symphonies," which, under the conditions, sickened me. Was it really necessary? To use a great classic work to cover over a dirty affair? So I immediately

recorded the information from the Mayak: those places are printed in different type. The footnotes were added later, when the text was being sent to the press.

There is something else: I did not plan to publish these notes. I made them in accordance with my habit of keeping a diary, hoping that "people don't burn manuscripts," although this time there was not much hope of that. If, however, they remained intact, I wanted to leave them for my "memoirs in retirement." But the absurdities, misunderstandings, and deliberate vilification of the President in the mass media forced me to change my intention.

21 August 1991. Crimea. "Zarya" [Dawn] dacha.

Apparently it is time to write a journal of the events. No one other than me will write it. Also, I had proven to be a witness to a turning point in history.

On the 18th, on Sunday, after lunch at "Yuzhnyy," Olga and I returned "to the job." Tamara (since it was Sunday) asked if she could remain at "Yuzhnyy." Actually, there was nothing to do. The speech for the signing of the Union Treaty was ready. He had made changes in it several times, constantly asking Shakhnazarov and me (Shakhnazarov was staying at "Yuzhnyy" here and never showed up "at work", but kept in touch with M. S. by telephone) to expand it, and also asking me to improve the style.

So, at about 1600 hours Olga and I drove into the dacha area. As usual, two militia vehicles were parked near the driveway. A tape with spikes in it was lying on the ground, but it was moved aside for us. (Footnote: Incidentally, that tape, unlike the situation last year and the year before last, always lay on the ground from the moment of the President's arrival in the Crimea, rather than from the day of the putsch.)

At about 1700 hours Olga came running up, asking, "Anatoliy Sergeyevich, what's happening?" Boldin arrived by vehicle. Baklanov and Shenin were with him, and also a tall general wearing eyeglasses. I did not know him (it turned out later that he was Varennikov). I looked through the door... a large number of vehicles had accumulated near the driveway to our "official" building. All of them had antennas, some of them had emergency lights... there was a crowd of drivers and guards. I looked through the window, in the direction of the building where M. S. was living... a gloomy-faced Plekhanov was walking along the path. In the distance, on the balcony, I could see Boldin.

Olga said, "Anatoliy Sergeyevich, all this looks bad... Do you know that the communication has been cut off?" I lifted the receiver... one, then another, then a third, including the SK (Footnote: Direct communication by way of space, which is used by all the special telephone operators, who are located in a special area several km from the President's dacha), but there was nothing but silence. We began to make guesses. Aloud I made a wild guess about some kind of new accident at a nuclear power station (inasmuch as Baklanov...): the night

before, there had been a report about problems at the Tiraspol AES [nuclear electric power station] and at one of the Chernobyl units...

But the situation proved to be... much worse than that!

Four people were with M. S..

Plekhanov, Generalov (his deputy), and Medvedev were sitting on the parapet of a flight of stairs under my window... They would look around when I approached the window... I turned on the transistor radio... ordinary broadcasts. Later that day there was a report that M. S. had been present at a certain regularly-scheduled conference, and his message to Nadzhibulla on the occasion of "their" holiday (I myself had written all of it...) had been transmitted.

Approximately an hour later, the four people left. Plekhanov also left, taking with him Medvedev, the President's personal lawyer. That in itself was a sign. So when I spoke to Olga concerning the AES, I realized that we were talking about Gorbachev.

Communication was completely cut off.

While Olya and I were driving here, she had asked if she could be allowed to leave a bit early, at about 1700 hours, in order to take a swim, etc. But the car had not come for her. I told the driver that he should come for me at 1830 hours. But he did not come for me. Through the guard who was on duty, I asked if the person who had been left behind as the senior person would explain to me what was happening.

In about 10 minutes, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Generalov appeared... he and I were well acquainted from our trips abroad with M. S.—he usually headed the President's security there... He's a very polite person. I asked Olga to leave. He sat down. "Anatoliy Sergeyevich," he said, "understand me correctly. I have been left here as the senior person. I have been ordered not to let anyone leave. Even if I were to let you leave, you would be immediately detained by the border guards: they are situated in a semicircle from sea to sea in three ranks. The Sevastopol-Yalta road is closed in this sector. As you can see, there are already three ships at sea"...

I asked a naive question: How will things go tomorrow with the signing of the Union Treaty? He said, "There will be no signing. The aircraft that had arrived for M. S. has been sent back to Moscow. The garages with his cars here on the territory have been locked with lead seals and are being guarded not by my people, but by people with automatic weapons who have been specially sent here.

"I cannot release even the large number of service personnel (the local people—gardeners, cooks, cleaning ladies). I do not know where I will be able to put them up here."

Again I asked naively, "But what am I supposed to do... I have things at 'Yuzhnyy', and, after all, it's suppertime! Tamara Alekseyevna (my secretary) is rushing around

there. She can't understand anything. She can't get a telephone call through to anyone..."

He said, "I can't do anything. You must understand me, Anatoliy Sergeyevich. I'm in the military. I have been given orders... No one is to be allowed to leave! Not to go anywhere. And there is to be no communication."

Then he left...

Olga returned. She's a lively, alert, and intelligent person (she was married recently and has a child who is a year and a half old, and a husband, Kolya—who is a member of the guard here!!). She began criticizing Boldin, who was her chief long ago. She hasn't been able to stand him for a long time. "Why did he show up here"... To show that he can already start licking the new bosses'...?", etc.

Time went by slowly.

It was turning dark when the newly assigned (to replace Medvedev), pleasant, handsome Boris reported that M. S. was asking to let me out... He said that he was taking a stroll here, near the house.

I got dressed quickly. As I walked along, I wondered how he would look now... how was he??

(1000 hours. There was a report over the Mayak from the Moscow commandant—during the night there had been the first conflicts, an attack on BTR's [armored personnel carriers] and patrols at Smolenskaya Ploschad (near my building), in front of the building that houses the RSFSR Supreme Council, and in front of the VS [Supreme Council] hospital—there had been people killed and wounded. So this was the first blood. The commandant heaped all the blame on "hooligan elements" and criminals...)

(At 1200 hours, over the Mayak: Ivashko announced in a message to Yanayev: the PB [Politburo] and Central Committee Secretariat cannot make a judgment about the events until there is a meeting with CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev! This is yes!... Especially after this. (Footnote: That is, after the spilled blood.)

So, M. S.; R. M.; Irochka, his daughter; and Tolya, his son-in-law were standing near the entrance to his house. They were joking: some were cold, others were warm. M. S. was wearing a warm jacket because two days before that his old radiculitis had hit him in the small of the back, but it had already passed. M. S. said that "they had asked him to take care of himself." In general he is afraid of drafts.

He was calm and even-tempered, and was smiling. "Well," he asked, "do you know what happened?"

"No, how could I know anything? I could only observe things from the window. I saw Plekhanov and Blondin. They say there's some big general wearing eyeglasses... and Baklanov."

"The general is Varennikov. He was the most active one. So listen to me. I want you to know."

R. M. joined in: "They came in without asking, without giving any warning. Plekhanov was leading them—in front of him, the entire guard was clearing a path. It was completely unexpected. I was sitting in an armchair. They walked past me and only Baklanov said hello to me... As for Boldin!.. with whom I had shared my innermost thoughts for 15 years, whom everyone treated as a member of the family, to whom we all confided everything, even the most intimate things!!!!..."

M. S. stopped her.

"Listen," he said. "They sat down. I asked them what I could do for them. Baklanov began, but Varennikov spoke more than the others. Shenin remained silent. Boldin broke in once and asked, 'Mikhail Sergeyevich, are we really to believe that you don't understand what the situation is?' I told him, 'You *mudak*! You ought to keep quiet if you've come to lecture me on the situation in the country.'" He pronounced the word *mudak* "in front of the ladies"... Irochka began laughing and interpreted: he meant "mutant," which was very apt. In general she is an intelligent and educated person.)

In a word, M. S. continued, "They have offered me two alternatives: either I hand over my powers to Yanayev and agree to the introduction of a state of emergency, or I give up the presidency. They tried to blackmail me." (He did not explain how.) "I told them: you can guess that I won't take either action. You have undertaken a coup d'etat. What you want to do—with this Committee, etc.—is unconstitutional and illegal. This is an adventure that will lead to blood, to civil war. The general began trying to prove to me that they would 'make sure that that won't happen.' I told him, 'Excuse me, Comrade Varennikov, but I don't remember your first name and patronymic.'"

"He said, 'Valentin Ivanovich.'"

"All right, then. Valentin Ivanovich, society is not a battalion. Left face! Forward march! Your undertaking will be interpreted as a terrible tragedy. Everything that has already begun to get well established will be ruined... All right: you will suppress absolutely everything and everyone. You will disband everything. You will put the troops everywhere. Then what? You have caught me at work on my article." (Footnote: He was immediately taken aback when they arrived... I had been assembling his thoughts of recent months that had been published or not been published, adding certain things of my own, "smoothing out" the text, etc. By 15 August there was already a 30-page text with, in particular, a detailed analysis of all kinds of ways out of the crisis that had been proposed from the left and from the right.)

"So the article also takes into consideration your alternative—the one with the state of emergency. I have thought everything out. I am convinced that this is a

ruinous path, and perhaps a bloody one... and it does not lead anywhere. Instead, it leads us backward, to the times before perestroika."

With that, they drove off.

We walked around in the darkness for about 15 more minutes. Everyone was vying with one another, asking what was going to happen next. M. S.: "They will have to promulgate it tomorrow. How will they explain 'my position'?" We discussed those who had arrived... I did not fail to interject that these are all "your" people, M. S. "You fostered them, you elevated them, you confided in them..." And Boldin... "Well, concerning Plekhanov," M. S. said, by-passing Boldin, "there's nothing to say: he's not a human being! What is he doing? He's concerned about his Motherland, so he betrays me? He's worrying about his own skin!"

As it turned out, the next day Medvedev told Plekhanov as soon as he arrived "what was what." He wrote a report with a request to get him away from M. S.!! The guys from the guard unit of which he was the chief were grieved: Vladimir Timofeyevich had not been authorized even to say goodbye to them.

I returned to my own place and I began worrying about Tamara. She was there, at "Yuzhnyy"... in panic. She could not understand anything or get in touch with anyone. She was probably running back and forth from Primakov to Shakh, from Shakh to Krasin (Footnote: Yu. A. Krasin—rector of the former Institute of Social Sciences, with whom I have been acquainted for a long time. He was staying at "Yuzhnyy.") She kept begging to learn something... anything at all. The next day I mentioned her to Generalov, and asked to send her to Moscow and to help her to get a ticket. He said that no one could possibly get a ticket now (really? not even he couldn't get a ticket!...).

"But what degree of readiness is she in?"

"What?"

"We have a military aircraft that will be leaving today. It will be carrying the communication apparatus and several communications specialists and a sick person from the guard."

"Then take Tamara too!"

"Okay. I'll send a car right now to get her."

"But make sure that she packs my suitcase, and have someone bring it here."

My suitcase was brought to me late in the evening. Several things were missing. Not only some bottles (I had French cognac, whiskey, and Spanish wine, that I had brought from Moscow), but also... a suit, as well as my notebook with telephone numbers. I had to send again for the suit. Tamara had apparently been in panic when she threw everything into the suitcase, and wasn't thinking clearly.

It was reported to me that she had been given a place in the aircraft. But yesterday, over the BBC, it was stated that the persons who were being detained with the President were V. A. Medvedev (an aide who was staying with his wife at Nizhnyaya Ariadna and had never been here); A. S. Chernyayev, an aide; G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, an aide... That is, they had heard the ring. But something else was stated over the BBC about Khosroyevich: he had apparently wanted to make a break, and had been detained.

On the 1500 TV News. Yeltsin in the Russian parliament; Gorbachev in isolation in the Crimea. Decision—send here Rutskoy and Silayev, plus other deputies. Bakatin made a statement there. The announcer, in an excited tone of voice, gave his speech in detail... I imagine to myself...: a coup d'etat. Gorbachev, at least on Sunday, was completely healthy, if one discounts the radiculitis (apparently he had learned this from Primakov). Illegal things were going on. Deputies from the USSR VS [Supreme Council] would be invited to the Russian parliament. Intensive efforts were currently under way to process them. And—allegedly according to unconfirmed information—the board of the Ministry of Defense had made the decision to withdraw the armored equipment from Moscow...

The parliament gave a minute of silence to honor those who had fallen that night "on its approaches."

So, Mikhail Sergeyevich, where are the people being verified... Bakatin, whom you shoved aside, being afraid of all these Lukyanovs, Yanayevs, etc.!

It was not until today, after my persistent demands, that it was reported to me from Generalov that Tamara, like the other people in that military aircraft, had flown to Moscow and then a car from the Central Committee supposedly came for her and drove her home. Thank God. Incidentally, it would be confirmed soon: in accordance with a request from me and Gorbachev, Olga was authorized (with an escort, of course) to make a trip to Mukhalatka and to telephone home: she had an infant son and a father who had had a heart attack. They had not known anything about her for several days. I asked if she could also call home for me, and also call Tamara. Would they allow her to?

In the morning of the 19th, as soon as I heard over the Mayak about the Committee for the Emergency Situation, I began thinking of how to conduct myself with M. S.—should I wait for him to call? That is, should I act in accordance with the previous subordination? No, I shouldn't do that: he must be convinced that I am still loyal to him. And, also, he needs support. I went to see him. For a long time I wandered through the building until his granddaughter discovered me. She led me upstairs to her grandfather. He was lying on the bed—he had just had a medical procedure: radiculitis had been "donated" to him. But he jumped up in good spirits.

"You know, Anatoliy... when I spoke with these people, not a single muscle of mine was shaking. I was completely calm. I'm also calm now. I am convinced that I

am right. I am convinced that this is an adventure and I hope to God that it won't have any bloodshed... I remained silent... They won't succeed in restoring order, in bringing in the harvest, in starting up the economy... They won't succeed! It's a criminal adventure!"

Olya was driven to Mukhalatka (Footnote: The presidential dacha's communication center for communicating with the outside world; situated about 20 km from the dacha). The driver was "Volodya," who had been assigned to us since the very beginning and who used to drive us three times a day from "Yuzhnyy," back and forth. He dropped by at my office. He didn't say hello, but simply said, "Is Lanina here? I've been ordered to drive her to the telephone." I stood up and extended my hand to him... He delayed a while and then flabbily extended his own hand. I noticed a change in him as early as when he made the trip to pick up my suitcase. For him I was already a criminal, a prisoner. When she returned, Olga said, "In the car he sat as far away from me as he could, as though I was a leper." She was also escorted by someone from GB [State Security]—a communications specialist. He sat across from her when she got in touch with Moscow—he was monitoring everything she said, so that he could cut her off immediately if she began to say anything extraneous. "I couldn't stop crying," she said. "My brother kept shouting, 'What's the matter with you?' It was complete chaos. And they wouldn't let me call your wife. They had been told that I could make just one telephone call!"

In general, we were made to understand what kind of people they took us for. In the roadstead at night Olga counted approximately 16 combat vessels, including PL [submarines]. During the daytime, in the fog, not all of them were visible. I asked Olga, "When you were driving, what did you see on the road?" "The road was closed. There were border guards at every step of the way."

Continuing with M. S.. In the evening on the 19th he called me again... No, it was not quite evening... maybe about 1800 hours. He and the entire family had gone to the beach... Because it was already impossible to speak inside the house—there were "bugs" everywhere (in any case there was a simply panic-like fear, especially on the part of R. M. that there were).

"When we went down to the beach," he said, "my youngest granddaughter pressed up against me and took me by the hand. She said, 'I've got cards (she had a deck of cards in her little hands). This one's the king, and this one's the queen... no, it's the jack. This one—oh! I forgot' (it was the ten). I told her, 'That's okay. But what suit is it?' (I didn't even know whether she knew the word.) 'Chervivyy' [worm-eaten; instead of *chervonnyy*, clubs]."

R. M. came into the cabana where M. S. and I were sitting. Everyone else had gone into the water. She feverishly tore several clean pieces of paper out of a notebook, handed them over to me, and kept digging for a long time in her purse. Finally she found a pencil and

handed it over to me. "I'll leave you both alone," she said. "Yes, yes," he said curtly, impatiently (which was unusual for him when talking to her!), "we have to work." She smiled and waved goodbye to me.

"Tolya! We have to do something. I'll bear down on this no-good" (he had in mind General Generalov, Plekhanov's deputy, who had been left behind as the chief gendarme to guard us, the chief of the "internal" guard). "I'll make demands every day. Then I'll make more."

"Yes, M. S., I agree. I doubt whether the gang in Moscow will react to that. But we can't allow them to think that you have resigned yourself to the situation..."

"Write this," he said. "1. I demand the restoration of governmental communication immediately... 2. I demand the immediate sending of an aircraft so that I can return to work."

"If they don't answer, I'll demand tomorrow that they send journalists, both Soviet and foreign ones."

I wrote down what he said. He said, "Make sure that they don't take the notes away from you while en route." "They won't!" (I said that confidently because during the day, when I was on my way to see him, the sentry in the sentry box in front of the official building stopped me on the way to the dacha and asked me, "Who are you?")

"An aide."

"Where are you going?"

"It's easy to guess," I said, pointing to the President's dacha.

"It's not allowed."

I blew up and began berating him. Suddenly, from behind me, Oleg jumped up (he was one of the personal guard), and told him, "March back to your sentry box. And don't you ever approach him" (pointing his finger at me) "like this. Anatoliy Sergeyevich, please continue on your way."

I'd like to make a digression. It is important. It does a lot to maintain an atmosphere of some minimal hope. In any case, the hope that we will not be taken by bare hands. And if they attempt this, it will cost dearly. There is the personal guard, to which "the public" usually takes a disdainful attitude. And these guys have shown themselves to be real knights. Their chiefs, Plekhanov and Medvedev, betrayed them too, and betrayed the President. But they have not faltered. Day and night, as their shifts replace one another, these calm, tense, strong guys with their pistols and mini-rations, some of them armed with semiautomatic weapons... at all the "vital" points around the dacha, sometimes hidden in the bushes. They were ready to take a life-or-death stand: both because of the oath that they had taken to do their duty, and also, chiefly, in a human way, because of the nobility of their spirit.

Yesterday morning Olya said, "A. S., why do you keep sitting in your office... Let's go for a swim. The guys" (that is, the guard—she knows this from her husband) "are not allowed to go into the water. But I don't think they will stop us. But they won't let us through without you."

"Well, where do you want to go?"

"Over there, behind the house, where the dining hall and the garages are located, where most of the guys live. There's a place where you can go down to the water. True, it's steep and there are rocks there, and you might fall. But people want to go anyway."

I agreed. N. F. (Footnote: Nikolay Feodosyevich Pokutniy, the President's second personal physician) brought me back something on a plate from the dining hall. I ate it. Olya dropped by with Larisa (a nurse) and Tatyana—a big, kind-hearted woman, a masseuse.

They left. The first sentry looked at us very suspiciously. He did not stop us, but immediately reported over his walkie-talkie: "Chernyayev has started to go somewhere." When we were passing the service building, guys from the guard whom we knew ran out toward us. They had a ball with them (there is a playing field right there). I asked them, "Are you getting a bit of relaxation?..." "Well, what else is there to do, A. S.?... We're not allowed to go anywhere. It's so hot here. It's boring!"

We got as far as the footpath, and then we went down the steep slope on homemade steps... The descent was about 100 meters. Halfway down, Olya told me, "Look behind you!" I did so. A person was walking behind us. We descended to the water. Between large boulders you can make your way into the way. A small piece of ground. Three wooden mats were lying there. Larisa lay down on one to get a suntan. Three of us went into the water. You could break a leg as you made your way to a place deep enough to swim. I made a few strokes and turned over onto my back. The bruiser who had been walking behind us kept talking into the telephone. Larisa told me later on that he had said into the telephone, "Chernyayev is here. I'm sitting here"... (There was a telephone in the cabana... because the people in the guard swam here... in case they had to make a call...).

On the right was a border tower. Two soldiers had trained all their telescopes and field glasses on us. In front of us were a cutter and a speedboat... They started up the engines. A frigate was looming up about 100 meters away.

Why, then, did they need the bruiser from the guard?... To catch me if I started swimming to Turkey? He couldn't catch me: I swim better than he does (he's much heavier). It was obvious: so that we would know that we were not free to do as we pleased, to know that we were being observed everywhere, and that we were semi-prisoners... Psychological pressure.

After a half-hour we came out. He was "looking off to the side," not acting suspiciously. We started to go up the steps. We could hear him talking into the telephone, "Chernyayev is going back up!" (Footnote: Yes... I remember... While we were still on our way back from our swim, Oleg came out to meet us. He said, "M. S. wants to see you... But it's not urgent... but... bring the 'material' with you." Just in case, I picked up a copy of the article. That is apparently what he had in mind. I leafed through it, marking the places where he sharply censured the "way out" with the aid of the state of emergency.)

The women persuaded me to go swimming again today. We're on our way to the water. I tell them, "I just don't like doing this..." Tanya reacts, saying, "I also would prefer not to do this, but I want to irritate these sons of bitches."

The "procedure" is the same as the first time: a member of the guard (true, a different one) began coming down the steps behind us. Without having time to undress, he said loudly into the telephone, "Objective is here. I am staying here..." But this time, up at the top near where the path begins, yet another border guard with a dog appeared.

We began swimming. We could see Tolya and Irishka observing us from the dacha balcony. Down below, closer to the "president's" beach, Generalov and about five more persons had got into position, looking through their field glasses. Later on, he "deemed it necessary to inform" Olga that he had seen us swimming.

After this, M. S. told me, "Don't go far away from the building... or, in any case, without my knowledge..." What did he have in mind?..

Yesterday I went to see him immediately after my "swim." Once again I walked for a long time through the building until the cook pointed me to the office where he was. He came out to meet me, and immediately, from another room, R. M. also came out... She immediately took me by the arm and led me out onto the balcony, indicating with her other hand the lamps, the ceiling, the furniture—the "bugs." We stood there for a while, leaning on the railing. I said, "R. M., do you see that cliff with the border tower on the top of it... Behind it, where the road turns, is Tesseli. Before this dacha was built, there used to be a wild, deserted 'beach' here... Actually, it wasn't any kind of a beach—the boulders made it rather difficult to get into the water. Well, I stayed several times at Tesseli. I would swim here... from behind that cliff. I would lie on the beach here and then I would swim back."

She was only half-listening to me. Then she got very excited when I continued, "You probably know that I swim very well, don't you? Swimming five km, or even 10, is no problem for me. Should I take the risk?"

I was smiling when I said that. She perked up her ears. For a long time she looked straight at me—that is, she

was seriously thinking that this "alternative" might be possible. Prior to this, in a rapid whisper, she had told me how, at 0300 hours, having curtained themselves off in an inner room, Tolya's chamber, they had photographed M. S.'s statement... "We tore it out of the cassette," she said (but she concealed the fact that it had been photographed in two versions, in addition to a statement by physician Igor Anatolyevich)... "So I will pack the film in a small package and will give it to you tonight... But, for God's sake, don't keep it on your person... they might search you... and don't hide it in your office." At that point M. S. interrupted and advised me to hide it in my swim trunks. I dry them out on the little balcony outside Olya and Toma's room, where their typewriters are located. She's lying down there right now.

M. S. took a skeptical attitude toward the idea—even if I swam to Tesseli, to Foros, or even to "Yuzhnyy," even if I didn't get caught in the water, and came out of the water naked, what then? They would send to the closest border station and the film would be lost... But we discussed the situation seriously... even though the alternative was obviously absurd. But I was "proposing" it to him as a joke, in order somehow to dispel his nervous state.

R. M. gave me the film after lunch... In the meantime M. S. asked her to take care of the children. He and I went over to another balcony, stood near the railing, and immediately saw the telescopes on the tower turn toward us and the border patrol on a nearby cliff watching us with field glasses... Simultaneously we heard from the sentry box down below, under the building, someone saying into a telephone, "Objective has gone out onto the balcony. Second person is on the right!..." M. S. and I looked around. I burst out laughing and began cursing "them"... He looked at me: previously I would have not allowed myself to do this in his presence... (I regretted what I had done, because he would think that now I could do that!)

We sat down at a table. He put a notebook in front of himself. He asked me to sit down opposite him—one of us with his back to the sun, and the other facing the sun. I asked him, "Could we sit side-by-side? I don't like the sun. Unlike you and Bush... Don't you recall how, at Novo-Ogarevo, he changed places with me when the sun came out from behind the wall and I had left—he sat down next to you in the shadows..." M. S. smiled, evidently recalling that meeting with Bush as an episode from ancient history.

He began dictating his statement—his Message to the nation and the international community. We discussed and formulated every point. I went back to my office. Olya typed it on *shervashka* (Footnote: Especially heavy paper, intended for the President's notes). That evening I asked him to put down his signature, the date, and the place... He signed at the top, and added that this statement should be made public by any means by everyone into whose hands it might fall... When I was leaving, R. M. again began giving my strict instructions: telling

me that I should hide the film well and how I should carry it, so that I would not be search while en route... These fears seem to me to be the fruit of nervous overstrain... In general, since I war I have had a somewhat atrophied sense of physical danger.

Yesterday she gave me her book, "Ya nadeyus" [I Hope], which had been sent to her on the 17th...—a prepublication copy. She asked me to read it that evening... I read it and I praised it highly. That greatly pleased... M. S.. His eyes even began to moisten. I assured them that the book would travel across the world, that people would snatch it up... and people in our country would do so also (R. M. doubted that it would be printed now). "You can't remain silent, no matter what happens," I assured her... In general, by my entire appearance and behavior, I attempted to show her that "everything will turn out all right"... They met me with a certain heightened hope... couldn't I give them some "good piece of news"... They asked me what I had heard over the Mayak (over an antediluvian VEF that happened to be in Olga and Tamara's room). How did I evaluate what I had heard? What, in general, did I think about what would happen tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, or in a week? I answered, "in a manner to which I am not accustomed," in a self-assured and up-beat manner... All this time R. M. was in extreme tension, and didn't smile even once. On the other hand, her daughter—Ira—was very self-confident, fearless, and sharp... She was merciless in her words and "epithets" concerning what "they have done to them"... It turned out that she is an educated person with good taste... We changed over to "abstract" topics... which seemingly were not apropos. Her husband, Tolya, is a surgeon at the 1st Gradskaya... He is intelligent, self-assured, "a bruiser," her "support"...

So I never brought them any "news items." And our "discussions" constantly dealt with the arrival of Boldin and Co... Which we got by fits and starts from the small Sony (Footnote: Currently I have been asked: (after the press conference with M. S., after the "Vzglyad" interview, at that splendid dacha didn't the President have anything other than that "matchbox?") That's right. We didn't have anything else. Because all the "electronics" that had been built into the rooms were "chopped out" at the very first moment that the "gang of four" arrived... as was the TV antenna that served the entire "zone.") that proved to be in Tolya's room.

All this time R. M. carried with her a small silk purse. Obviously it contained the things she kept most secret, and that she would part with last of all... She was very afraid of a humiliating search... She was afraid for M. S., who would be completely shaken by this. She was constantly in a nervous condition. It was in that condition that she handed over to me during the evening the film that had been wrapped in paper and sealed with Scotch tape.

"We have already sent other versions. It's best if I don't tell you to whom they were sent. This is for you. No, not for you..."

"Why not for me? After all, I continue to enjoy my rights as a people's deputy: I want to be at the session of the Supreme Council on the 26th that was announced by Lukyanov."

M. S.: "You want to do what?"

Me: "To do this, of course. To get onto that rostrum a witness of your fatal disease and incapacity—even those cretins guess that that's impossible..."

R. M.: "Anatoliy Sergeyevich! It's necessary to go through Olya. She has a child. Her parents are ill, you said... But will she agree? Because this is very dangerous..."

Me: "She will agree. This is a 'desperate' woman and she hates them passionately, and also because they have cut her off from her Vasya..."

R. M.: "But you warn her thoroughly. Tell her to hide it... somewhere in the most intimate place ... in her brassiere or in her panties, perhaps... As for you, when you go back to your room, where are you going to keep this film now? Don't keep it in your pocket. Carry it in your hand and hide it... But don't put it in the safe... Put it somewhere in the corridor, under the doormat..."

But I put it in my pocket anyway. I waited until that evening to tell Olga. She was sitting quietly in an armchair. Symphonic music was playing over the Mayak—it was driving both of us crazy. But the silence was even worse. I would switch it only only at every half-hour, to get the news. But frequently they were about sports or cultural life. The program one night was about... a visit by the wife of the president to Bolivia in Peru, where she engaged in some activities connected with philanthropy or some festival. The height of idiocy. I thought immediately—and sensed it sharply and physically—that the gang was returning us to the information environment of the worse times of the stagnation.

Emergency reports again. At 1630 hours the Mayak began with the announcer's excited voice, saying, "We, the workers of television and radio, refuse to execute orders or to subordinate ourselves to the so-called Committee for the Emergency Situation. We have been deprived of the opportunity to provide objective and complete information. We demand the removal from their positions of the television and radio administrators who have completely discredited themselves. If we manage to get on the air again, we shall honestly fulfill our professional duty."

Bakatin and Primakov (that fine guy, Zhenka, had broken through to Moscow!), as a member of the SB, states that GKChP [State Committee for the Emergency Situation] is illegal and unconstitutional... And so are all its decrees. Gorbachev is healthy and is being kept in isolation. It is

necessary immediately to get him to return to Moscow. If not, he should have the opportunity to meet with the press.

Nishanov and Laptev—the chairmen of the houses—have held an emergency session of the committees.

Lukyanov has flown to the Crimea to meet with M. S. Gorbachev.

And, best of all: **Minoborony** [Ministry of Defense], having analyzed the situation that has developed as a result of the introduction of the state of emergency in a number of places, has made a decision to send troops there immediately from those places (that is, not simply armored equipment, but also troops entirely—that is, paratroopers, etc.).

With whom do Yanayev and Pugo, plus their general Kalinin—the Moscow commandant—remain in the face of the nation?

At about 6 o'clock it was announced over the space-communications system that the entire session of the RSFSR VS would be relayed!

It was already about 2300 hours (Footnote: On the 20th). I turned on the television to full power. I squatted down in front of Olya's knees.

"Olya, this is a serious matter. Are you ready to listen to what I have to say? But it's very serious. If you want to, even before I begin, you can refuse to listen to me."

"What are you talking about, Anatoliy Sergeyevich! It's as though you don't know me! So, please talk." So I told her.

"All right. Let's assume that I get to Moscow. Then what? They will certainly be keeping track of me..."

"Yes, of course. We discussed that with M. S. and R. M. And we came to an understanding. It will be completely natural if you drop by to see my wife. I'll write a letter to her... they'll certainly send it to her, just as they would send a letter from prison. I'll tell her that everything is all right, don't worry, I'll be coming back soon, the circumstances... etc. In the event that you might be searched in the plane or at the airport, you'll actually have to hide the small package with the film in a 'modest' place. Then this is what you'll have to do: if you manage to get the film to Moscow, go to [Ulitsa] Vesnina to see my wife. Give her the letter and this item. Tell her to telephone Lena—Bovin's wife. They know one another. She should tell her to come to see her—Lena, that is, rather than Bovin himself: he's too noticeable a figure, and he's still under suspicion, especially after his little question at the press conference of Yanayev and Co. Have my wife give her this item, and she can give it to Sasha. He will know immediately what has to be done."

Olga took the film and put it anyway in her blue jeans (Footnote: And that is how she got that small package to Moscow. When everyone "broke out" together, she returned it to me. I returned it to Gorbachev, and he

showed it at the press conference). But the package kept bulging out of the pocket... I chuckled as I pointed my finger at "that certain spot" where she should hide it... We attempted this morning to move Generalov to pity, or even to blackmail him slightly, saying that we could not keep sitting here forever and that he would have to answer for having carried out this outrage on a young mother about whom no one at home had known anything for days... But he "outplayed" me: he organized for Olya a trip under guard to Mukhalatka, so that she could make a telephone call home, once again under observation... I have already mentioned that.

Then follows some text that was written in Moscow, during the first days after my return, with additions before being handed over to the press.

At about 1700 hours on the 21st, all three women—Olga, Larisa, and Tatyana—in a state of great agitation. "Anatoliy Sergeyevich," they say, "look at what's happening." We ran out onto the balcony... ZIL vehicles were moving from the ramp from the entrance onto the grounds of the dacha, and moving toward them were guys from the guard, carrying their Kalashnikovs in the "port arms" position. They were shouting, "Halt!" The vehicles stopped. "Halt!" some other guys said from behind the bushes. The driver and someone else got out of the lead vehicle... They said something. The response given to them was "Stay where you are!" One of them started running to Gorbachev's dacha. Soon he returned, and the cars started driving to the left, behind the service building where my office, etc. were located.

I came out of my office. It is on the second floor. Right in front of me was the flight of stairs to the entrance door. I was wearing a crumpled T-shirt and sports pants that had already become my best trousers. The idea flashed through my mind—I look like a prisoner in a camp!

Then, following closely behind one another, Lukyanov, Ivashko, Baklanov, Yazov, and Kryuchkov came through the door. They were all wearing a beaten expression. Their faces were gloomy. Each of them bowed to me! I understood everything: they had come to plead guilty. I stood there as though I had been turned to stone. I was filled with rage. Even before they went into the room at the left, I turned around and showed them my back. Olga was standing alongside me, completely flushed, and with her dark eyes flashing triumphantly.

Larisa and big Tatyana ran into the office. Tatyana, who usually is so staid, strong, and calm, suddenly threw herself onto my neck and began sobbing. Then there was nervous laughter, all kinds of exclamations, and not too memorable remarks... In a word, there was the sensation that our confinement had come to an end. The dregs had come crashing down with their undertaking.

I got dressed and ran to see M. S. I must admit that I was afraid that he would begin to receive them... And it was especially necessary not to do that, because it was already known from television that a delegation from the

Russian parliament would be flying here. Gorbachev was sitting in his office, "issuing commands" over the telephone. He broke off his conversation and said, "I have just given them an ultimatum—if they don't turn on the communications, I will not talk with them. And now I won't have to."

In my presence he ordered the Kremlin commandant to take the Kremlin completely under his guard and not to release any of the participants in the putsch, no matter what pretext they gave. He ordered him to call to the telephone the commander of the Kremlin regiment, whom he ordered to put himself exclusively at the disposal of the Kremlin commandant. He called to the telephone the chief of governmental communication and the minister of communications, and demanded that they cut off all the communication from the participants in the putsch. Judging from their reaction, they were standing at attention at the other end of the line. I mentioned to him that their ZILs had a self-contained communications system... He called Boris and ordered him to "separate the passengers" from the cars.

Then he spoke to George Bush. It was a joyful conversation. M. S. thanked him for his support and solidarity. Bush congratulated him on his liberation and his return to the job...

M. S. also had a conversation with V. I. Shcherbakov and someone else—I forget who. The gist of it was, "I'll be arriving there and we can discuss everything." Before I arrived, he had spoken to Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, Kravchuk... and someone else. He told me about that.

As we walked along, he dispelled my fears, saying, "What are you talking about! How could you ever have thought anything like that? I am definitely not planning to see them, and particularly not Lukyanov and Ivashko."

Boris reported that the Russian delegation had appeared on the grounds of the dacha.

"Call over," M. S. said, "and have them go into the dining hall." In a couple of minutes we went there. I will remember for the rest of my life the scene that followed. Silayev and Rutskoy rushed up to embrace Gorbachev. There were exclamations and various loud words. People kept interrupting one another. Then Bakatin and Primakov. He greets the deputies. I look at them. All of them are among those guys who, both in the parliament and in the press, had repeatedly vilified M. S., had argued, had become indignant, had protested, but now the misfortune had instantaneously revealed that they were some kind of single entity and that, as such, they were necessary to the country. I even said loudly, as I observed this all-encompassing joy and all these embraces: "It looks like we have had a unification of the Center and Russia without any Union Treaty at all..."

We sat down at the table. Everything kept interrupting one another as they began telling what was going on in Moscow and what was going on here. It turned out - and for some reason this surprised me—that they did not

even know who was coming to see the President with the ultimatum or that, in general, that ultimatum existed.

Ivan Stepanovich and Aleksandr Vladimirovich were against having Gorbachev receive Kryuchkov and Co., who, essentially speaking, were being kept under guard in the service building. He said that, most likely, he would receive only Lukyanov and Ivashko, who apparently had arrived by air separately.

The conversation stretched out. By now it was 2200 hours. Rutskoy got involved in the situation. He is a strong, handsome person, and it's pleasant to watch him in action. The land stands on people like him.

"Mikhail Sergeyevich," he says, "it's time to discuss what we shall do now... We will not allow you onto the plane (the president's), on which they (!) appeared. We'll fly in my plane. It's at the same airfield, but far away from yours. It is being guarded reliably. I brought with me 40 lieutenant colonels, who are all armed. We will break through."

(It's worthwhile to discuss these lieutenant colonels. When M. S., after making a fake exit from a car alongside the president's airplane, in accordance with Rutskoy's plan, got back immediately into the car, which dashed off, toward Rutskoy's plane, which was about three-five km away. So, when M.S., wearing his woolen jacket that everyone saw him wearing on television at Vnukovo, left the car and started toward the plane, those officers, with their submachine guns, formed a guard and stood there until he went up the steps to the plane. Looking at that scene, I thought that there still exists an officer's honor in our army, and that honor is completely genuine. There is also a high intellectual level in that environment: suffice it to ask the same A. V. Rutskoy or Colonel N. S. Stolyarov, which also flew here as part of the group of deputies to save their President. We drove to the airport in the same car with them.)

Then the flight occurred. Rutskoy was in charge. He himself mentioned that on television... M.S. and his family were situated in a small compartment. He called me there. It was so crowded there that his granddaughters and grandsons lay down on the floor and soon fell asleep.

When I went in, he asked me in a happy tone of voice, "Well, who would you be now?" I answered, "A simple Soviet prisoner," but a former one. Everyone laughed excitedly. Silayev, Rutskoy, Primakov, and Bakatin came in. Also doctor Igor Anatolyevich. R. M. told them what had happened to her when they learned that the participants in the putsch were coming by vehicle to find out the state of Mikhail Sergeyevich's health, that now she was feeling better, but she had poor control of her hand. A lively discussion ensued: about people—how they are tested in such circumstances; and about immorality—the source of all crimes and misfortunes. There were toasts to a long life... And it was M. S. who said then, for the first time, "We are flying into a new era."

Many journals printed the photograph: Ira coming down the gangway (at Vnukovo), carrying her daughter, who was wrapped up in a blanket. She walked past the crowd that had encircled the President: I noticed that those people included not only those who were genuinely glad, but also those who probably felt that, for them personally, "the other way" would have been better. Irishka carried her daughter into the car that I happened to be standing next to, off to the side of the people who had crowded around M. S.. She jumped down onto the seat and began sobbing and shaking. I bent over to her and tried to say something to her. Her husband was seated next to her. He kept embracing her and patting her, trying to calm her down, but unsuccessfully. That scene, the final one for me at the airport, will remain a symbol of the tragedy that occurred not only there, at the dacha in the Crimea, but also the tragedy with the entire country. Irishka, a young Russian woman who, when face to face with misfortune, had been full of energy, completely controlled, and firmly resolved and ready for everything, now—after "all that" had ended—exploded in tears of despair and joy. It was an emotional discharge. But, later on, things would have to get back to normal, and she would have to do her job.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Editor Suggests Gorbachev Knew Coup Was Imminent

914B04384 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 20 Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* editor in chief Anatoliy Yurkov: "Did Gorbachev Know About the Plot?"]

[Text] Did Gorbachev know that they would try to topple him? What a naive question—sure, he knew! He simply could not help knowing, incidentally, as well as our colleagues who out of a professional habit peruse newspapers knew. They are now trying to conduct "a private investigation," apparently in the belief that two general procurators, the Union and the Russian one, are not the right bunch to ferret out the truth.

Why do I suppose that they could not but know?

As early as on 3 July 1991, in the article "Instigators at Work," published on the first page of *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*, our staff correspondent Ivan Mordvintsev issued the first documented report on an action being prepared against Gorbachev, not a report in general, and not about a plot in general—such "general warnings" were a dime a dozen, just as current fantasies are—but an absolutely specific factual report, both in terms of chronology and geography. In particular, he described how a certain representative from the center (first name, patronymic, and last name) came to Volgograd and incited local citizens united in monolithic party cells to topple Gorbachev and restore order in the country. When "the local citizens" refused to support him after all, and asked who had sent him out with dubious powers, the envoy responded that many of them were

traveling throughout the country, on a strictly individual basis and exclusively on their own initiative, but to be sure, with business trip papers.

Gorbachev knew about this—by this I mean the article in *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*—and paid very close attention to it because on the eve of the last (July) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee he held a closed-door conference of the first secretaries of republic committees, kray committees, and oblast committees of the party. At the conference, an acrimonious discussion began concerning responsibility for the state of affairs in the country and on "how to answer to the people." Mikhail Sergeyevich told one of such champions of the people, who had difficulty answering, frankly and openly: If a party leader of this rank does not know what to tell the people, it would perhaps be better for him to quit (I do not vouch for the stenographic accuracy of the text but this was the sense of the discussion).

A retort flew in from the floor: "It is a question of who must quit first." It was supported by other authors to the hum of approval of the audience.

Mikhail Sergeyevich responded to this: "I know who is endeavoring 'to have Gorbachev go' and how; I read this in *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*."

They yelled from the floor: "It is a provocation."

"On whose part?"

"On the part of *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*."

Gorbachev said: "Let us ask Comrade Anipkin, the first secretary of the Volgograd Oblast Committee of the party. Let him stand up and say whose provocation that was."

The audience fell silent.

Anipkin did not stand up, and neither did he say anything while sitting down.

I was instructed to prepare to provide explanations at a plenum on the following day regarding the article from Volgograd and also other articles which maintained that "work was underway" against Gorbachev.

Surprisingly, the plenum went by quietly and serenely, except for the criticism of General Secretary Gorbachev by Moscow party secretary Yu. Prokofyev, the tone of which was provocative. Perhaps, his criticism was even more of a personal attack than traditional criticism by Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov which everyone had already gotten used to. However, this time Ivan Kuzmich kept silent. A.I. Lukyanov made a prophetic speech instead: The party will not survive without the president...

Perhaps, this was all. There was a lull, as if they had decided not "to show themselves" ahead of time, despite their "mutiny" the day before. Nobody brought up *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* and its denunciatory presentations. Did they lie low? And yet, all speeches by those

"not ours" were greeted by shouts bordering at times on unprintable curses by a large group of military men. However, nobody paid special attention to them any longer; they have become a regular attribute of the last Central Committee plenums.

Why do I so forcefully invite the attention of the readers to those articles in *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*?

It is one thing to know that both the extreme right and the extreme left are unhappy with you and do not disguise this unhappiness, and it is another one to know that they are preparing to deprive you, a president of the USSR, of constitutional power and perhaps not just power... To head a secret plot against... himself?

No, my reader, I am writing these lines being of sound mind and clear memory. I am also surprised: Who did this ridiculous nonsense occur to and for what reason? However, the author is known, and he is not embarrassed by his fantasies. Together with you, I am trying to understand what the purpose is of the now mounting newspaper campaign, within the framework of which the voice of the former "flagship" of the former "party press" is loudly heard, to the effect that, allegedly, Gorbachev betrayed the party and that, allegedly, he knew about the putsch in advance; still more "promising" hints are dropped.

The fiscal syndrome which has robbed many of our publications of their wisdom and honor, has now spilled over the edge of the trough in which they usually wash someone else's laundry. I would like to note still another interpretation of the historic events, coming from the astute pen of a seeker of the truth, in the issue of *PRAVDA* from the day before yesterday, in order to make it clearer for the not-too-refined reader what the primary origin of such rumors is. According to this version, the putsch failed because... the putschists waited for the command "to grab you know who" but did not get it. This is allegedly why they abandoned their plan. So to say, little children engaged in mischief in a locked room, smashed earthenware pots, and then knelt before their mother: You promised us jam, but there was none there... this will never happen again... Meanwhile, their perfidious mother took them directly from sunny *Foros* to the prosecutors...

Therefore, let the chroniclers stop, and let the historians resign their commissions: *PRAVDA* will once again speak the whole truth for you. Georgiy Ovcharenko is used to it, he has become an old hand at that. I mean the whole truth. In the light of this 1,001st truth of his, we should not bring up the people—what did they have to do with the putsch failing? What are they to be praised for if the junta did not infringe on anything or anybody; it simply awaited an order from *Foros* and, having failed to receive it, quietly went to the slammer.

Obviously, there was no reason to throw up barricades around the "White House," and arm their defenders, to

say nothing of sacrificing oneself... In a word, a totally different light is shed on those who organized resistance to the putschists.

Another path finder, affecting the learned airs of an expert, proclaims from the TV screen that he has personally read a horribly classified manual for coup d'etats in the USSR; supposedly produced in the secret recesses of the KGB, this manual was entrusted to him (we are to understand—as to one who belonged in these recesses). In the manual, everything is different. It is done knowledgeably and smoothly: It says who is to be intimidated and how, and who is to be placed in what recesses. Therefore, as the TV speaker transparently hints, the KGB does not claim the authorship of this poor excuse for a coup. Allegedly, someone else wrote the scenario.

Still another fact, perhaps even a random one, or more precisely a coincidence, gives us certain food for thought. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is now printed at the PRAVDA printing plant, side by side, so to speak, with PRAVDA. On the same day, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA printed a letter to Boris Yeltsin from the well-known millionaire Artem Tarasov whose whereabouts abroad is unknown. A list of other abdication points in the message of the Russian deputy includes an ultimatum: He, the first Soviet businessman A. Tarasov, will not go back to Russia for as long as M. Gorbachev remains USSR president, even to rejoin \$9 million which was left at the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations and "frozen."

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA notes, referring to an "expert testing," that the letter was indeed written by A. Tarasov.

I never doubted that there are mighty forces on that side as well which are in mortal fear of an alliance between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. They have always removed their disguises in extreme situations. However, the outbreak of a putsch was apparently needed for them to engage in a rapprochement that rapidly. However, I repeat that this may be a purely random coincidence: After all, is there anybody who is not trying to hit the former general secretary with some kind of "bullet?"

The readers would recall that the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA article in question was called "Instigators at Work." This was about visitors to Volgograd. Another article, about other instigators from hero cities, was called "The Ensconced 'Bolsheviks' of Smolensk Do Not Surrender Their High Ground." We may now repeat that they still "do not surrender," and they are still "at work," except that, it appears, they have changed addresses.

If we discard all the trash from the "1,001 versions" which are being foisted on us in the guise of Moscow rumors, it is easy to find under it the 1,002d version, perhaps, the only one for the sake of which skilled forces apply themselves.

To sling mud at the USSR president—let him wash it off if he manages to before the forthcoming presidential election—and at the same time, drive a wedge between

Gorbachev and Yeltsin, thus considerably weakening the positions of both and interfering with their ever stronger consolidation on the grounds of common sense, and as a result, weakening the process of democratization and political stabilization. After all, it is becoming increasingly obvious with every passing day that only the joint efforts of these leading politicians of the country may still save our tormented Motherland from ultimate disintegration and the peoples from a fratricidal war. It seems that they have understood this themselves and have resolutely cast ambitions aside in order to salvage the cause. It is easy to see already that a zone of stability is emerging ever more distinctly around these figures which will serve as a construction site for advancing reforms. It is a little bit late, but may God help them anyway. Their pooled efforts and their firm will guarantee us the progress of democracy and a ticket to the civilized world. I believe that everything else depends on us alone.

A poll of its readers which RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA took on the day B.N. Yeltsin took office as RSFSR president, and the results of which it released two weeks before the putsch, confirmed this aspiration of the people: Either Gorbachev and Yeltsin unite, and then a realistic opportunity to save the country would appear, or a confrontation which is a way to nowhere will continue.

Despite the calculations of the "friends" of Gorbachev, the putsch cemented the union of the two presidents in front of the entire world and the entire country. We have come to believe that the process of radical changes is irreversible. Objectively, this is a credit to Gorbachev before history.

Apparently, this belief has put some people on their guard, and possibly prompted them to act vigorously. For the sake of what—in order to morally crucify Gorbachev and call a third force into the arena? Which one?

May yet another set of wrestlers who are growing muscles before going into the arena remember that all of us have only one arena—an impoverished, high-strung country. It will not be saved by yet another revolution but by productive work—work by the sweat of our brow, work till our hands bleed.

Any other kind of blood will cause nothing but agony for both the nations and the state.

Incidentally, not all of those who go to the arena leave it victoriously. Some run away to the whistling and jeers from the crowd. Others are simply carried away as the audience is silent.

Coup Prosecutors, Defense Lawyers' Press Conferences Compared*914B0438B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Sep 91
Union Edition p 6*

[Article by V. Rudnev in the column "Three Days of the Putsch. An IZVESTIYA Investigation": "The GKChP Case: Defense Lawyers Will Be Checked for Political Loyalty"]

[Text] On 17 September, defense lawyers also held their own press conference, following that of the investigative team. However, the prosecutors presented all plotters the same, as the accused in the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] case, whereas the defense lawyers worded the topic of their meeting with the journalists as follows: the defense of the members of the former GKChP, and separately—that of Lukyanov.

While the press conference was underway, the wording was refined: the trial of seven (apparently, excluding the late Pugo) and others. The correction was made by Attorney A. Kligman, defense lawyer representing former USSR KGB Deputy Chairman V. Grushko. One more distinction: The prosecutors invited us to the comfortable press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs whereas the defense lawyers to a small hall in the House of Journalists which is not suitable for press conferences.

The nature of these press conferences almost did not differ in any other respect. First of all, we did not get answers to many questions at both press conferences. At the time, the prosecutors referred to the confidentiality of preliminary investigations, and the defense lawyers are now referring to signed pledges not to divulge the same secrets demanded by the above prosecutors. Apparently, we will have to do our duty to the readers of the newspaper by a proven old method—by our own investigation as journalists...

It appears that a split "along Union and republic lines" has emerged in the ranks of defense attorneys, as well as in the ranks of the prosecutors. At the other meeting with journalists, representatives of the USSR Procuracy were absent. At this meeting, defense attorneys on the GKChP case belonging to the USSR Union of Attorneys were absent.

Representatives of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Union of Attorneys were in attendance: V. Pavlov's defense attorney A. Galoganov, A. Kligman representing V. Grushko, Yu. Borovkov representing Yu. Boldin, Yu. Ivanov representing V. Kryuchkov, and A. Gofshteyn representing A. Lukyanov. The announced defense attorney of D. Yazov, N. Pechenkin, failed to show up. Later, he explained to an IZVESTIYA correspondent that he did not come because he had nothing to tell the journalists.

Incidentally, there was no uniform view of professional rules even among the defense attorneys in attendance.

For example, A. Galoganov, responding to a question concerning fees, did not give the amount, citing attorney's confidentiality. On the contrary, Yu. Ivanov believed that this issue is no secret: He signed a contract for 3,000 rubles [R] with Kryuchkov's relatives. If the trial of the case takes longer the amount of fees will naturally go up.

The demand to the general procurator of Russia to protect the defense attorneys against the wiretapping of their telephones and the inspection of their correspondence was made at the press conference. The defense lawyers protested the introduction of special clearances in the case and other infringements of their legitimate rights. One of the defense attorneys voiced an opinion that lawlessness on the part of the investigative organs may bring about their joint strike. However, observed A. Gofshteyn in the lobby, each attorney should choose forms of protest on his own.

I will discuss special clearances in particular. No such restrictions are envisaged for criminal proceedings. However, they existed in the past court and investigative practice, especially in cases investigated by the KGB organs. Many defense attorneys view this clearance as a technique for removing honest attorneys from the handling of sensitive cases, in particular, those of dissidents.

In the Procuracy of Russia, they thought that there was nothing illegal about the very fact that special clearances were introduced in the GKChP case. They referred to a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers which indicated: The functionaries of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], courts, and administration of justice are required to have a special certificate of clearance in order to work with secret and top secret documents. Also, those with a court record, mentally ill, those who have relatives in capitalist countries (?) and those "with regard to whom a determination on the undesirability of clearance is made by the KGB" (?) cannot be cleared.

Therefore, the following issue arises: Who from among the KGB leadership will issue certificates on the political loyalty of the defense attorneys?

The defense attorneys also gave other examples of the violation of their rights and the rights of their clients. As defense attorney A. Galoganov said, personal records and records of conversations with his attorney were illegally confiscated from Valentin Pavlov. In addition, the defense attorneys are not allowed to familiarize themselves with all materials of the case, which violates the Russian law of procedure. In the opinion of the defense attorneys, they have now been given the role of notaries or, say, attesting witnesses, in the course of the interrogations of the accused.

The mass media caught it yet again, for the n-th time. The defense attorneys believe that newspapers, radio, and television frequently distort their words, mold public perception of the accused in a one-sided manner, select facts subjectively, and create a stir around the GKChP case... A specific rebuke was also voiced, in

addition to the regular general ones. As Yu. Ivanov put it, the respectable TV journalist V. Molchanov interviewing V. Kryuchkov acted like the importunate reporter A. Nevzorov. However, this drew a caustic question by M. Deych from Radio Liberty: I cannot understand—how did we wrong you?

There was one more sensational statement by the attorneys. As they see it, M. Gorbachev is not at all a witness in the GKChP case but a victim. As the defense attorneys maintain, B. Yeltsin, R. Khasbulatov, I. Silayev, and G. Burbulis are witnesses.

Excerpts From 17 Sep Coup Defense Lawyers' Press Conference

914B0438C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 19 Sep 91 p 1

[Statements by A. Galoganov, attorney for former Prime Minister V. Pavlov; A. Kligman, attorney for former USSR KGB Deputy Chairman V. Grushko; Yu. Ivanov, attorney for former USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov; A. Gofshteyn, attorney for former USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov, at a press conference on 17 September 1991 at the Central House of Journalists in Moscow: "The GKChP Case: Defense Attorneys Speak. 'We Will Act Independently.'"]

[Text] The three tragic days in August which are now called "a putsch," "a revolution," or "a coup" will undoubtedly go down in the history of the country. Perhaps, not only participants and witnesses to those events will examine their most involved intricacies by the hour and by the minute but also history analysts. It is already apparent that quite a few points in this horrible drama, which literally shook the world, are not unambiguous. This drama has spawned a great many ringing questions which have so far gone unanswered.

At present, the entire country watches closely the progress of the investigation, and anxiously awaits a trial of the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] members and their accomplices. At times, the press is in a hurry to offer predictions and conclusions. At times, absolutely overwhelming news is reported. This is why every truthful and weighed word of professional lawyers is particularly valuable.

A meeting with the attorneys for the arrested participants in the coup, which was held on 17 September in the Central House of Journalists in Moscow, caused sharp interest on the part of Soviet and foreign journalists. This was the first press conference organized by the Union of Defense Attorneys of Russia.

A. Galoganov, attorney for former Prime Minister V. Pavlov:

...Briefly about my client. I have established businesslike relations with him. The position of the defense has been worked out. I am profoundly convinced that there is no corpus delicti, as envisaged by Article 64 of the RSFSR

[Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Criminal Code, in the actions of my client.

All of you know that on 20 August 1991 he suffered an attack of hypertension. Unfortunately, the health condition of Valentin Sergeyevich still gives rise to serious concern...

I have filed a motion to have the measure to secure his appearance changed. Unfortunately, this motion was not accepted...

A. Kligman, attorney for former USSR KGB Deputy Chairman V. Grushko:

...My client Viktor Fedorovich Grushko pleads not guilty of treason to the Motherland. This is why the considerations I am going to outline refer to the charge filed in general rather than specifically to Viktor Fedorovich Grushko. Issues associated with the above charge pose certain complications for all lawyers in view of the absence of theoretical studies and of the charge being unneeded until recently.

Charges under Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code have been filed against our clients. Meanwhile, all of them were supreme officials of the USSR. There is the Union Law on Criminal Penalties for State Crimes which was adopted on 25 December 1958... This is a law rather than basic legislation, that is, a directly applicable [pyamogo deystviya] normative act. This is why there is a problem for us as defense attorneys and lawyers: In principle, under what law, Union or republic, may charges be filed?.. The law defines "treason to the Motherland" as an action committed...to the detriment of sovereignty, territorial integrity, state security, and defense capability of the country. I am not answering a question, I am bringing it up. Think whether any one of those arrested committed any actions to the detriment of the sovereignty of the USSR, the territorial inviolability of the USSR... the state security, the defense capability of the USSR...

Our clients are accused of treason to the Motherland which was expressed in a conspiracy aimed at seizing power... The law does not refer to what "power" may be at issue... One of the commentaries indicates: The presence of changing the existing Soviet state and public system as a goal of participants in a conspiracy is characteristic of the latter. Once again, I suggest that you think. Did those who have now been arrested have this goal—to change the existing Soviet state and public system?... I quote from the Course of Soviet Criminal Law (there is no other, later source available): "Conspiracies for the purpose of seizing power have always been viewed by participants in them as a means to restore capitalist relations in our country. Such conspiracies are associated with the hostile operation of the intelligence services of imperialist states or assist the latter in their subversive operations." Esteemed comrades, ladies, and gentlemen, think whether this definition is a fitting description of the actions of those who have now been arrested?

I go on quoting: "Treason to the Motherland is betrayal of the Soviet people who are building a communist society. It means direct aid to the forces of imperialist reaction which combat the USSR and other socialist countries by various means." (Laughter on the floor)...

Yu. Ivanov, attorney for former USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov:

I would like to touch on just one issue which to my mind is vital because we are facing the issue of the objectivity of an investigation. How is this expressed? Look, yesterday some newspapers were adorned with joyous headlines: "Gorbachev Has Been Interrogated as a Witness. The President Obeyed the Law," and so on.

As I see it, Gorbachev has been interrogated improperly. He is not a witness. He is a victim. A definition in the RSFSR Criminal Code says absolutely clearly and plainly that a victim is an individual who has suffered physical, material, or moral damage. In his words, Gorbachev was isolated in the Crimea; his satellite communications were turned off. According to some reports, his wife apparently even lost the feeling in her arm or was on the verge of a stroke...

I have no doubt at all that at present President Gorbachev is interested in the outcome of the case. Whether consciously or not, he may display a lack of objectivity.

Please note: Why do I, a defense attorney, need to demand that the investigation determine him to be a victim? It is very simple. What is happening? Together with the president of Russia, this victim announced at a meeting with the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Russia on 24 August that Boris Nikolayevich and I came to an agreement. This is supported by all republics. A joint investigative team has been formed. They will report on the case to us, and we will inform you. We will make the decisions which the law demands. So, what happens? A victim will be informed about the course of the investigation, and he will filter this information for us?

However, at present all mass media organs overflow with interviews by the president. As a defense attorney, I believe that he may give interviews to the press and make statements in the newspapers—the president is entitled to this. However, I am interested in his answering the questions of the defense as well as of the prosecution. As of now, the defense is deprived of the right to interrogate this victim.

His testimony as a witness, received from the prosecutor who reports the circumstances of the case to him, is, to my mind, something utterly incredible...

...Moreover, quite a number of leading personalities are already making successful statements about the measure of punishment. In summation, I will tell you one thing about the significance of such statements. The entire history of our state testifies to the following: Utterances

by leading personalities are frequently taken as directives for the actions of investigative organs.

A. Gofshteyn, attorney for former USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov:

The unprecedented interest in this case is great, and it is understandable. It is also understandable that, along with this interest, a tremendous shortage of honest, trustworthy information about this case exists in our society. Which one of you will say today that he knows anything about this case?

My colleagues from the defense have already said that our situation is virtually the same. At the same time, we are witnessing, from the very first steps in the investigation of this case, long before the verdict, the publishing, by the very same mass media which acknowledge the absence of credible and reliable information, of utterances by politicians of various stripes, and not just politicians, sometimes with comments and sometimes without. These are utterances in which everything has already been determined, including forms of complicity and the degree of guilt. In the process, this is being discussed as if everything were already clear and had already been proven. Individuals arrested by the investigation are already called criminals.

Discussing the work of the defense in this case, I would like to say that nothing is clear, nothing has been established, and nothing has yet been proven for the defense, as well as for all participants in the proceedings.

I must also state this in view of a multitude of publications in which, to put it mildly, premature statements are made: No matter what they write on this account, the defense in this case will act independently of the mass media, independently of the view which they try to propagate among the populace, and independently of political sympathies and antipathies.

I must say this: Despite the fact that politicians are being tried, we will do everything in our power to prevent this trial from turning into a political trial in the worst meaning of the word.

It is important to note that the defense attorneys were of the same opinion: The forthcoming trial should be public. They expressed their conviction that such meetings with representatives of the mass media are necessary.

Putschists Relied on Supreme Soviet Backing for 'Legal Camouflage'

914B0438D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Sep 91
Union Edition p 8

[Interview with Candidate of Legal Sciences Mikhail Krasnov, senior research associate of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, by V. Rudnev in the column: "Three Days of the Putsch. An IZVESTIYA Investigation"; place and date not given:

"The GKChP Affair: They Counted Not Only on Tanks but Also on the Parliament")]

[Text] This version was offered by Candidate of Legal Sciences Mikhail Krasnov, senior research associate of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in his letter to IZVESTIYA.

[Rudnev] Many officials cited the same argument in order to justify their passive position in those three days of August: A session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was expected, which should have taken a stand. This is what Lukyanov, who expressed his confidence that the Supreme Soviet would not have recognized the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency], also stated.

[Krasnov] I strongly doubt this. Even if some officials froze while awaiting a decision of the Supreme Soviet due to their legal and political virginity (despite it being impermissible for statesmen), it is very hard to believe in the naivete of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a doctor of legal sciences, and a qualified state law specialist. Here is why.

It was stated directly in one of the first GKChP documents, "Appeal to the Heads of States and Governments and the UN General Secretary," that for the duration of the state of emergency "power in the country in its entirety (emphasis mine) is transferred to the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR." However, neither the USSR Constitution nor the USSR Law on the Legal Regimen of a State of Emergency provides for any restrictions on the power of the supreme organs of the state or the very creation of any structure with functions and powers similar to those of the GKChP. Therefore, the very fact of the appearance of this committee could not mean anything but the toppling of legal power in the USSR, or more precisely, usurpation of power.

Think about it. After all, "power in its entirety" is precisely all power, which leaves no power for either the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, or the Supreme Soviet and its chairman, or the USSR president himself. Incidentally, it leaves no power to Yanayev either, if we ignore the fact that he usurped this position illegally.

[Rudnev] However, let us assume that Lukyanov was at a loss. Besides, in his words, it was not simple to convene a session; 26 August was the most immediate prospect.

[Krasnov] We could believe that the former chairman of the parliament of our country was at a loss if it were not for the agenda of the session announced by him. I quote from his decision: "In conjunction with the submission of a decision to introduce a state of emergency in individual areas of the USSR to the USSR Supreme Soviet for confirmation, to convene an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 26 August 1991 in the city of Moscow." I have emphasized the words which give Lukyanov away completely: Such a wording contains not even a hint of the

parliament of the country discussing the issue of legality of the formation of the GKChP. The sense of Lukyanov's decision is: Confirm it, and that's all. It hardly needs to be proven that by this act alone he legally sanctified the coup d'etat.

As far as timing is concerned, the Russian parliament did manage to get together within one day...

[Rudnev] Still, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, there is a flaw in your version. Having usurped "power in its entirety," the GKChP did not need to have its operation sanctified by the parliament of the country. This means that Lukyanov's actions were nonsensical; they were due to his being confused.

[Krasnov] I beg to disagree. A very careful selection of legal camouflage for anticonstitutional activities is characteristic of the August coup, precisely camouflage, which always amounts to concealing what is real. It was not at all an accident that the plotters did not dissolve either the Congress of People's Deputies or the Supreme Soviet, despite being "bound" to do so by the laws of the coup d'etat, or at least suspend the operation of the old authorities since they announced that they were seizing power. The putschists got rid only of the Security Council, apparently not counting on the loyalty of its members.

[Rudnev] Here is yet another contradiction.

[Krasnov] Indeed, it is so. However, few understood this contradiction. Mass consciousness could have very well failed to grasp this paradox. This was actually what the plotters were betting on. Had the GKChP lasted until 26 August, its organizers would have come out smelling like a rose: After all, we did not touch the legitimate authorities, did we? This is the essence of the legal camouflage for the operation of the GKChP crowd.

[Rudnev] Do you think that the parliament would have taken the side of the GKChP?

[Krasnov] I repeat that the refined calculations of GKChP strategists were built on the fact that our controlled parliamentary majority would throw itself on the mercy of the victors. After all, the latter spared their "lives" demanding an insignificant service in return—to create a civilized, legislative image for political bandits from the GKChP. Apparently, this was supposed to happen. This is precisely how I interpret the hidden sense of Lukyanov's wording concerning the convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Rudnev] Let us assume that this would have happened. However, in this case, why did the plotters put tanks on the streets if, as you maintain, the legitimacy of their power could be assured in a "peaceful," parliamentary manner?

[Krasnov] First, I do not maintain it; it is merely a version. If you will, the tanks, as well as the introduction of the state of emergency, were miscalculations on the part of the GKChP. It appears to me that stereotypical

plotters' thinking did them a disservice in this instance: A putsch means a show of strength, precisely a show, nothing more. After all, evidence to the effect that the plotters did not count on using force openly but, on the contrary, hoped for a parliamentary solution to the issue keeps mounting with every passing day.

Imagine now if there had not been tanks on the streets of Moscow at the time. I do not think that the "White House" would have succeeded in bringing down the GKChP so spectacularly. This, however, is my personal opinion.

[Rudnev] I am down to my last argument—our Constitution.

[Krasnov] It has been violated so many times by the head of our state, and by our legislative organ together with the executive one that yet another violation would have simply gone unnoticed. Unlike in a rule-of-law state, sacrificing the law for the needs of politics is a regular occurrence in a state of the rule of socialist law.

Starodubtsev's Career Examined

914B0441B Moscow TRUD in Russian 21 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by TRUD staff correspondent V. Gorodetskiy: "Power Did Not Turn Out To Be Sweet: How Vasily Starodubtsev Proceeded From a Kolkhoz Dictatorship to Participation in the Coup"]

[Text] Tula Oblast—"If a peasant who has an auxiliary plot comes here to work, he comes to steal something."

"The notion 'peasant' is obsolete. There should be agricultural workers in rural areas who are not bound by either land lots or their own housing. All of these should be provided to them by the farms on which they will give their all to work."

(From a stream of consciousness of Chairman of the Peasant Union V. Starodubtsev recorded on tape some time ago).

An UAZ [Ulyanovsk Automotive Works] jeep hopped all over the stubble like a mad goat. A driver who sat behind the wheel wearing a shirt open on his breast yelled excitedly and angrily at a peasant running across the field with fishing rods: "Stop, bastard, or I will catch you anyway. I will teach you a lesson about poaching in my pond!"

This is how I met the well-known chairman of the kolkhoz [collective farm] imeni Lenin, Vasily Starodubtsev (he was the driver), 17 years ago. An authoritarian attitude, as well as personal fearlessness and energy, have always been characteristic of this man. These traits made him very successful in the years when stagnation "blossomed" and when dullness and uniformity triumphed. He knew how to "arrange" solutions to specific supply issues in the interest of the kolkhoz, and how to gain allies. He also knew how to quickly make a decision which was almost always right.

On one occasion, architects from the Civil Construction Design Office in Tula came to the kolkhoz when I was there. They brought with them a model of the central village of the kolkhoz. This was a sample of the barracks-style dream of the 1950's—uniform one-floor houses lined up in strict ranks.

Starodubtsev asked journalists whom he liked to be friendly with for as long as his innovative endeavors were supported: "What would you say?"

We shook our heads in unison.

"Right," said Starodubtsev. A couple of weeks later, a talented architect appeared in the kolkhoz who designed a merry and beautiful kolkhoz settlement, truly a modern one.

Later, the belief in his own infallibility would become a reinforced-concrete wall in his relations with the people because, as he saw it, he was the only one who could solve problems. To be sure, he did solve them within the scope of the village of Spasskoye where the central settlement is located. He obtained deliveries, shook things loose, made arrangements, and got his way. He was a fountain of energy! However, when he became chairman of the APO [Agroindustrial Association] Novomoskovskoe, taking control of all the kolkhozes and sovkhoses [state farms] of the rayon, the habit of acting on his own authority did him a disservice: He had neither enough time nor enough energy.

He did not tolerate intelligent aides. Random people who were not necessarily reliable ended up in his "orbit"; all of them without an identity of their own and used to obedience. Even now, after everything that has happened, they continue, in timid and respectful voices, to mention him by only his name and patronymic, stressing in every way possible Starodubtsev's tremendous "services to the rayon and the country." They are afraid to admit that these services are a matter of the past, and that the infamous authoritarianism of Starodubtsev has done more harm than good.

Peasants in the nearby kolkhozes have long spoofed Starodubtsev as grabbing four telephone receivers with two hands at the same time. These are the same peasants who, at one time, dropped in at his place in the evening to seek his counsel and do some "soul-searching..."

It appears to me that a kolkhoz was the limit of Starodubtsev's abilities. Until a certain point, he understood it. The Tula people offered him a promotion repeatedly, and he turned it down. People from adjacent oblasts came by inviting him to move there, but Starodubtsev was not swayed by promises, and did not abandon the kolkhoz. He was right: An Antaeus should not lose contact with the land.

For many years, I had no desire to meet with him again. His arrogance and peremptoriness have gotten the upper hand over other traits. A stranger, an unquestioningly imperious and conceited man sat in the familiar office of

Starodubtsev in which we had at one time spent entire evenings discussing general-interest and kolkhoz topics.

During the days of the putsch, I watched a press conference at which he, with a bored and smug expression on his face, sat next to Pugo. The question by one of the journalists "How did you end up with this company?" was clearly uncalled for. Starodubtsev had come there along the same logical path he had himself elected. Later, the TV showed Vasilii Aleksandrovich departing for the Kremlin in order to take charge of the affairs of state. There was a great deal of haughtiness with regard to others stirring somewhere on the lower rungs of the social ladder...

Fate cared to give him so many public and state distinctions that they would have sufficed for half a dozen prominent figures. Hero of Socialist Labor, USSR people's deputy, corresponding member of the VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin], chairman of the Peasant Union, chairman of the Kolkhoz Council, chairman of the APO Novomoskovskoye, chairman of the kolkhoz imeni Lenin, winner of a state prize... Why was he distinguished?

The kolkhoz which Starodubtsev took over in the spring of 1964 performed brilliantly. Those who managed to find their way to the holy of holies, the famous Starodubtsev complex which was erected on the basis of his draft, were dumb struck with delight. The white tiles and fresh paint glistened on the premises. Cows with full stomachs reluctantly regurgitated abundant fodder. The milk yields were the highest in the country. Everything was mechanized throughout, and labor was automated. Grain yields were unprecedented for Central Russia. The settlement was marvelous; there was an athletic complex with swimming pools and saunas (which we will refer to shortly). There was a tremendous waiting list of those waiting to join the kolkhoz.

Indeed, there were and still are amenities for the people. However, the inexorable logic of struggle in the apparatus prompted him to use these very people as a means to assert himself and move on. Ranks of black limousines were parked in front of the building of the board, with greenery and roses twining round. Ministers, Central Committee secretaries, the head of the government himself, and even the KGB chairman came by. They began to talk about Starodubtsev ad infinitum and to write about him liberally. They even began to take lessons from him: A permanent interrepublic school with its own hotel was built in the kolkhoz.

There was a small room in the back of the old kolkhoz canteen. Anybody who was of interest to Starodubtsev went through this room. Journalists came through in order to glorify the success of the kolkhoz and, of course, its chairman. Economic managers and party functionaries came through in order to hack out allocations for the farm, funds, and other benefits without which the kolkhoz would have had a very hard time becoming better than a solid average performer. A special chef, the

winner of numerous competitions, baked and cooked nonstop. The best meals and hard drinks accompanied by intelligent conversations suggested an obvious thought to the visitors: They were looking at a connoisseur of the psyche of the peasantry, an outstanding expert on cattle breeding and agronomy. The guests went to the parts of the farm where Starodubtsev himself took them driving his UAZ.

The hearts mellowed, and the state coffers opened up.

The best of everything was given to the kolkhoz. Even cattle were purchased abroad with foreign exchange provided by central establishments. I remember times when 15,000 tons of protein supplements were allocated for all of Tula Oblast, and all of this specifically for Starodubtsev alone. We may also recall brand-new imported combine harvesters which went straight to the village of Spasskoye—and nowhere else!

Later, when Starodubtsev set out to rapidly build a civic center in his village, a restaurant-type canteen appeared with two banquet halls in the back. The general hall was somewhat empty and low on food. Receptions for important guests were another matter. Everything was at their disposal, including saunas at the new athletic complex. On one occasion, a bath attendant, outraged by the libations of the chairman with highly placed guests, approached the CPSU oblast committee. The woman soon had to leave Spasskoye. By then, Starodubtsev was already immune to criticism, especially to that from the "grassroots..."

Here they got away with everything that would have cost others their heads. At the same time, this added to the luster of both Starodubtsev senior and his brothers. A young tractor operator assigned to work at a feed concentrate plant on the kolkhoz imeni Lenin died there. Elementary occupational safety rules were violated: The unfortunate man was run over by a truck whose driver could not see because of the driveway being cluttered up. According to all written and unwritten laws, a grave accident should have deprived the farm of the right to a prize in the competition. The oblast party committee and the Central Committee of a branch trade union refused to endorse prize award documents. However, the Union Agroindustrial Committee got by without them: The prize and the winner's flag were handed out after all.

In recent years, an agrarian dynasty which provided role models in terms of the ability to work and operate an economy, turned into a peculiar symbol of permissiveness in the Tula area.

V. Starodubtsev proclaimed himself to be a defender of the peasantry, having become simultaneously chairman of the Peasant Union and the Council of Kolkhozes. A defender against whom? His speeches suggested: against the urban dwellers who had taken everything, and this time around refused to help. This was a point of view which, at Starodubtsev's hand, gained currency in other oblasts too. In Ryazan, for example, the oblast committee compiled a letter to the urban populace which

indicated that the rural areas would be within their rights if they suspended the deliveries of foodstuffs to the urban areas.

The juggernaut of the apparatus pyramid elevated him still higher and further. He switched to pushing papers which he used to regard in previous years with undisguised disdain. The streets got dirty even in his native kolkhoz; driveways to the building of the board got cluttered, and shops became barren. Vasilii Aleksandrovich began to hold conferences with the chief specialists of the kolkhoz in Moscow, and not in Spasskoye anymore. He summoned them to one of his offices in the capital city, gave them instructions, and verified their execution through his authorized representatives.

The trouble and the fault of the kolkhoz Antaeus was losing contact with the land. What was supposed to happen indeed happened...

I went to the kolkhoz immediately after the coup failed. There no longer were ministerial or Central Committee cars on a deserted lot. An unfamiliar, lonely Zhiguli car, which three brawny fellows in plainclothes had gotten out of, stood out. An arrest detail awaited Starodubtsev. Chief specialists who had worked with their "boss" for decades, walked about with confused expressions on their faces and talked softly. A collective letter asking that their chairman be pardoned was sent by the kolkhoz.

If we think about it, this finale is terrifying. A person who promised to feed the people turned into a dictator. At one time, I wrote a lot about Starodubtsev, his accomplishments and his bold plans. Therefore, I am also to blame for this man losing his head.

Boldin's Career, Betrayal of Gorbachev Examined

924B0018A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 37, Sep 91 p 6

[Article by Viktor Loshak. First paragraph was in boxed in area in article. Words in boldface as published.]

[Text] The Valery Boldin, one of the closest associates of the Soviet President, took part in the coup dealt a heavy blow to Gorbachev. Like Gorbachev himself, Boldin served both state and party as head of the presidential office and head of the general management department of the CPSU Central Committee.

For a decade Boldin remained in the shadow of Gorbachev, never changing his position. Becoming a secretary of the Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev asked Boldin, at that time Editor of *Pravda's* agriculture department, to serve as his aide. There is no knowing whether Gorbachev's choice was prompted by his being responsible for agriculture at the Central Committee, or maybe he liked Boldin when he visited Stavropol (when Gorbachev was its party boss) as a *Pravda* man, or perhaps because he played up the story of farming successes in the Stavropol Territory. Another likely

reason is that Boldin had already served as a Central Committee secretary. At any rate, as an apparatchik Boldin rose to power from 1981 together with Gorbachev. He evaded the limelight, always remaining behind the shoulder of the bosses and never proposing his own views. Amazingly, he kept away from the political scene in the same way he avoided cameras. The vast TASS picture library contains only one shot of him.

He never made any speeches, but his power is in glaring contrast with his notoriety. His only chance to get into the political limelight failed: the President nominated him for the Security Council but parliament voted him down.

Anyone with even a superficial knowledge of the system of promotion of officials to the Soviet throne will know that had the times not changed, Boldin could very well have ended up near the top. Think of Konstantin Chernenko, whose office at the head of the General Secretary's general management department propelled him to the top seat. Once inside the presidential office Boldin shuffled personnel in a big way—I hardly need to tell you about the power of someone who can shift key figures.

He sometimes made boasts about his political clout. I've read the verbatim record of his recent interview to a noted journalist: "Formally I'm considered head of the apparat. This is as may be, but my functions are perhaps wider, since I've been with Mikhail Sergeyevich from the first day he became General Secretary, I'm obliged to handle much more work and I don't know where the line can be drawn."

The extent of his powers was such that one presidential aide could not even hire a secretary, no matter how hard he tried. Boldin would not endorse any candidate, only because he disliked the aide. Another presidential aide, press secretary Vitaly Ignatenko, remembers Boldin's recent order: "No further information should be given to Ignatenko."

Interviewed by the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, the former press secretary said: "We disliked each other. But the rub was that all sorts of papers had to be endorsed by the man. Baklanov was friends with Boldin, and I think he (Boldin—V.L.) forced him on the President."

Finally, the opinion of yet another man in the presidential office: "I think that when many of those who were undecided about joining the plot heard that Boldin was among the plotters they decided on betrayal."

Those in the know perhaps regarded Boldin as a symbol of the system of power, the offices hiding behind the guarded doors where policy was being made and destinies decided to the soft hiss of air conditioners.

Quitting the presidential office, Academician Nikolai Petrakov described the atmosphere in Boldin's office by quoting a line from Bulat Okudzhava: "It smells of

thievery in our house." But Petrakov could hardly imagine the scale of the planned deception.

I think even the trial is not going to answer many questions. Why should a successful man who was well-nigh the only one routinely meeting the President betray him? Which role was he offered if the coup were successful, or was he himself due to cast the roles? How much must he have hated the boss who addressed him simply as Valery and summoned him with just a nod or a blink? Boldin, they say, saw M.S.—apparatchiks' acronym for the President—two or three times a day. Only Boldin and Lukyanov could phone the President directly, bypassing his secretary. Receiving Gorbachev's instructions from someone else, Boldin said in hurt tones: "He could have called me as well."

As a matter of fact, people have always betrayed each other in the world of men like Boldin. Think of all those personnel reshufflings during the Central Committee plenums. No one used to leave his position of his own accord. Each dismissal was the result of a string of petty conspiracies. But these were described as personnel changes, building up the apparat, etc. Boldin for that matter started his own career at the CPSU headquarters following some scheming. His patron was Ilyichev, a Central Committee secretary, one of the figures in Brezhnev's plot to topple Khrushchev. After Ilyichev's dismissal, Boldin could hardly stay afloat and he had to enroll in the Academy of Social Sciences to get out of the way.

The Central Committee, *Pravda*, the Academy, back to the Central Committee—provided splendid training for a future conniver. But didn't he try to topple the President even before 19 August? Wasn't it a plot hatched by Boldin, Kryuchkov and Lukyanov for Gorbachev to be put in what was described as "information aquarium" last autumn and winter? That was a neat piece of work. There was one episode in which a team of trusted informants persuaded the President that the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies was preparing to depose him.

Did we know that it was Boldin's handwork when all proposals from democrats were dismissed by Gorbachev who said: "The people will not understand this" or "The party is not ready for that."

A few words exchanged, a telephone call, a reworded resolution, and the final decision gets postponed. The secret moves made in the offices are often imperceptible but their impacts are often stronger than those of million-strong rallies or troop movements. Some presidential decrees were seen for the first time by the President's own aides in the papers, even those concerning matters they were directly in charge of. How come? Because of the way documents had circulated, because of the sequence in which signatures were affixed. In autumn of 1990 things came to such a pass where the Council of Ministers discussed decrees signed by the USSR President and decided on whether to approve them or not.

Pulling the wool over the President's eyes about the situation in the country, the plotters took their game a bit too far—when asked about the reaction around the country to the coup, their own aides in the provinces reported: "An overwhelming majority of the working people, as their letters, cables and telephone calls indicate, support the Emergency Committee and hope for stabilization."

Those in the presidential office today say Boldin was feared and resented. They say he kept aloof, never spoke his mind and was brief. His only friends, they say, were Baklanov and Shenin, and the three secluded themselves in their office sometimes. What they discussed is now for the investigation to reveal.

I doubt if the President knew who took whose orders in his own office. Boldin had built such an intricate web that no one could trick him. The apparat came to contain such expendable figures as Primakov and Bakatin. It also came to include the Defence Council under Baklanov, a body not provided for in the Constitution and which did nothing. Vice-President Yanayev, as it turns out now, was not responsible for anything in particular.

The President repeatedly included Boldin in various groups to draft very important documents, and Boldin worked there together with Alexander Yakovlev, Anatoly Chernyayev, Georgi Shakhnazarov and Nikolai Petrakov. While they argued matters out and exchanged ideas, Boldin remained silent. They thought he was being modest. When he finally started to talk, everybody could see that the man did not have anything to say. That gave rise to a special socioeconomic group to coach the apparat chief.

Gorbachev's attachment to Boldin is hard to explain. It was an illusion of devotion, but not only that. Boldin for example, was fond of books, and he hired the finest book binders for the CPSU Central Committee general management department. He nurtured the idea of a presidential library, and planned an article on spiritual values of young people. Perhaps he decided to join the betrayal because of his personal trauma—as a party bureaucrat he did not fit in the new environment.

Had not it been for the coup, no one would have been able to halt the process that was in full swing—people from the Central Committee apparat were crossing over to take positions of state power. One of the main pumps that kept the flow moving was Boldin. He was building the apparat using "tested" people and "tested" means, those from the CPSU headquarters in Staraya Ploshchad. The process consisted of three parts: sending over party money, personnel, and the subtle creation of economic structures fully subordinated to the party clan.

The plotters who visited Gorbachev at his Crimean retreat in Foros are said to have virtually attacked the President with tirades. Only Boldin remained silent. Chances are that by this time, his bureaucratic flair told him that his time was up. It was a disaster.

Gorbachev Has Right To Publish Book on Coup*PM0810153191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Oct 91
Single Edition p 2*

["Our Commentary" by A. Petrushov in response to reader V. Golikov's letter; first paragraph is letter: "He Has the Right, But..."]

[Text] "M.S. Gorbachev has written a book about the August coup. I think that until the investigation and trial of this case are over, neither Gorbachev, a key witness, nor any of his entourage have the right to publish any materials connected with the coup."

[Signed] V. Golikov, Moscow.

Our Commentary

Certainly, Mikhail Sergeyevich has indeed written a new book. TASS reported that the British publishing house, Harper Collins, is already preparing to publish it under the provisional title: "The August Coup." As for V. Golikov's claim, the editorial office asked lawyers for clarification. In their opinion, the fact that M.S. Gorbachev is a witness cannot prevent him publishing a book that evidently reflects the author's version of what happened in August. But if facts and opinions differing from the conclusions drawn by the investigation and the trial emerge from this book or any other publication, the latter in turn naturally have the right to an additional investigation.

Post-Coup Political Landscape Viewed*PM0310092191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Sep 91 Union Edition p 1*

[Albert Plutnik commentary under the "Political Diary" rubric: "A Month After the Coup"]

[Text] Two anniversaries at once. It is a month since the coup d'etat flared up, only to collapse. It is also a month since the "so-called" democrats came to power in our country, after its defeat of "socialism." It is they who now hold absolute power, although the old structures are still strong in many regions of the country.

When did this last happen? Knowing our history, particularly its post-October period, we can boldly say: Never. This is the first time. In our country the very concept of a democratic opposition disappeared from the political arena for a long time, after some extremely radical and extremely effective measures were employed to combat it, physical extermination included. It is noteworthy that the leader of the victorious "democratic majority" is none other than Boris Yeltsin: The first man rejected by the bureaucratic party apparatus who resolved to fly in the face of unshakeable tradition and bravely offer an open challenge.

Only a month has passed since the new power began to build a new, democratic state on the wreckage of Communist despotism. From the very outset, alternating

amazingly bold decisions with hasty, ill-considered decisions, in which lingering vindictiveness toward the defective system it has overthrown has gained the upper hand over political wisdom and farsightedness, this new power has provoked very mixed attitudes. It has come under fire from well-wishers and ill-wishers alike—from the very outset, naturally, because glasnost and freedom of speech have developed even further. Well, the democrats have yet to prove their commitment to democracy by their attitude to criticism and different ways of thinking. The new power has to learn not to see plotters in those people who are far from always in agreement with it but who sincerely sympathize with its aims and objectives—and certainly with the titanic efforts it is making as it strives to lay firm foundations for a fundamentally new state system and a fundamentally new way of life.

On this anniversary, we are struck once again by the way in which the old system of power collapsed almost instantly. It had seemed extraordinarily strong—built to last forever. But the buttresses of state, whose collapse, like the end of the world, had been used by those of an imperial mentality and adherents of the so-called communist future to intimidate us in the past, vanished in a moment. Where is it now, the former might of the Communist Party, so long depicted as the stronghold and guarantor of our approaching prosperity but failing in all the years of its monopolistic rule to live up to the role of popular benefactor—a role which, unaffected by modesty, it ascribed to itself?

Clearly, only a regime that had rotted to the core and lost the people's trust completely could collapse in such a way.

The victory over reaction has revealed who's who to a large extent, and the long line of subsequent cadre changes in the top echelons of power seems natural; it is a cadre purge on a scale which must be unprecedented in our history. A great many vacancies have formed. Moreover, for the first time in our lives, the leaders at fault have not simply been transferred from one post to another: They have been consigned to political oblivion, if not thrown behind bars.

The fact that the coup leaders held the positions they did has exposed major flaws in the cadre policy to which we have adhered for decades. It is now obvious that President Gorbachev was surrounded by a tight ring of conservatives and reactionaries and essentially held hostage to their views and interests. He can and must be blamed, of course, for his "choice and placement of cadres," but the fact is that, for all his authority and all his powers, old and new, the president had become a kind of figurehead. The real power was held by quite different people.

Naturally, Russia—which played a decisive role in the August events—has been given a priority right to nominate its representatives to the top positions in the new appointments which mark the victory of the democratic

wing. In these days which have determined so much in our life, because they have clarified so much, we have discovered the real strength of the sociopolitical forces which previously ruled the country and of those which merely had pretensions to power. We have come to appreciate who is really a force and who is only reputed to be a force—through habit and on the basis of certain formal criteria.

Just one month in power.... A month equivalent to years and decades if we think of the unprecedented rate at which totalitarianism has been dismantled and the entire political and state system radically restructured. We now have a right to say that the time when big policies were made exclusively in Moscow, in the Kremlin, is irrevocably past. That is no longer the case. Even if the two presidents are now peacefully working alongside each other there, under the canopy of ruby stars, they no longer make the decisions for everyone. Real policies are also being made in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Kiev, Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Bishkek.... The diktat of the center is over, the division into junior and senior is a thing of the past, and we must now build our relations solely as equals—on the basis of mutual understanding and mutual accords.

With regard to the mistakes made by the new power and some of its individual representatives, including the most prominent.... In my opinion, when assessing its actions, we should take two circumstances into account. First, as I have already said, the fact that the democrats are running the country for the first time in our history. That is the first point. Second, that power has dropped straight into their laps. Totally out of the blue. Yes, they have been active in the political arena for several years. Yes, they have enjoyed victory in elections and their rallies have gathered audiences of millions. Yes, they have demonstrated their ability to produce real leaders from their ranks. Yes, they have mastered the art of doing battle in parliament and gained recognition not only in our country but in the international arena as well. But for all that.... I am not so sure that they themselves had believed that their time would come so soon. They had expected it to happen one day in the future. They had been reckoning on a more distant point in time, in my opinion. Then suddenly....

We should ask ourselves: Who exactly are our democrats? Many are yesterday's partocrats and functionaries who loyally served their party for a long time but then left it—at different times and for different reasons. Many were not born democrats but became them in adulthood, with no practical experience of participation in democratic government and certainly no experience of democratic expression of will. Indeed, who does have that kind of experience in our country?

The people who have come to power are therefore best described as theorist democrats. Because it simply is not possible for them to have practical experience of democracy. How could they, when three generations of Soviet people have lived and died under totalitarian rule? They

have never tasted the freedom they longed for or set eyes, even for a moment, on the bright future constantly referred to by the Bolsheviks. Some have been luckier than others. There have been two or three brief thaws in the last 74 years, amid decades of totalitarian frosts. But could they warm through the earth sufficiently for real democracy to germinate in it? What can we do if it has fallen to our lot to live in an unfortunate country whose level of government has never fully corresponded to the aspirations and potential of its people? Yes, many things said and done by today's democrats—who are now the real power—could put us on our guard and arouse foreboding or prejudice. But that is not what I want to talk about now. I want this first month to be followed by a second, a third.... I want the democrats to have time to show what they can do. Time to put their best plans into practice so that our society can prosper.

Yes, demands start to be made on any power the day after it assumes responsibility for governing the country. If we were overly indulgent toward the democrats and ignored their mistakes, it would mean we do not believe in their strength. That kind of attitude could only displease the strong, in my opinion.

Yes, life is still hard for us at the moment. There have been no instantaneous changes—nor could there have been. Particularly in the economy, where change comes more slowly and painfully than anywhere else. But a month after the coup, I feel it is extremely important for all of us when pondering its very first results to seriously ask ourselves a question that is not new but which society has somehow forgotten about recently: What kind of government, what kind of leadership, and which specific individuals did we have in mind when we were discussing the need—on a purely theoretical level—to form a government of national accord that would enjoy a large measure of popular trust? Surely it was the kind of leadership and government we have in power now? Surely we intended the participation of people like Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Silayev, Bakatin, and Yavlinskiy? And of the marshals and generals who have only recently taken control of the Army and not compromised themselves in any way?

We must work calmly, with faith in the future. In my opinion, we now have more substantial reasons to believe in the future than we did before.

Yakovlev on USSR After the Coup

*PM0810141691 Paris LIBERATION in French
5-6 Oct 91 pp 14-15*

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of Gorbachev's Political Consultative Council, by Lilly Marcou in Moscow on 14 September—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, the "spiritual father" of perestroika, has been at Gorbachev's side since the early days of glasnost. In a book of conversations with French academic Lilly Marcou (research

director at the International Studies and Research Center) conducted in November 1990 (published by Seuil), he explained "What we want to make of the Soviet Union." In July 1991, Yakovlev abandoned his post alongside Gorbachev...just a few days before the coup d'etat. After the failure of the putsch, he resumed his place at Gorbachev's side and on 25 September was appointed as a member of the Political Consultative Council under the USSR President. Lilly Marcou returned to Moscow to continue their dialogue on 14 September.

[Marcou] You announced the putsch 48 hours in advance. Did you have information or was it a premonition which was proved right?

[Yakovlev] At that time I spoke of a potential putsch which was foreseeable and which was the cause of my resignation at the end of July. I had the feeling that if I did not leave, I would be pulled backward. Gorbachev tried to persuade me to stay but I left nonetheless. I have now returned because he needs help, the country needs help. However, I warned of this danger several times, of this counterrevolution which lay in wait for us. Gorbachev told me that I was overestimating the revolutionary forces.

[Marcou] Eduard Shevardnadze has recently adopted an unfriendly stance toward Mikhail Gorbachev. How do you explain that attitude?

[Yakovlev] It is important to remember above all that Shevardnadze and I had realized and announced the danger posed by the conservative forces for some time. The difference between he and I is that I was accustomed to being criticized and dragged through the mud by the conservative press and at their meetings. When Shevardnadze was attacked in the Supreme Soviet in December 1990 by representatives of the military-industrial complex who accused him of selling the country to the West and demolishing its foundations, he was angry because Gorbachev did not defend him. As foreign minister, he was simply implementing the president's policy. Of course he was talented and brilliant, but he was only Gorbachev's agent. He therefore expected the president to take the floor and defend him from that slander. But Mikhail Sergeyevich did not lift a finger; he did not defend him or me. Because Shevardnadze is a Georgian, he is more impulsive than I am, as a northerner I am calmer. But this will all now be sorted out.

[Marcou] When he returned from the Crimea after the failure of the putsch, Mr. Gorbachev expressed the hope that a reform of the Communist Party was still possible. He then changed his mind about that. How can you explain that attitude?

[Yakovlev] You are putting your finger on the heart of our great quarrel. At the 28th CPSU Congress, I said that if the party did not reform and become a real political force instead of an administrative tool, it would be left on the sidelines of history. Perestroika will be implemented with or without the party. It is now obvious that

I was right. For some time I had been saying that the party would either have to divide or I would have to leave it. I have always known that the party apparatus would not abandon its position calmly. There are too many privileges and too much money is earned without any real work for those rather uneducated and demagogic people to quietly withdraw. In the party there are hundreds of thousands of honest, educated people but those who held key posts were mediocre civil servants.

[Marcou] In our book of conversations, you expressed the hope that the market economy would be developed at the same time as an effective system of social protection and you described that plan as a "socially oriented market economy." Do you still think it is possible to establish this kind of protection against the eruption of unbridled capitalism?

[Yakovlev] We will certainly try to safeguard social protection but I think that the best way of protecting people now will be to establish optimum conditions for them to work and earn money. My economic program is simple: Let the people work and don't prevent them from earning money. Small and medium-sized enterprises must be privatized, especially commerce and services. In the rural districts, only the kolkhozes which work will survive, the others will vanish. Everything must be reviewed and the only criterion must be efficiency.

[Marcou] How can the new political scene be described? Do you place your Movement for Democratic Reforms in the center, between an ultraliberal Yeltsin and a Social Democratic Gorbachev?

[Yakovlev] As I said during our November 1990 talks, I do not like "isms" and political labels because they are meaningless. I do not side with Yeltsin's or Gorbachev's positions. I have never taken sides. I am primarily a convinced democrat and I have no social democratic program. I am skeptical about programs in general. In my long political career, I have followed a large trajectory from the complex to the simple. At one time I was fascinated by systems of thought and complex plans, but my program can now be summed up in this brief formula: "Let the people work." But what I want is for the people to be aware of and assimilate the notions of freedom and responsibility. At the moment, although freedom is desired, a sense of responsibility is disregarded. People have not yet realized that to live well you have to work hard.

[Marcou] Will other political parties be built on the ruins of the Communist Party? Will the Movement for Democratic Reforms, for which you are the main inspiration, turn into a party?

[Yakovlev] There is a real debate on this subject. Some people think that it should remain a movement whereas others want it to be turned into a party. I support the former group, because a movement can encompass several parties. Furthermore, because of the past, there is in

our country a real allergy to the very notion of a party as an institution. What counts is to unite all the democratic forces.

[Marcou] Your break with Gorbachev last July surprised many people, especially because during our conversations you had told me: "We must not stop halfway, we started together, we will continue together." What was the reason for that about-face?

[Yakovlev] When the right-wing forces became increasingly influential from December 1990, Gorbachev was in a difficult situation. He was attacked and criticized in the party and in public opinion. He was isolated and, from the ethical viewpoint, the question of leaving him then could not even be considered. But as soon as he strengthened his position, I tendered my resignation. That was because I no longer wanted to be associated with a leadership team in which a right-wing line predominated.

[Marcou] I have the feeling that in your articles, speeches, and interviews since that summer you have withdrawn all reference to the notion of socialism. Is this the sign of a turning-point in your own political itinerary?

[Yakovlev] I do not really question the idea of socialism, the ideal which it represents. But the socialism which we have built here does not deserve to exist. At all events, today's capitalism is not the same as it was last century. Francois Mitterrand is a socialist, Pierre Joxe is a socialist, but France is described as a capitalist country. I do not agree with that viewpoint. France is not a capitalist country in the sense which Marx gave that term last century. France is a country in which there are major socialist achievements. Throughout Western Europe, the socialists and social democrats have been in power at some time and have left their mark. In these conditions, can the influence of socialist ideals be denied? It is because of all that that our movement is prepared either to join the Socialist International or cooperate with it.

[Marcou] How and with whom will political pluralism be built? Will Gorbachev join the Movement for Democratic Reforms or create his own party?

[Yakovlev] I do not know. I have never spoken to him of the possibility of joining our movement. And I do not think that he wants to organize any other party. Moreover, in a country like ours which comprises several republics, the president must be above the parties. And if he belongs to one of them he must withdraw from it during his mandate. When we created that movement, it was designed as an opposition to the CPSU headed by Gorbachev. Now, in this post-putsch phase, we are living through a difficult period for democracy. It will be sorely tested. Will it be able to improve the situation? The putschists promised that. Now that the democrats have the power, will they be able to do anything? At the present time, Gorbachev is relying on the democratic forces. He and we are expected to take practical action.

Mikhail Sergeevich and I now have good and friendly relations: I see him often and we work together.

[Marcou] What remains of the Union, of any notion of the Center, and what is Gorbachev's real power?

[Yakovlev] The situation is paradoxical, I would even say strange. Everybody says they are against the Center but everybody continues to address the Center. And it is the Center which receives the bulk of demands and criticisms. It is even blamed for problems which fall within the republics' authority. For instance, for two years the republics have been given the task of supplying their population with food. And at the time they were pleased to be given that responsibility. Now, however, their leaders claim that it is the Center which is responsible for the poor management of supplies. We are in the middle of a transitional period: Everybody wants power and honor but refuses to respond when faced with specific actions.

[Marcou] How can the separatist contagion be handled? Is it still possible to stem the separatist wave? Is there awareness of the multiple crises which will be engendered by border problems and by interethnic quarrels?

[Yakovlev] I have my own viewpoint on this question, namely that I will not try to hold back any republic. First, I did a great deal to ensure that the Baltic countries became free and independent. Now that they have separated, we will all see how they move close to us. Nobody is thinking of touching the existing borders. Let us take the problem of the enclave of the former city of Königsberg: The Germans are not putting forward any claim. The same is true of Bukovin. All the existing borders are recognized by the Helsinki Accords and we have the signature of all heads of state. With regard to Moldova, I am not at all sure that it will continue to express a desire—as it is now doing—to join Romania. And if it really wants that, I am not sure that Romania will agree because I do not think it would be at all advantageous for it. But let's suppose that Romania agrees, as do the Moldovans. In that case the Russians in the Dnestr region—the richest part of that republic—will oppose that because they have absolutely no desire to go over to Romania. That is certain. What will become of Moldova without that territory? At the present time, the production of that Russian-speaking region represents a little more than one billion of gross national product. However, the rest of that republic has a deficit of almost two billion. In the Ukraine, if you remove the Crimea which does not want to separate from Russia, and the majority of cities with dense Russian populations (Footnote) (Lugansk, Kharkov, Nikolayev, Sumi, and Odessa), only the steppes remain. All that prompts me to say that for the time being the Union certainly exists. There are only the three Baltic republics which have separated and even in that case the negotiations should continue. The Union which remains will not just be economic. We are busy drawing up a political agreement which will be signed very soon.

[Marcou] Given this complex situation which you describe very convincingly, the prospect of complete sovereignty for the republics, even if they are still vaguely linked to the Center by economic and political agreements, raises the problem of the fate of nuclear weapons....

[Yakovlev] The question does not even arise. Nuclear weapons are in the president's hands and will stay there. Everybody agrees on that.

[Marcou] The defeat of the putsch seems to have had the effect of sweeping away a century of history with its values, myths, achievements, and heroic chapters—I am thinking in particular of the battle of Stalingrad as the symbol of the victory over the Third Reich or of the martyrdom of Leningrad's inhabitants during the German siege. Is anybody still drawing conclusions from 17 October and testing Marxism as a method of investigation?

[Yakovlev] People in our country are tired. The economic problems, and most elementary domestic problems are exhausting each individual. I think and hope that if the standard of living improves, interest in history and culture in general will return. We are a people who love extremes—we move suddenly and strongly from one side to the other. For a good part of the century, we were atheists, and religion now interests the majority of society. Everybody is in favor of democracy, but now that they have acquired it, they do not know how to use it or what to do with it.

[Marcou] A propos, in view of the fact that there is democracy in the country, are preparations being made for presidential elections by universal suffrage?

[Yakovlev] This question will be dealt with in the framework of agreements for the Union which will establish the method for conducting presidential elections: universal suffrage or election in the framework of parliament or yet another solution. I am in favor of universal suffrage. But it is up to the State Council for Parliament to establish the rules. I think that the population wants universal suffrage.

[Marcou] Would you be a candidate?

[Yakovlev] Never!

[Marcou] What about Eduard Shevardnadze?

[Yakovlev] Nor him.

[Marcou] And Mikhail Gorbachev?

[Yakovlev] I do not know. He does not talk about it. It is too soon. The economic problems must be solved first. It is becoming vital to know which republics will remain in the Union and which will leave. For the time being, we need to know precisely and stick at that. Anybody who does not want to stay can leave and organize themselves.

The choice must be made peacefully and freely and there will be no drama. The tragedy will be suffered by the peoples who leave.

'Communist Experiments' Impossible After Coup

PM0310095991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Sep 91 Union Edition p 3

[Doctor of Economic Sciences R. Ryvkina article: "1917 and 1991: Two Communist Experiments"]

[Text] After the 1917 revolution in Russia the foreign press repeatedly wrote that this revolution was extremely disastrous for the people but, at the same time, an instructive experiment.

But the history of Communist social experiments in Russia did not end there. The August 1991 putsch was yet another.

Everyone is now trying to track down the specific individuals responsible for the putsch. They must be identified, of course. But the investigatory angle must be supplemented by a historical view. The question "What are the social roots of the putsch?" is no less important than the question: "Who's to blame?" It is certainly true that the putschists wanted to play on the population's unsatisfied needs. They were well aware of why people are dissatisfied and on what basis they could secure their support.

Wherever you go, you hear people say: "The old order has been demolished, but no new system has been created." It is hard for people to live and work in rapidly changing conditions and with an uncertain future. After all, social stability (as the antipode of anarchy, with everyone fighting everyone else) is one of the main values of any normal human being. Sociologists rank it alongside interesting work and material living conditions. Perestroika has robbed millions of people of the stability (and therefore the interest) they had under the totalitarian system, under Stalinism and later, until the second half of the eighties. The reason is clear: It always takes far less time for an old system to collapse than for a new system to emerge and strengthen.

Universal nostalgia for this lost stability can be seen as the social basis of the putsch. This was the social mood that the putschists were able to count on.

However, calculations made in an office are one thing, and real life is something quite different. No one could know with any degree of accuracy before the putsch began how the population in the center and in the provinces would really react. That could only be discovered when the new regime planned by the putschists had been brought as close as possible to the people. When they had been shown this regime and told: "You support us, and this is what we will give you in return." When they had been offered the choice they had so much discussed: "Continued chaos or order."

By confronting people with the order they desired and offering them a regime which could guarantee this order, the putschists placed us all in the situation of a social experiment. It was essentially simple: They would introduce various new conditions and observe how the subject reacted to them (whether frogs or people, the concept of the experiment stays the same). But the putschists were not preparing a scientific experiment, of course: They wanted to seize power.

So what exactly was verified in the experiment of 18-20 August staged in the USSR by its long-suffering history? What was verified was the correlation of social forces and, in particular, the real influence of the "nostalgia for order" and the real choice of millions of people. If the putsch had been more radical, it would be ridiculous to talk about an experiment: Once the handcuffs have been put on, people no longer have a choice. But the situation on 18-20 August was more complex: The new order was announced, people were in a state of shock, but everyone remained at liberty. Consequently, once they had recovered from shock, they began to do whatever they felt was natural: Some went out to defend the White House, others plunged into secret talks; some returned from trips abroad, others did the opposite and decided to stay abroad. If we could now get an accurate picture of the correlation of forces between those who supported the ideology of the new order in this critical experimental situation and those who opposed this ideology, we would have a quantitatively accurate answer, tested in practice, to the question: What was the country's choice?

Such a comprehensive picture is impossible, of course. Nevertheless, the fact that the tanks did not open fire can be seen as a significant overall indicator. Evidently the putschists somehow gauged or sensed the correlation of forces in the country.

Unlike experiments in chemistry or physics, social experiments are instructive for the participants as well. On entering the putsch situation, confusion reigned in the country. On leaving, we all found ourselves to be politically more mature. Although the danger of a political putsch had long been discussed, we had never taken it really seriously or felt in our bones that it would happen. But when the specter of a coup suddenly came to life, the country's entire human potential seemed to mobilize.

Yes, during the putsch our choice became more precise. Before the putsch, it had consisted of two alternatives: "democracy" or "order in the country." The putsch showed that in actual fact our choice is quite different: "democracy" or a "repressive regime with tanks, handcuffs, and censorship." It was clearer to us in the three-day putsch than in all the years of perestroika that this is our only alternative.

The above concerns only one stage in our country's history: three days in 1991. But it is very important to view these three days from a historical standpoint and draw at least a dotted line to the source of the putsch:

1917. For all the obvious differences between the events of 1917 and 1991, they have much in common. Both social experiments were prepared gradually and conducted from above by a handful of conspirators. Both gave the people's interests as their justification and were allegedly carried out in the name of the people and their welfare. In fact, the aim of both experiments was to seize political power in a situation where the preceding power had become unsteady. Finally, both experiments played on the people's problems, using the slogans "Peace, bread, freedom" in 1917 and "Order in the country" in 1991.

This similarity is perfectly natural, because both experiments sprang from the same source: the Communist Party and its ideology.

But there is one difference. In 1917 the people allowed themselves to be deceived, were won over by flattery, did not suspect deception, and did not see through the demagoguery. But I would like to draw attention to one seemingly unimportant fact: The revolution under Communist slogans in 1917 was the first in Russia. It caught the people's enthusiasm. The Communist putsch of 1991 would have been the second. But society's memory of the events of 1917, 1929, 1937, 1939-1941, and many other bloody events in our history came into play.

If the putsch had not happened, we might have had to invent one. After all, we did not really believe that the specter of war communism would come to life again. It had to show some signs of life for us to believe it and be afraid. And when it began to revive we received another crash course (this is the fashion now!) in civic education. If we emerged from the putsch more mature than when it began, by interpreting its results we have become more mature than we were in the square in front of the White House. We have moved even further away from the people who were our predecessors in 1917. So it will be even more difficult to repeat the Communist experiment with us in the future. In fact, it will be impossible.

Putsch Investigation Commissioner Briefs Newsmen

PM0810115391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Oct 91 Single Edition p 2

[G. Ovcharenko report: "If You Want News, You Have Come to the Wrong Place..."]

[Text] "If You Want News, You Have Come to the Wrong Place..." is what A. Obolenskiy, chairman of the parliamentary commission investigating the causes and circumstances of the coup d'etat in the USSR and people's deputy of the country, told journalists at the first press conference hosted by the parliamentary commission.

He cited the law regulating the commission's activity whereby it is to carry out its work in camera and prevent any leak of information constituting a state secret or a

secret pertaining to the preliminary investigation. Moreover, all members of the commission have given the appropriate "undertaking not to make disclosures." And therefore, Aleksandr Mitrofanovich went on, this "press conference must be understood as the presentation of our commission."

In short, there was nothing said at the press conference, that is to say, presentation, about the causes of the putsch, the circumstances contributing to it, or what the commission had already managed to do. But journalists did manage, nevertheless, to extract a little. For example, it was said that the commission representatives have met with all the arrestees and have not heard a single complaint from them. In response to a PRAVDA correspondent's question, A. Obolenskiy stated that, in the commission's opinion, the putschists' trial should be held in open court.

Regarding the commission's tasks, it was reported, among other things, that it does not set itself the goal of being an "avenging sword" and does not reject the possibility of a "tragedy for the people who might have thought that they were doing good for the country."

Journalists were particularly intrigued by Obolenskiy's statement that, although the commission is seeking to get to the truth of what happened in August, the whole truth about the putsch will only be known by our descendants several generations on.

It was on this encouraging note that the presentation of the parliamentary commission ended. The journalists were able to see for themselves that its members know how to hold their tongue.

Public Attitudes on Coup Examined

924B0001A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Sep 91 p 1

[Comments by Yu. Levada, L. Sedov, and A. Levinson of the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research: "Victory Has Many Parents—Defeat Is Always an Orphan"]

[Text] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA asked three VTsIOM [All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research] sociologists one question: Who supported the putsch?

The more one works with numbers—with survey results—the more one thinks of their hidden meaning. I think that the data we were receiving during the hottest days of 20-21 August in the environment of a very excited and very poorly informed society speak more of TENDENCIES rather than PROPORTIONS. It is clear that even in the situation of high uncertainty the overwhelming majority of the population did not accept the coup.

I think that it would be interesting to discuss not the snapshot of the confused society by itself, but rather a

question formulated this way: Who would have supported the "emergency" had it lasted a little longer? If THIS had lasted a little longer—five days, perhaps—the people would have received more information about the situation, about the resistance on the part of the population and the Russian leadership. Then, I think, the share of those who recognized the legitimacy of the junta would have been not 20, but five to 10 percent. If, however, the junta had been able to stay in power for several months or half a year (such turn of events could be assumed until we learned the true level of its actors), then, I think, it would have been possible to see the true distribution of forces, in which not such a small share, but perhaps 30 to 40 percent would be inclined—or simply forced de facto—to recognize the junta, tolerate it in some way. Is it much or not?

The question is which social categories and groups would have fallen into this percentage. There are all the reasons to assume that they would be first and foremost the people in the older age groups, less educated, and more likely rural residents than city dwellers. In other words, those social groups which cannot by themselves constitute the foundation for a stable existence and development of the society. Their support is not enough for a protracted existence of the "emergency."

[signed] Yu. Levada, Doctor of Philosophy

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In my assessment, based on the comparison of various data, about 15 percent of the city dwellers in Russia supported the coup either by participation or as sympathizers.

Naturally, the democrats' victory has reduced this share: "Victory has many parents, but defeat is always an orphan." Nevertheless, I believe that even now about 8 percent remain in the position of supporting the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] and the ideas of the state of emergency, and about 18 percent are indifferent.

The GKChP leaders had wanted to play first and foremost on the great-power feelings that are still very strong—unlike the party and communist ones. For instance, 50 percent of the citizens of Russia supported (with 30 percent being against) outlawing the CPSU (after the putsch); at the same time, only 40 percent (with 36 percent against) supported the disbandment of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the transfer of all power to the republics, that is, the dismantling of the center. There is a reason to worry that these moods of "imperial nostalgia" will increase in Russia as the process of the disintegration of the country unfolds.

The majority of city population in Russia still does not part with the idea of the all-Union presidency (only 18 percent believe that such a post is not needed), and one-half believes that Gorbachev should remain in this post (one-third supports replacing him).

It appears that the population appreciated the neutral position of the Army in the putsch, and the attitude towards it improved among 30 percent of the population in Russia, and got worse among 12 percent.

In the eyes of the society, the CPSU as a whole and its apparat are the main culprits in the putsch (one-third of the respondents in Moscow), greater than even the KGB (15 percent) and the military-industrial complex and the Army (12 percent).

[signed] L. Sedov, Candidate of Historic Sciences

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"Who in our society supported the goals proclaimed by the GKChP?"—this question was asked by VTsIOM interviewers of 1,155 city residents in Russia on 24 August. About one-third were not certain; the others chose one of the five reply options. The reply selected most often: the coup was supported by those "who are not politically aware." This option was selected by 32 percent of respondents, which placed it far ahead of other options: "supporters of true socialism" (13 percent) and "those who want order" (12 percent). In the opinion of nine percent of the respondents, nobody supported GKChP goals at all. And, finally, a small minority of three percent chose this option: the coup was supported by "true patriots."

As we can see, as early as the morning after the putsch a relative majority was certain that a "normal" person—one who understands what the real situation is—cannot support the GKChP. I think that of all the facts revealed by the survey, this is the most important one. Kryuchkov and his fellow putschists were afraid, of course, that some people would not support them, but they had expected that by their promises (allocation of 15-hundredths, price decreases, etc.) and by demonstrating the return to "order" they would get the support of those they call "the people."

It is not obvious but it is supported by other VTsIOM data that the GKChP's "patriotic" gestures had not been able (or at least had not had time) to elicit a response wave of national-patriotism in the society. There is, by the way, an important conclusion that follows from this: Those national-patriotic leaders who have a better understanding of the situation will now abandon attempts to form a bloc with hardline Communists, or the core of the KGB, the military-industrial complex, and the Army, and will now start looking for ties with one or another democratic group. Both democrats in power and those in the opposition will be attractive to them. It appears that the political scene in Russia will be reshuffled.

[signed] A. Levinson, Candidate of Art History

As we were going to print:

HOW WOULD YOUR LIFE HAVE CHANGED HAD THE COUP SUCCEEDED?

For the better—8 percent

For the worse—47 percent

Would not have changed—21 percent

Do not know—24 percent

VTsIOM survey: 2,075 respondents, representative sample of the USSR adult population, preliminary data.

Deputy on Functions of New Central Organs

924B0001B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, RSFSR people's deputy and political scientist by Andrey Sorokin; place and date not given: "The Center Can No Longer Impose Its Opinion: The State Council Needs To Be Expanded"]

[Text] At the request of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy and political scientist, gives his assessment of the new structures of the all-Union power.

[Ambartsumov] The center at this point had three functioning organs of power: the president, the State Council, and the Committee on Operational Management of the National Economy. I would start with the latter, because normalization of the economy is the key to stabilization of the entire society.

It is known that Silayev would much prefer to return to his post in Russia. It would be in common interest, however, to keep him as the head of the committee, at least for some time. The government of Russia and Silayev's new all-Union team are exactly the structures capable of establishing interrepublic economic coordination. No matter what plan of accelerated economic reform is eventually adopted (most likely, it will still be Yavlinskiy's plan), we should not forget about the current discipline and the preservation of a single economic mechanism.

In time, it will probably make sense to consider putting a new man at the helm of this committee—or rather, government, which it would still be advisable to create, with limited functions and with the center of gravity shifted to the republics. In my opinion, the person to head it would be a notable pragmatist-practitioner familiar with our economy and all of its open and hidden springs. Someone like, for instance, Svyatoslav Fedorov.

Now, about the State Council. Its emergence is quite natural. It seems to me, however, that the State Council is an organ—convening from time to time—of the confederation the USSR is inevitably turning into. There are, however, very important current state affairs the president cannot decide on singlehandedly. It seems regrettable to me that the State Council is comprised of

only the republics' presidents and does not have members that could have been selected from a pool of the most distinguished and nationally respected reformers and appointed there by the president.

And, finally, the functions of the president himself. Right now, we have a tandem at the helm of the country; moreover, since the coup Yeltsin has gained the number one position. Quite possibly it offends the USSR president, but in the final count, it is not only in the interests of the country, but in the interests of Gorbachev himself. The boundless number of responsibilities imposed on the president had led to a situation where he had not been able to keep control over all the functions. They are still quite extensive and not just ceremonial—to answer the frequently used expression “the Queen of England.” Gorbachev is also important as a symbol tying together the country in danger of disintegration.

[Sorokin] The State Council is the body that has to handle all most serious disagreements between the republics. In your opinion, what instruments for influencing this situation do Gorbachev and Yeltsin possess now?

[Ambartsumov] Generally, only the force of persuasion, the force of argument. The republics themselves increasingly understand that there is a certain linkage on the economic level, and that each one separately may fall down. There is a problem of common security: common defense of the sovereign republics from aggressive forces—both internal and external—that at this point may be totally impossible to predict. This problem is linked with the problem of the nuclear arsenal. Right now, fortunately, it worked out that Russia has taken upon itself the burden—and it is a burden—of responsibility for the nuclear arms. But it does not want to be a nuclear zone, either. Let us hope that in the nearest future the other nuclear superpower will also speed up the process of nuclear testing reductions. But then there will be a problem of combating the proliferation of nuclear arms and of potential nuclear terrorism. In this respect, of course, the responsibility is shared by all republics.

Finally, there is a problem of common foreign policy. Instead of being an umbrella for the organization, for which they had been previously providing a cover, Soviet embassies abroad should—and can—become an umbrella for the diplomats of the republics remaining in the Union, for the representation of their political interests abroad. Obviously, the structure of the all-Union MFA should change accordingly.

[Sorokin] Are you not concerned that the resource of persuasion and argument may become depleted very soon? Many republic leaders already are not responding to these methods.

[Ambartsumov] There is such a danger. First of all on the part of those republics where the democratic movement is weak—I mean the Central Asian republics (with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), Azerbaijan,

and Georgia. They will be striving for sovereignty, for maximum independence in order to preserve their internal regimes. But I do not think that the national communist circles there will remain in power for long, either. They will be pushed aside by another elite—of religious, Islamic type.

As to the Ukraine, I would still like to hope that there will not be a complete separation. The roots of relationship between Ukraine and Russia are just too deep.

[Sorokin] Do you expect some changes in the organs of new all-Union power in the nearest future?

[Ambartsumov] Possibly. But the result may be the preservation and development of one or another function of the center only upon the consent of the republics.

President Creates Sociopolitical Research Organization

92P50009A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Oct 91
Union Edition p 8

[Unattributed report: “Political Experts Hold Open Discussion”]

[Text] October 3rd was the first evening of political lectures of the Fund for Sociopolitical Research.

This fund was created by decree of the President of the USSR. The Institute of Political Forecasting, the Center for International Relations, and the Center for the Study of International Political Experience will operate within the framework of this Fund. The Fund council includes the following: G. Shakhnazarov, S. Stankevich, D. Volkogonov, A. Galkin, A. Kiva, Yu. Krasin, O. Latsis, K. Lubenchenko, V. Lukin, and other well-known political experts. One of the important areas of its work will be regular meetings of prominent political figures and scholars of diverse political orientation, at which free and open discussion will be held.

Yakovlev Criticizes Marxism; New Research Fund Established

LD0610095791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2037 GMT 3 Oct 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Stepanchenko]

Moscow, 3 Oct (TASS)—Aleksandr Yakovlev, a member of the Political Consultative Council under the USSR president, today criticized Marxist teaching and its implementation in the Soviet Union. His public report, which contains an analysis of the theoretical legacy of Marxism and its practical consequences, has in fact set in motion the work of a sociopolitical research fund [sotsialno-politicheskikh issledovaniy], which has been set up by decree of the USSR president.

Commenting on the consequences of Marxism in the USSR, Aleksandr Yakovlev said, in part: “At the end of

the day Marxism has brought us to the abyss, to backwardness and the extirpation of one's conscience." In his view, by attaching itself to Marxist teaching, Bolshevik Communism lost out in its dispute with history because of the sins originally implanted in its genes. The first sin was the sacrifice of the actual living person to an abstract one, of the individual to the community, and of life to a master plan. The second sin was the sacrifice of morals.

The priority plans for the new fund, for which Aleksandr Yakovlev will serve as honorary chairman, involve research into the radical changes in the sociopolitical structure and state administration of the country and the problems of federalism, interethnic and international relations, the development of leaders, and the technology of election campaigns. To this end the fund is setting up an institute of political projections, a center for international relations, and a center for the study of international political experience.

The fund's council, which includes prestigious statesmen and political figures and eminent political scientists—Georgiy Shakhnazarov, Sergey Stankevich, Dmitry Volkogonov, Aleksey Kiva, Otto Latsis, Konstantin Lubenchenko, and Vladimir Lukin—plans to turn this organization into an independent pluralistic platform of free public thinking. It will become a kind of bridge serving as a meeting place for statesmen, political figures, and scientists who wish to link the escape from the present crisis in society to the complete dismantling of the totalitarian system and a mastering of the worldwide values of democracy.

Further on Yakovlev's Attack on Marxism

LD0610103191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 4 Oct 91

[Text] Doctor Aleksandr Yakovlev has debunked the Marxist theory and condemned its uses. The member of the Political Consultative Committee, under the Soviet president, was addressing political scientists and newsmen. Radio Moscow's (Valeriy Platonov) shares his impressions and writes the following:

Dr. Yakovlev opened political readings of a social and political studies fund. This was set up by a decision of the president. Both the choice of Yakovlev as a speaker and what he had to say immediately spelled out the fund's key effort: to look for a way out of the present crisis. The board of this fund believes the totalitarian structure must be completely disbanded and the true values of civilization must be adopted.

The former member of the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee traced Marxism from its origin up to date. Where the ideology of Marxism was accepted, the teaching became a state religion, a religion dangerous for the rest of the world at that.

[Yakovlev, in Russian fading into English report] Any person on earth knows that Marxism in the first place is

a teaching of destroying both private ownership of the means of production and the material, legal, and spiritual foundations for Western civilization. As you know, Marx as long as he lived remained loyal to the Communist Manifesto, this guide for the proletarians to destroy everything that had until now safeguarded private ownership. Marxism is an expansionist doctrine by nature; it's a teaching of a permanent proletarian revolution. What makes Marxist fundamentalism dangerous is that it allows for labeling us as supporters of revolutionary terrorism. Marxism maintains that everything that is consonant with the interests of the Revolution and Communism is law. When these principles became a government policy the tragedy began.

That morality was used to justify the taking of hostages, the clampdown on peasant farmers, concentration camps, and the resettlement of people. In the end Marxism led us to the brink of an abyss, to backwardness and the decay of morality. Marxist vision of the society's economic development was wrong. Its hypothesis that a government-run [as heard] is more efficient than any other proved unjustified, said Aleksandr Yakovlev. The nationalization of means of production and management by decree failed to bring about quick technological progress.

It makes no sense to bow to irrelevant dogmas. If social and economic utopias are tried to be translated into reality they lead to disaster. The history of this country is evidence of that. Aleksandr Yakovlev says that Bolshevik Communism lost its dispute with history due to several inherent flaws. The presence of obstruction to the human being, of community to the individual under the scheme to life was one [sentence as heard]. The sacrifice of morality was another flaw. Aleksandr Yakovlev warned that inhuman system has undergone insignificant transformation and that Stalinism lives on. What is to be done now in order to do away with the deadly legacy of the past, then?

Our salvation is in restoring the hierarchy of values, in changing the spiritual situation in promoting spiritual evolution, relying on the basics of life, said Dr. Aleksandr Yakovlev, addressing political scientists and newsmen.

Deputies Comment on Future of USSR

924B0005A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 38, Sep 91 p 4

[Statements by USSR People's Deputies Roy Medvedev, Albert Makashov, Olzhas Suleymenov, and Boris Oley-nik, and RSFSR People's Deputy Father Gleb Yakunin: "Fatherland, Tell Us Where You Are Headed? USSR and Russian People's Deputies Reflect"]

[Text]

Roy Medvedev: The Union Is Inviolable After All

When I hear resounding declarations about "the disintegration of the USSR" and "the former Soviet Union," I interpret this either as panic or wishful thinking.

Our country was created and existed within its current boundaries long before 1917. We are bound by thousands of threads and by centuries of living within the same state, within the same economic, political, cultural, and humanitarian universe. Is the will of individual leaders or a wave of opportunism really capable of destroying it? I believe that "de facto" the Union existed, still exists—and will exist!

By all signs, even the republics which have proclaimed their political "divorce" from the Union do not intend to sever the entire wealth of relations. Those who will attempt to do so will find out very soon that they are simply not in a position to sustain their existence separately.

The leaders of some republics, particularly in the Baltic area, refer to the experience of the "small countries" of Europe which succeeded in ensuring economic prosperity under independence. I think such references are improper. These countries have been developing for centuries precisely as separate states, whereas the historic experience and traditions of, for example, the Baltic republics are absolutely different. Incidentally, real politicians understand this: For example, there is a reason why representatives of all 15 republics participate in solving the economic problems of the country one way or another.

I am convinced that those who have now yielded to political centrifugal tendencies will sooner or later come to appreciate the need for creating and reinforcing central power and centralized government in a renewed format on the basis of a joint agreement. It is another matter that this is better done sooner rather than later. Is it really necessary for all of us to live through chaos, enmity, and bloodshed in order to learn that we are inseparable? The price is too high...

It is necessary to ensure this actual inseparability "de jure" in order not to pay this price. Our centrifugal movement has gone so far in this sphere that, of course, we will have to agree to any compromise. It appears to me that this is what the USSR Congress of People's Deputies did, paying a price for the preservation of the all-Union organs of power in that these organs themselves became much more authoritarian and less democratic, and legislative power yielded to executive power considerably, to the detriment of constitutionality. However, I cannot argue that a different way out existed under the circumstances.

However, in other cases restrictions on democracy are clearly arbitrary, and are dictated by political trends. This is what reprisals against the CPSU became. That the general secretary resigned his powers and stated the wish that the Central Committee disband itself does not

mean that the disbandment of the party occurred, as they hastily proclaimed. I am convinced that the CPSU has a right to exist, and will exist, as one of the political parties under a multiparty system. Scientific socialism, of which Marxism-Leninism was neither the first nor the last stage of development, has by no means exhausted its potential. I think the anti-Communist hysteria will recede soon, and the party will be reborn. The Central Committee might recover from shock, or a group of Communist parliamentarians might assume the functions of a temporary center...

However, at present the Union Treaty is the most important point, as well as the reinforcement and establishment, on a new basis, of the common space, primarily economic space, which exists "de facto."

Albert Makashov: The People Were Deprived of Their Voice

I am a Communist and I subscribe to a class approach to history. Ultimately the leading role in history is played by the working masses: the workers, the peasants, and the working intelligentsia. They drive social development. Even a most popular politician and a most educated parliament will be doomed to demise sooner or later if they go against this force.

"Dictating" history through "putsches" similar to the recent one is an even greater impossibility. In general, as I see it, this was a spectacle rather than a coup, a spectacle in the course of which the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] acted as someone's puppets, as hostages to someone's secret interests... It is enough to look soberly at the nature of the "putsch" for this to become obvious. It appears that having declared that they had taken power, the leaders of the "putsch" subsequently did everything to ensure their failure (that is to say, did absolutely nothing practical!). Bringing armored materiel to the streets of Moscow was rather like a familiarization exhibit for pioneers and schoolchildren.

However, this is just a remark in passing. Let us go back to the role of the masses. Indeed they play a decisive role, but precisely in the final count. At present, their will is being egregiously trampled on and ignored. This has to do with the resolution of the issue of the Union by the rulers. The kind of "Union" devised at the Congress means the disintegration and breakup of the great united power and a sacrilege with regard to our ancestors who shed their blood and died in battles precisely for a united state. The "Center" allowed itself to be led by politicians who have seized power in the republics and are pursuing their own objectives, which are hostile to the class interests of the working people, rather than the peoples of the republics. In reality the preservation of the USSR was possible on the basis of the principles built into the 1922 Treaty, within the current borders of the country. It is exceedingly inhumane to test the degree of our real integration by strengthening disintegration!

After all, the people will be the ones paying the price! They have already sensed the menace and are taking their measures. Congresses of workers have been held in many cities. The peasants are stopping the sale of grain to the authorities: They do not wish to feed parasitic politicians.

If the authorities are bad, the people should elect others in a constitutional manner; however, at the latest Congress they were virtually deprived of this opportunity as well... Meanwhile, the disintegration of the Union is underway, and I do not see what may stop it now.

Olzhas Suleymenov: On the Basis of Common Confidence

I am an optimist. In the future, I envision the United States of Eurasia—a collective of nations, of bright individualities which will follow a policy of common sense and of friendly and civilized coexistence rather than a crowd of destitute, leveled states and peoples. I believe that precisely this kind of development will be imposed on them by the difficult experience of the suffering we have gone through in the course of our barbaric, ignorant, and uncivilized coexistence, under dehumanizing and ruinous totalitarian oppression which was common for all of us.

It is precisely this oppression that has brought about mutual suspicions, enmity, and bloodshed...

Do not get me wrong: I do not at all want to ignore all that we have lived through and acquired together over the ages. We did not come together just yesterday; we have "built up" the lively economic, cultural, and geopolitical ties of kinship at all levels, from peoples to individuals and families. This is not only "a difficult heritage" but also our wealth.

It will be possible indeed to take full advantage of this wealth when every trace of coercion and inequality is gone from our relationship, when the need for living together is appreciated by us voluntarily, on the basis of our freely gained experience!

I am in favor of the Union of Sovereign States similar to the European Community but with a more clearly defined, strong center created on the basis of common confidence. The decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies open such a path. These are steps which should have been taken long ago. At present the main point is to maintain peace among our peoples, avoid blind separatism, and strike a reasonable balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces.

We should not by any means stoop to counting mutual wrongs, to say nothing of settling scores. This does not involve interethnic relations only. Thus, I am convinced that "revenge" should not be taken against millions of honest Communists for the villainy of the apex of the state-Communist hierarchy. I think the Communist Party may and should exist in a civilized multiparty system as a representative of certain social forces.

The Law on the Opposition, which will clearly regulate its rights and responsibilities to society, is needed in order to avoid a relapse of "the rule of revolutionary law" on the part of native brothers, right-wing and left-wing radicalism. We were not the ones to note that progress is possible only as the resultant force of a struggle-interaction between innovators and healthy conservatives.

To preserve its unity, the Union should first of all become a genuine rule-of-law, democratic state in which the rights of both individuals and all peoples are respected; these rights are inseparable.

Father Gleb Yakunin: Beggars on the Ruins

The current disintegration of the monstrous USSR is a reality. It is also a rule: The peoples have become accustomed to identifying the authority of the center with the arbitrary rule of the Communist empire, the partocracy, the military-industrial complex, and the KGB. Of course, a federation is out of the question by now—thank God, if we preserve at least something on the basis of a confederation.

However, if the peoples of the former USSR could immediately become truly independent, having shed all the old chains of relations, we should only welcome it. Alas... Our commonality will continue to exist due, at the very least, to our monstrously perverted economy whereby all republics are forced to maintain a united economic field as they are equally uncompetitive in the world market. However a common political "boss" is harmful and unnecessary. We need a consultative economic center on an interrepublic basis. A joint organ for controlling nuclear weapons is necessary. Finally, cultural and spiritual ties should be preserved through our joint efforts, including interdenominational ties, especially between Orthodoxy and Islam, which have the largest numbers of believers on the territory of the former USSR.

At present, it is hard to predict how this new, nonimperial commonality will emerge—the dust has to settle over the ruins of the empire. At any rate, it is clear that soviet organs, including the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, have played their historical role, and we should not interfere with their dying a natural death. However, they resist for egoistic motives—we saw this at the Congress.

I believe that ultimately everything will settle the way Solzhenitsyn predicted. The Slavic republics, brothers in blood and religion, will stay together. The Baltic area is gone, and it will not come back. Moldova will join Romania... and so on.

The hatred for the totalitarian system has now been extended to Russia. However I believe that these "liberation diseases" of the republics are temporary. At present Russia should be as patient and attentive as possible, and should not give even the smallest pretext for charges of great-power intentions.

Within Russia itself, the traditions of an intelligent, enterprising, and hard-working people should be restored, competition in the sphere of work should be given a free hand, and the prestige of good work and good earnings should be enhanced. Our republic may and should become an attractive example in this field, and therefore, a center of attraction (of course, not as it was previously interpreted).

At present I view preaching tolerance and goodness and preventing the outbreak of a civil war in this time of troubles as the main missions of the church. Unfortunately I would not take upon myself to completely rule out this scenario of the development of events. However, we should at least do everything in order to avoid it...

Boris Oleynik: Freedom Is Not a Toy!

First of all, I am convinced that it is necessary for the plenipotentiary USSR President in the person of M.S. Gorbachev to remain. All of his shortcomings notwithstanding, this may be virtually the only "linchpin" and guarantor of the Union whose legitimacy is acknowledged by a majority of both the citizens and peoples of the country.

I am definitely in favor of the Union. At any rate, I am aware of the absolute indivisibility of the historic fate of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. I see no contradiction between their sovereignty and unity.

The right to sovereignty is a sacred right of the peoples. The Union should be a union of the truly equal and free on a voluntary and feasible foundation.

This foundation does exist. Have we not lived for centuries so that grain has been grown in the Ukraine, bread has been sliced in Kamchatka, and butter has been spread on it in, say, Armenia? Of course, this is a simplification, but this does not change the essence.

If we truly adhere to freedom, independence, and sovereignty, we cannot treat them as castles in the air. We should proceed from the realities of life. The latter are such that whether we like it or not, we will live as neighbors, interacting and intertwining.

However, this is not to say that even minor irresponsibility may be displayed concerning the issue of the future of the Union! Balance, tactfulness, and wisdom should definitely be there! Look at this: No sooner had the statement by a press secretary of the RSFSR president appeared than the strongest "vibrations" affected the entire Soviet Union. Many people interpreted this as a relapse of well-known unpredictability and the inclination to take poorly thought-out and hasty steps. After all, this is not too far from entering a very dangerous stage: from battles over ethnic dignity—to battles over boundaries. That the axes will "do the work" in such battles is virtually inevitable. Therefore, a central power "linchpin" is necessary, but not just any "linchpin," whatever "linchpin!"

Indeed, during the days of the putsch, Russia saved more than just Russian democracy, and we are grateful for this. However, no republic may claim the role of "the most equal" in the Union, and as much as hint at that lightly, to say nothing of interfering in the affairs of its neighbors. This truly provokes separatism. I would like to hope that we will avoid this in the future.

I believe we should approach the arrangement of the Union in keeping with folk wisdom. At any decisive juncture, we should definitely consult the entire people, such as the Ukraine intends to do. It is absolutely impermissible to restrict and infringe on the representative organs of people's power. Unfortunately such a trend is discernible in certain aspects...

It is reasonable that by now an opportunity has been provided for the republics to participate in the Union to varying degrees, and that all models proposed by them have been accepted. All that is needed is for this to be truly the will of the people rather than a game of politicians who have usurped the right to speak in the name of the people.

I believe that we will have a commonwealth of peoples! We will have it because at present the peoples will not let anybody, including their own and someone else's politicians, make decisions for them. That time is gone. I am firmly convinced of the wisdom of the people and their good will.

Burbulis on Steps to 'Voluntary' Union

924B0018A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 36, 8-15 Sep 91 p 4

[Text] This year has been marked by a tense and uncompromising confrontation with the Union Centre, the bulwark of the Soviet communist totalitarian regime. Russia has taken some steps to meet the Centre halfway or conclude truces, but nevertheless the two have remained in a continuous state of conflict.

What has changed? What is fundamentally new after the three grim days of the anticonstitutional conspiracy and the defeat of the putschists? Some commentators believe the plotters have caused the system to self-destruct, as if by attacking democratic change they have eliminated the aggressive, totalitarian Union Centre with their own hands. I wouldn't assess the situation so light-heartedly. It's time to realize that the removal of individuals nurtured by the criminal system without changing that system's economic, political and legal foundations is not going to alter anything. It is an illusion that by arresting Pavlov, Lukyanov, Kryuchkov, Yazov and their associates and by closing down Communist Party offices we have stopped the totalitarian Centre from blocking all progress. Such illusions are not only naive and unforgivable, they are irresponsible. The Union Centre is not a geographical notion with a precise address, reaching out from the Kremlin to entangle the Republics. The Centre is the totalitarian system itself, which has extended over the entire area of the "Land of Soviets." For this reason

(not because they are naive), many people approach the problem of "sovereign Republics versus the imperial Centre" in a simplistic way. I think the solution of the problem lies in a qualitative change of the totalitarian social system through radical economic, political and cultural reforms.

The three days of the coup have shown beyond doubt that the Centre's borders do not run along the walls of the Kremlin or the frontiers of Russia. The border line runs between different values and objectives and the two ideas of how life should be organized in the enormous area which used to be the USSR. One set of objectives is held by those Union Republics which remain the stronghold of the communist regime. Entirely different objectives are held by Russia which has launched a programme of reform independent of ideology and carried this programme through despite opposition.

Hence the new problem that arose after the crushing of the putsch and the victory of democratic forces. After the battle the people of Russia have waged against totalitarianism, many ask how much longer we will have to expose ourselves to danger as we strain to pull the behemoth of the USSR out of the morass. Would it not be a better policy to look after the interests of the Russian people, declare our independence and order the life of the Republic according to the laws of a sovereign state? This position put on guard many Republics who think that Russia and Yeltsin are taking advantage of the Centre's state of shock in order to seize their powers and structures, in the spirit of Russian imperial tradition.

Who gains by interpreting Russia's actions in this way? These very people. Now it has become clear that the president of Russia and the people are really one, not only in conditions of peace, but also when the tanks start rolling. It is now clear that the peoples of Russia are shaking off their ingrained fear, although with an effort. Evidently methods of force no longer work and sooner or later the decommunization process will be completed. In these conditions, think some people in other Republics, would it not be better to dissociate themselves from the democratic, "procapitalist infection" in order to preserve their own communist totalitarian regime? This approach, among many other contributing factors, puts in question the further existence of the Union which only yesterday bound different peoples together by coercion and lies and deprived them of all rights. I think that if there is to be a Union, it should consist of sovereign Republics joining it voluntarily and with consideration of their own advantages.

I'm convinced this is possible. What specific moves can be made towards such a Union? First. There should be a transition period in which the totalitarian Centre can no longer rule the Union while the Republics are not ready for this. Second. Economic agreements should be hammered out on a priority basis between the 15 Republics and mutually advantageous rules of economic and managerial activities should be established throughout the former Union. Third. Temporary structures should be

formed to coordinate economic activity (e.g., an inter-republican economic council) and to steer state affairs and politics. Fourth. A temporary parliament should be set up, composed of representatives of the Republics (on the basis of quotas), with legislative powers for the duration of the transitional period. Fifth. All this would only be possible, given the obvious condition that the Republics independently decide on their form of participation in the long-awaited Union of sovereign states.

Consensus-Building Role Seen for Union Parliament

924B0018C Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 37, Sep 91 p 6

[Konstantin Lubenchenko interviews Vladimir Orlov. Words in boldface as published]

[Text] The USSR no longer exists in the shape it has existed for 69 years. During the days of the August coup, the central authority signed its own death warrant. But here is the surprise: The Supreme Soviet of the USSR will nevertheless continue existing with the consent of the sovereign Republics. Is this a tribute to constitutional conventionalities? A political expediency? These and other questions are pondered in a talk with Vladimir Orlov of MN by USSR people's deputy Konstantin Lubenchenko.

"There is every indication that Union power structures have lost legitimacy, as well as their functions, and the very institution of parliamentarism has been discredited," he said. "It is sufficient to recall the part played by Anatoly Lukyanov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is an open secret that he virtually controlled three apparats: the party apparat, that of the USSR Supreme Soviet and that of the government. The apparat, for example, even compiled the lists of objectionable deputies... This suggests that the all-Union legislative structure, controlled by the apparat, moreover in conditions of the Union's rapid disintegration, is unnecessary. But this conclusion is superficial."

Can you refute it?

I believe that in present-day conditions a renunciation of the Union parliament would amount to disaster—primarily for Russia. The fact that Russia's power structures proved to be more capable in extraordinary conditions than the Union's suggests that they can become substitute for the Centre. The Republics, however, will most likely appraise this as expansion. In this eventuality, Russia will not merely lose its role as moderator in border, ethnic and interethnic conflicts, but will provoke their escalation on her own territory. During the transition period, the central authorities can and must settle interrepublican disputes.

But how? Will the new Centre have enough power to do this? After all, parliament has now been deprived even of legislative initiative...

There is nothing terrible about that. The Supreme Soviet is necessary as a tribune for resolving disputes and differences between those subjects whose representatives sit in parliament. It must also coordinate the activities of law enforcers and keep a vigilant eye on the observance of human rights at all times... This will be a peculiar locale for diplomatic talks among the Republics for the entire transition period. During this time acceptable variants of economic agreements among the Republics must be found, and questions of their national security resolved. The new parliament can and must become a round table for achieving consensus.

Do you believe that the plan by which it will be formed will open up such prospect? And what about the former autonomies? They have never received a full vote in the Council of the Republics...

When we, with Rutskoi, Shakhrai, Stepankov and other representatives from Russia and the Centre, were drafting the final document of the Congress, I raised this question on more than one occasion. As I see it, the autonomies' representation in the new parliament is inadequate to their role. And this is a "time bomb."

There are also other dangers in the way to consensus, of course. Take, for example, the unabating anticommunist and anticollaborationist feelings, which are still hard to contain within the framework of legality. All this together provides a typical picture of society's mental imbalance, with the hallmarks of not only individual but even social hysteria.

Neither the right nor the left now control the situation. Some due to the nervousness generated by suspicions of being involved in the putsch; others due to their understanding of the inefficiency of the Union power structures. The democrats are prepared for a resolute, but half-hearted step; leave the Union political scene. All these problems will gravely compound the work of the "transitional" parliament.

You didn't mention among them the excessive pressure of the winners. Don't you think that victory had made the Russian rulers somewhat heady? How else can their statement about revision of frontiers be explained?

Indeed, that statement was hot-headed. The demand for a revision of frontiers conceals one of the greatest dangers for the political space which used to be known as the USSR.

According to my estimate, today there are over 20 flashpoints where conflicts may break out at any time in the name of "revising frontiers." But after all, there is an international principle. Don't be alarmed by a comparison with Africa, but when the colonial empires were disintegrating in the early 1960s, a principle was proclaimed: "The frontiers must not be revised." The same principle is predominant in Latin America now.

This must be accepted in our case as well. But the congressional document contains no such recognition,

although it would have been enough for the Russian leadership merely to nod. However, they didn't nod... Of course, not in order immediately to start talking about the Crimea, Novorussia; they wanted to reserve the trump card for themselves. But on the other hand, Russia must become a guarantor of stability.

Whether or not the "transitional" parliament will be able to play its historic role will also depend on its composition. Do you know which of the USSR people's deputies will represent Russia in the Supreme Soviet?

Not yet. But I hope that these will be upstanding, balanced and competent people. Today we desperately need diplomats on the domestic front.

G. Popov Moots Interim Structure for Society

PM0810074591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Oct 91 Union Edition p 1

[Gavril Popov article: "What Next? Notes on the Present Moment"]

[Text] It is very difficult to find even two or three days to write a normal article, if one follows the normal rules of the genre. Therefore I shall beg the reader's forgiveness for the fragmentary nature of my remarks. My themes are:

- theoretical assessment,
- analysis of practice,
- proposals for the future.

Theoretical Assessment

A month has passed since the putsch. What has changed? Have we learned any lessons? Have we drawn all the conclusions? Has the danger of a new putsch been averted? Have we taken a new path?

To answer all these questions it is necessary somehow to rise above the sessions and rallies, speeches and articles, and resignations and appointments. It is necessary to find a new line, the main problems of the era, to find the reference point which makes it possible to put everything in its proper place and understand it all.

The main problem is to draw a line under the Marxist-Leninist version of the bureaucratic and totalitarian socialist experiment and return to the broad highway of humanity. We have fulfilled our mission for civilization: We have made the world move on past the traditions of capitalism and embark on a new path and have warned by "personal example" against the most dangerous delusions.

In the economy we must implement destatization and privatization, create proprietors, a market, and competition, and on that basis clothe and feed the country.

In politics, we must protect human rights and replace the totalitarian system by a parliamentary democratic republic.

In national organization, we must dismantle the empire, free the peoples, and enable them to resolve their own destiny.

In a totalitarian country these transformations could begin only from the top and only on the initiative of the top man in the system. But thereafter the process had several variants.

From the viewpoint of national organization, it could follow three patterns:

- centrally regulated on a Union-wide scale,
- completely independently in each republic, accompanied by the total disintegration of the empire,
- in various combinations of independent development in the republics and of the common, centralized, coordinated efforts of all republics.

From the viewpoint of the existing social forces, development could also take three forms:

- the apparatus form, in which transformations are organized by those forces which led the country in the period of bureaucratic socialism,
- the democratic form, when large groups of the people, that is, the majority of society, take power into their hands,
- one coalition or another of apparatus and democratic forces.

From the viewpoint of the political mechanism, the transition also had three variations:

- use the pattern of the Soviet system cleansed of bureaucratization and a one-party monopoly,
- use the traditional system of the Western democratic republic with a parliament, self-management, a free press, a multiparty system, and so forth,
- find some special type of political arrangement taking into account the fact that the transition to a free market economy and democracy in countries such as Greece, Chile, South Korea, and others was carried out under regimes which combined enough economic freedom with rigid administrative control from the top.

Such is the overall "stock" of theoretically possible development options.

What has actually happened?

Analysis of Practice

Six years of perestroika have shown:

- the apparatus was incapable of organizing the transition to a new society,

—the center was incapable of organizing a process of transformations which suits the whole Union,

—the Soviet system proved unfit for anything creative.

These results can be explained and assessed in various ways. But they are the reality.

Six years of perestroika also showed:

- attempts by each republic to go its own special way are possible and realistic. But they are too costly,
- furthermore, under this option many centers of conflict will appear between republics and those centers will multiply as the autonomous entities join in the process of sovereignization.

Six years of perestroika have shown that attempts to utilize the forms of democracy known throughout the world have not had the desired effect since the old society did not contain within it sufficiently crystallized social groups interested in and capable of creating their own parties. In brief, democracy could not find in our country the kind of civic society for which democracy was the only possible superstructure.

That is why in our country democracy was enough to bring down totalitarianism but completely incapable of giving fifteen-hundredths of a hectare to everyone who wanted it even with the great abundance of land here.

Democracy degenerated into a squabble over microphones in the halls of elected organs.

The democrats themselves—without apparatus forces—were incapable of leading. That is galling. But it is a fact.

These are general conclusions. How have they manifested themselves in practice?

In the sphere of **national organization**, initially there were attempts to follow the pattern of the single Union.

When it became clear that this option either does not take into account the interests of individual republics or is very slow, or that certain republics do not want to wait for the rest—then the process of the proclamation of republics' sovereignty began.

Then M. Gorbachev tried to find some kind of combination of the center and the republics. The Novo-Ogarevo process began. Before the putsch it followed a pattern in which the center predominated. For example, N. Nazarbayev spoke of the need for a common Council of Ministers. Only B. Yeltsin immediately gave priority to the republics and proposed an Interrepublic Committee as a government. But in the treaty due to have been signed in August the idea of a sufficiently strong center prevailed.

After the putsch the situation changed. The center is now seen as something secondary in relation to the republics. The formula of One (the center) plus Nine (the republics) is replaced by the formula Nine plus One.

In this regard the weakening of the center is compensated for by the fact that the number of republics wishing to take part in the various agreements on the Union is increasing. Thus one can talk of the formula 10 plus 1, 11 plus 1, and so forth.

But the complexity here has remained. First, in the problem of autonomous entities. Clearly there cannot be two moralities—one for the republics which totalitarianism classified as the group of union republics, another for the republics which it called autonomous.

In the sphere of the forces trying to direct the transformations, the process developed as follows.

At first the center assumed the leadership. The opposition from the Left and the Right was not great. There was even an image: a boat with two oars.

But as it became clear that the center was not coping with the role of leader, both conservatives and democrats began to stand aloof and struggle for power.

In the elections to local and republic soviets victory went in some republics to one side, in other republics to the other.

In Russia as a whole the democrats won. In a number of other republics nationalist democrats won. Elsewhere national communists were victorious.

In this situation, M. Gorbachev forged an alliance with the democrats. The elaboration of the "500 Days" program began and so forth.

In place of the center a left-centrist coalition was able to come to power.

But under pressure from the conservatives the president broke off the coalition with the democrats. The "500 Days" plan was taken off the agenda.

The formation of a presidential regime began. In this process, M. Gorbachev himself wanted to create something akin to a right-centrist coalition.

It proved impossible to create such a coalition.

Now, since the failure of the putsch, talk is turning to a coalition again.

But whereas before the putsch the center tried to head the coalition, now a coalition can be created only with a predominance of democrats—Russian and nationalist democrats.

Thus, the general outcome of the development since 1985 has been the idea of coalitions;

—coalitions of union republics and the center;

—coalitions of democrats and the apparatus (in the center and in each republic).

Are such coalitions possible in the Union and the republics?

Or is the potential for coalitions at Union level already exhausted and was the only alternative to consider permutations within individual republics?

Proposals on the Union

In the sphere of economic and political organization development will now follow its own course in each republic with a vast variety of permutations in the spectrum of national communism, national democracy, and national anticommunism.

The natural question is—is it possible with such a range of possible developments within sovereign republics to speak of unity at all or is the only thing left to draw borders between republics?

The latter, apparently logical path runs into a series of serious obstacles.

First, even between union republics there are very contentious issues on the border question.

Second, there is the problem of the autonomous entities, where the border question is an almost universal bone of contention and in a number of autonomous entities the indigenous population is not the majority.

Third, there is the problem of the share-out of the common union heritage and the problem of the republics' reciprocal claims in the economic sphere.

Fourth, there is the problem of the republics' mutual dependence as a result of many years' development of the USSR economy as a single complex.

In brief, the "share-out" will hardly be peaceful. The military, non-peaceful form of sharing spells disaster.

Therefore the option of the clean "break" and "withdrawal" is acceptable only to some republics, possibly only the Baltic.

That is why it is now important to complete work on forming a new center.

It is necessary to speed up the conclusion of all agreements and elect a president for the Union and a new parliament.

It is necessary to agree on a Union in the form of several concentric circles: the Union as a roof over the agreements between republics, an economic union, a political confederation, and so forth.

But it must be clearly seen that in the present situation in the republics there can be no stable or broad agreement on the Union.

Thus it is necessary to conclude all agreements now if there are some.

It is necessary to find not a solution itself but a mechanism which will make it possible in the future to amend and refine the agreements.

The question of the criteria of entry into the Union is very important. Should all republics who want be able automatically to enter various agreements on the Union? Or should there be some conditions?

As much as I want to preserve the Union, it seems to me nevertheless that it is necessary to observe a minimum number of conditions. Something like a test of democracy. Like the United Nations, which does not accept those who do not observe human rights. Those republics which do not observe the elementary norms of democracy cannot be allowed into the Union.

Another main problem of the future Union is the national organization of the RSFSR. Unless the RSFSR's problems are resolved, a Union is hardly possible.

Under a national reorganization of the RSFSR there are two paths: The first is to repeat the entire path taken by the USSR but in the form of Russia and its autonomous entities (create two chambers in the Russian parliament and so forth), and second, seek a solution straight away taking into account the clear predominance of the Russians.

I advocate not repeating in the RSFSR what happened in the USSR. Otherwise there will be the same conflictual outcome. Unfortunately, that is the very path that the RSFSR has chosen. But the calamity of the Union as a whole is so graphic that it is still not too late to take the first path.

Proposals on National Organization in Russia

The starting point must be the idea that a citizen of any nationality needs first and foremost the right to study a language, preserve his culture and history, and so forth, and what he does not need for this is to be forced to have some form of national administrative-bureaucratic territorial structures if his national interests are protected without it. Of even less concern is the question of whether there is somewhere within Russia a separate national territory (in which, of course, the representatives of other nationalities also live) of those citizens of this nation living in other parts of Russia. For them it is important to have throughout Russian territory the conditions to ensure their national interests.

In other words, the model that must be taken right now for the future Russia is that of the multinational United States, where all nations can develop in any part of the country and where there are no separate administrative-territorial formations (apart from Indian reservations).

The structurization of Russia must be carried out without national-administrative borders only in the

form of 10-15 federal lands [federalnoye zemlya] of Russia (North, Center, South, Volga, Urals, West Siberia, North Caucasus, and so forth).

All federal lands will have equal rights. Russia will exercise the maximum decentralization retaining only the minimum for the leadership of the Russian Federation: finance, defense, foreign affairs, and so forth, and transferring the remaining questions to the jurisdiction of the lands.

Particular peoples may indeed predominate in individual lands but there will be no national-administrative structures in Russia.

In each federal land the representatives of any people may constitute a national community [natsionalnoye obshchestvo]. The leaders of such communities will form a Council of Communities [Sovet soobshchestv] of the given federal land. The Council of national communities of the federal land will distribute budget resources between communities, the Councils of communities will organize the study of their language, support culture, museums, organize the publication of newspapers, radio transmission, and so forth.

A Council of ethnic communities will also be created on the scale of Russia. But it will include only those which, in the first place, are organized on the same scale and, second, only those which have at least 100,000 members. This Council will be a kind of Russian ministry for nationalities problems.

As a result of this restructuring all types of administrative-territorial autonomous entities will be abolished. Those autonomous entities of Russia which do not want to take such a path are obliged to leave the RSFSR and hold a referendum. But the right to a referendum must also have certain criteria. For example, a referendum on leaving Russia may be held only by those autonomous entities with around 1 million people and where the indigenous nationality constitutes around 50 percent of the population. Referendums in such autonomous entities must be held immediately and by the end of 1991 the problem of the federalization of Russia on a multinational basis must be resolved.

The proposed scheme combines two solutions:

- the priority of national rights not for structures but for people;
- the full equality of rights of the representatives of all the peoples and the safeguarding of those rights for each citizen in any part of Russia.

We shall create a Russia in which there will be no administrative-territorial national structures which create a prospect not so much for national development as much as a basis for national bureaucracy with the inevitable prospect of conflicts and the splitting of Russia. Before it is too late it is necessary to remove this

mine—even at the cost of the immediate withdrawal from Russia of several "intransigent" autonomous entities.

Proposals on Power in Russia

The main thing is the comprehension of the fact that we are talking about a **transitional** period. More precisely—about that stage of it when it is necessary to create a new society.

It was impossible for any stable nuclei of the new society to appear within the socialist system. Thus it is impossible to rely on classes and on mass parties. Consequently, only the minority which has gained power in elections should carry out the transition from the old to the new society.

Because this power has the steady backing only of an association of leading citizens, the main role in the system of that power must belong not to deputies but to the leaders of executive power.

But as a guarantee against the degeneration of executive power into totalitarianism there must be direct elections of the leaders of the executive power and the control of representative power. Whereas at the transitional period stage connected with the destruction of the old it was the deputies' corps which was most important, at the stage of creation the key player must be the executive power. Either it carries out perestroika or no one will.

There must be two forms of executive:

- an elective one (directly elected, by the population, and indirectly, by deputies),
- an appointed one (appointed by elected leaders or deputies).

The option involving the participation of deputies was justified until direct elections of leaders of the executive power. When they exist all other executive leaders must be appointed by them.

Otherwise the direct elections of administrator-leaders become senseless. How can a president or mayor carry out his election program if he cannot appoint his own ministers?

References to the experience of certain Western democracies, where parliament appoints in person the ministers proposed by the president, are not appropriate to our conditions. Because over there they have an established society living independently of both government and parliament. But in our country the authority must share ownership.

Russia's administrative leaders should be directly elected only at three levels:

- the president of Russia;
- governors of lands;

—mayors of cities or elders of rural settlements.

All the remaining leaders—both sectorial and territorial—must be appointed by superior elective administrative leaders.

Because the transitional period will last at least 5-10 years, the term of election of the administrators must be at least five years.

The deputies' corps must retain the right to express no confidence in the elected leader—by two-thirds of the votes. But if no-confidence is expressed there must be reelections not only of that leader but also the entire deputies' corps.

Representative power must also be formed at only three levels:

- the parliament of Russia,
- the parliaments of the lands,
- municipal councils of cities or settlements.

Thus, parliaments and municipalities must first and foremost elaborate laws and norms and also control the representative power, their size cannot exceed 200 deputies in Russia, 100 in a federal land, 20-50 in a municipality.

Elections must be held according to party lists or a candidate stands as an independent. If a deputy is elected as representative of a party and that party ceases to regard him as "its" man reelections must immediately be called in that district. Then the former deputy may take part in the reelections as representative of another party or as an independent.

Because the correlation of forces changes rapidly in the transitional period, reelections of the representative organs, at least 50 percent of representative organs must be reelected every two-three years.

Laws on privatization are the prerogative of the all-Russian parliament. But the main juridical rights on denationalization—of land and other property—must belong to the executive power. And at the level of the federal land.

The Russian Constitution must not allow the rights of representative organs to conflict. A question must be entrusted to one organ alone and its decision must be final.

The judicial power must be elective, too. The most sensible thing to do is to combine the interests of the executive and the representative powers here. Judicial nominees must be proposed by the executive and elected by the representative power. The procuracy as a separate system is not needed.

What is to be done now? It seems to me that the president of Russia should put forward a short program

for the organization of Russia and transformations and hold a referendum (or poll) of the republic's entire population.

If the ideas win support, the following must be done immediately:

- 1) suspend the activity of all Soviets,
- 2) hold referendums in autonomous entities wishing to leave the Russian Federation,
- 3) approve a structure of federal lands,
- 4) approve a law on elections,
- 5) hold elections to the Russian parliament, of governors and parliaments of lands, mayors, elders, and municipal councils,
- 6) the new Russian parliament must ratify a new Russian Constitution,
- 7) prior to the adoption of a Constitution, the Russian president must issue decrees whose subsequent fate will depend on their congruence with the new Constitution.

Future Activities of CPSU Viewed

924B0008A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Sep 91
Union Edition p 5

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Without Trial or Investigation, Life Will Determine the CPSU's Future"]

[Text] Rumors of the death of the CPSU seem somewhat exaggerated. The sealing of offices, the seizure of bank accounts, the removal of archives and other "final honors," the notable haste with which they have been and are being given up—all this may be due to uncertainty as to history's full and final account. The revolutionary patter of the edicts which prescribe "halting," "forbidding," and "taking property under guard" will scarcely be the final word, as some may imagine. Much has been left unsaid, and the further we go the more palpable it becomes, despite the energetic cries of, "There is no such party!"

There is. There still is. Having placed itself outside the law through its complicity in the coup d'etat, and having received from the people a full measure of anger and contempt, the CPSU in the person of its leaders at the center and in the locales has nonetheless declared its readiness to live on and fight, asserting once again that there is no fortress that the Bolsheviks cannot defend (we no longer have to talk about the capture after the putsch).

"I believe that the party's intellectual core must continue to work on the party's program," said the (former?) first secretary of the CPSU's Leningrad (St. Petersburg?) Obkom [oblast committee] in an interview. "Young people, new people, must come into the party leadership."

Party leaders in Moscow and Moscow Oblast speak about the same thing with the same unrelenting decision: "There can be no question today of disbanding the party. That decision can be made only by a congress of the CPSU, and its prohibition is the prerogative of the USSR Supreme Court."

Does the further fate of the CPSU still require definition? Yes, states G. Zyuganov, secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. Having confirmed in a conversation with a TASS correspondent his unshaken (after the August events) loyalty to the views set forth in his "A Word to the People," he decisively condemned the decision of the country's parliament to halt Communist Party activities. He also declared that that decision was "a part of the lawlessness that has been permitted in the last two or three years."

"The millions of simple, honest communists, who are guilty of nothing, should not be persecuted or deprived of their rights!" This appeal of the leaders of the sealed Central Committees and obkoms will ring out like a tocsin, with such force that one might think a wave of mass repressions had indeed arisen, that a "witch hunt" was on, and so on. Demanding revenge and settling scores is, of course, repugnant. But who is demanding that? Show us. Who is depriving whom of their rights, persecuting, and making their lives miserable? No one doubts the noninvolvement in the putsch of millions of communists, just as, however, no one is grateful for the fact that "simple, honest, completely innocent people" tossed their general secretary to the tyranny of fate, did not hold one single tiny meeting or a single even very modest demonstration in his defense.

The appeal to the unbesmirched party mass—well, that mass is the CPSU, not Shenin, Prokofyev, and the other members of the Politburo and Central Committee—is an old demagogic device to which the party nomenklatura (which is exactly what it is and always has been) has resorted to each time the demand to ascribe crimes to a leader who is deceased or removed from power has arisen. Stalin—that's not the party! Brezhnev—that's not the party! The party is "millions of shoulders pressed tightly to one another." The CPSU always defended itself from encroachments on its very existing by naming guilty leaders and proclaiming the sinless millions of rank-and-file communists. And here it is again: We will not let a shadow be cast on the entire party!

"If the millions of rank-and-file communists are guilty of anything, it is of having allowed the 'leaders' to dupe themselves and lead them into an impasse," believe the communists of Voronezh's Kominternovskiy Rayon. "Communist ideals have been besmirched and discredited in the eyes of the people by careerists, double-dealers, and the paid ideologues of the party apparatus. But what does this have to do with us, who came to the party to serve bright ideals?" This was printed in PRAVDA. "The names of the communists who spoke with us are not named purposely," the paper reports. "They possess sufficient courage and are prepared to

address in an open letter any government office that will hear them out and understand. But inasmuch as there is reason to doubt that they will understand, it is not worth subjecting people to the risk of repressions."

Here is yet another accusation addressed to the new authorities: They persecute dissidence and drive ideas underground! It is the simplest thing to ask again: Who? Who is persecuting? Who is forbidding the expression and dissemination of communist postulates, regardless of how the clear-headed majority feels about them? And who has been forbidden, it would be interesting to know—PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, GLASNOST, whose ideological orientation after the putsch did not change substantially except that the tone may have become more reserved? But asking this means giving oneself over to self-deception, that is, deciding that the CPSU truly does possess some ideological baggage that the victorious democrats are trying to confiscate along with the party's garages, printing presses, and other property.

No, the CPSU never had any ideology of its own in the strictly theoretical, philosophical sense. It was created and existed as a **party of power**. Marxism-Leninism merely sanctified the acquired right to be the "leading, governing stratum." Communist dogma allowed and justified any actions that helped the CPSU maintain complete sway. This party was afflicted least of all with ideas, although it fought cruelly for their purity. It was guided not by ideals but by interests, as the last plenum of the Central Committee confirmed, where the conservative majority, having agreed to the democratic draft for the new program, gave up both Marxism-Leninism and the class approach practically without a fight. Retain power under any flag—this is the only idea with any practical meaning that party functionaries held up till 19 August.

Naturally, no one has the right to forbid communist ideas and their dissemination. Everyone is guaranteed freedom of political creed. But here is what is remarkable: By inspiring fear, by scaring people with a "witch hunt," the guardians of communist ideals are not defending communism at all. They are fostering Bolshevism, producing, as always, a substitution for those concepts. Communism is a goal; Bolshevism is a means. They say one thing, though, and mean another. This official party wail produced by people who for the most part are not overly burdened by communist or any other type of ideals, is not in fact about communism.

The final cessation of activity of the CPSU, which properly speaking was never a party but a fundamental part of the state structure, is supposed to come about in a peaceful and civilized manner. Please note: the cessation, not the prohibition. Although I do admit: The concern that the CPSU, in shifting to illegal status, is capable of strengthening and showing itself a threat, seems exaggerated to me. Once it had finished ideologically and physically with the opposition, this party existed for many decades in conditions of political

comfort. Now, outside the stable vertical and horizontal structures, without a monopoly on the mass media, without a powerful material basis, deprived of its special nomenklatura perks as one its chief incentives for active "political activity," the CPSU will not last long. Its prohibition is not dangerous because it will provoke strong resistance. It is dangerous in and of itself—as an instrument of public life made according to the same Bolshevik technology.

"Essentially, right now there is no legal basis for the nationalization of the CPSU's property," said V. Mishin, first deputy director of affairs of the CPSU Central Committee. "The decision to disband itself must be taken by the organization itself. After all, it is registered at the USSR Justice Ministry, is not prohibited by law and, naturally, has the perfect right to a further civilized existence."

Yes, the juridical ambiguity of the sanctions against the CPSU have been recognized even by the Russian leadership that undertook these sanctions. The working commission of the RSFSR Council of Ministers resolved: The building on Staraya Square shall be handed over to the Council of Ministers of Russia for temporary use. Only if the court proves the involvement of the CPSU Central Committee in the attempt to overthrow the state and recognizes the party as a criminal organization will there be any juridical foundation for the compulsory disbandment of the CPSU and the nationalization of its property.

On 3 September, almost all the secretaries of the Central Committee sent the president of the USSR a collective letter: In order to determine the further fate of the party and its own, they asked for permission to hold a plenum. The request was refused.

A trial is needed. The fate of the CPSU must be decided in accordance with Article 22 of the USSR law: "On Public Associations." Excuse me, but it is hard to believe in self-disbandment. The makeup of the congresses and plenum is well known to us: intelligence, honor, and conscience are not a great burden to the presidium and the hall.

No matter what is done under the mantle of the law, whether or not the CPSU has a future will be determined by life itself without a trial or investigation. It already is. The collapse of the USSR has been echoed in the instantaneous collapse of the CPSU. The Baltic Communist Parties have been subjected to prohibition. The activities of the Communist Parties of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia have been halted. In Kirghizia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, the Communist Parties have ceased to exist. In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan they have changed their names.

There has not been an ideological monolith for a long time. Now there is no organizational monolith. Meanwhile, there is a desire to glue the pieces back together. An illegal organizing committee for the resurrection of

the party has proposed to its comrades from the republics that they join together in a Union of Communists on apparently confederative principles. It is unlikely that the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, the People's Democratic Party of independent Uzbekistan, or others of those that have changed their names and acquired the status of independent political organizations will agree to this.

However, let us abandon our illusions. With the demise of the CPSU as a single whole, unfortunately, the ideas and principles that formed this "order of sword bearers" are not going to go out of circulation any time soon. The signs are changing; the spirit remains. The same offices, the same people inside them. A speedy regrouping of reactionary forces is under way. They need their own party. Probably the kind envisaged by E. Ligachev: "We need to create a party of social justice, a party that will defend the working man. Perhaps even take the path of creating a socialist workers party, a socialist party of labor, to join together the broad masses with the working class at their head."

This would be a revanchist party. Nina Andreyeva, who is determined to resurrect the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], dreams of it. OFT [United Front of Working People] figures, proponents of the "Communist Initiative," and liberal gentlemen led by Zhirinovskiy foster it in their plans. They are not about to read ideological sermons (even the putschists did not mention communism), but they will try to retake power, taking advantage of the chaos, the extreme impoverishment, the democrats' internecine quarrels. This party, knocked together from the obkoms of the CPSU, emerging from it as from Stalin's greatcoat, may prove capable of inspiring and heading up a new coup—one that starts from below.

Dictator-populists always try to take over from dictators detested by the people. Until the ideological ashtray of the CPSU burns to the bottom, they have a chance

Resolutions Adopted by Komsomol Plenum on Special Congress

914B0410A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 3

["Decisions of Komsomol Central Committee Sixth Plenum"]

[Text] There has been a fundamental change in the political situation in the country, and the democratic transformations of society have become irreversible. The stage of half-measures and semireforms is over. Radical economic and political reforms and fundamental changes in all political institutions have become inevitable. The path of the evolutionary, gradual reforming of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] is exhausted also.

The plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee resolves:

1. To convene a special VLKSM congress on 27 September 1991 in Moscow. To submit for consideration by the congress the question of the fate of the VLKSM.

2. The VLKSM Central Committee plenum believes that the congress could when determining the question of the fate of the organization proceed from the following basic propositions:

—completion of the political role of the VLKSM as a federation of republic and other youth organizations with the announcement of a transitional period for the purpose of their self-determination;

—relinquishment by the VLKSM central bodies of their authority and the formation of an interim coordinating committee based on agreements with the parity representation of the subjects of the present federation and other organizations which are a part of the VLKSM which declare a desire to participate therein;

—implementation of a contractual process between youth leagues on bilateral and multilateral cooperation and the possible creation of a common youth structure for them. It would be advisable here to proceed from its organizational and political asymmetry and the determination of its jurisdiction, functions and structure by the youth organizations themselves

3. The VLKSM Central Committee plenum believes that the solution of the question of the property of the VLKSM at the special congress should be based on the following principles.

—use of the property in the interests of the youth of all republics.

—an opportunity for the use of the property of the VLKSM by its successor (successors) and other youth organizations.

—management of the collective property of the VLKSM in the transitional period by representatives of the organizations which are currently a part of the VLKSM.

—assurance of the interests and rights of the workforce of enterprises, publications and organizations of the VLKSM

4. The plenum instructs the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau, taking the said propositions as a basis, to prepare detailed proposals for the congress.

Convening of a Special Congress of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League

1. To convene a special congress of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League on 27 September 1991 in Moscow in the Cinema and Concert Hall of the Orlenok hotel complex.

To examine at the congress a set of questions connected with the fate of the VLKSM. To instruct the VLKSM

Central Committee Bureau to prepare the necessary material pertaining to the congress' agenda.

2. To establish as the VLKSM special congress representation quota one delegate per 38,500 members of the VLKSM. Subjects of the federation, organizations which are direct members of the VLKSM and republic, kray and oblast organizations with fewer than 38,500 members will elect one delegate.

3. To determine that delegates to the VLKSM special congress will be elected at congresses, conferences, councils and plenums of Komsomol committees of the subjects of the federation and organizations which are direct members of the VLKSM and republic, kray and oblast Komsomol organizations.

In other respects the right to determine the procedure of the election of delegates to the VLKSM special congress to be accorded the elective bodies of the subjects of the federation and Komsomol organizations which are direct members of the VLKSM.

To authorize the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau, in the event of the corresponding appeals of Komsomol organizations, to make changes to the established procedure of the election of delegates.

New Body To Protect Communists' Rights

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Single Edition p 2*

[V. Kozhemyako article: "The Putsch Helped Those Who Needed Witches. PRAVDA's White Book"; last paragraph is PRAVDA Editorial Office postscript]

[Text] Who will defend Communists? Only recently such a formulation of the question might have seemed strange and even absurd. There was the ruling party. But what special protection do its members need?

The situation has changed radically now: Following the events of 19-21 August, the activity of the RSFSR Communist Party was suspended by decree of the Russian president. The Communists of other republics also found themselves in a difficult situation, for the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee laid down his powers and called for the self-dissolution of the Central Committee. Reports of violations of the civil rights of party members began to appear one after another. But we learned recently that a public association "In Defense of Communists' Rights" is being set up in Moscow.

Several members of its organizing committee came to us in the editorial office. They are mainly prominent jurists, in other words people for whom serving the law is, you might say, their life's work. Apart from them, the committee includes philosophers, historians, economists, workers, journalists, engineering and technical personnel, and RSFSR people's deputies. What has brought them together?

"Anxiety," Doctor of Juridical Sciences Valentin Martemyanov said. "A sense of great and profound anxiety in connection with the anticonstitutional, illegal acts directed against the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party. Of course, we resolutely condemn the actions of those leading party workers who were accessories to the adventurist conspiracy or gave them support and who voiced solidarity with the notorious State Committee for the State of Emergency. However, something else is also clear: Certain forces in the republic and the country have used the August putsch to infringe and limit civil rights and freedoms, to stoke anticommunist hysteria, to fan lawlessness and vandalism, and to victimize dissidents, a position in which millions of Communists find themselves today."

Legal language is strict and precise. And this is reflected in the committee's statement, whose text has been made available to the mass media, including PRAVDA.

First of all, it is pointed out that unlawful bans have grossly violated the constitutional rights of Soviet people to unite in public organizations and to act in the interests of society and the state—Articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution. Second, there has been a violation of the USSR Law: "On the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency," in accordance with which a political party's activity may only be suspended if the normalization of the situation is being prevented and only under conditions of a state of emergency. And yet such a state has not now been legally declared either in the USSR or in the RSFSR.

Third, the acts suspending the party's activity are a cover for its virtual liquidation. Meanwhile, the liquidation of public associations is possible only by decision of the Supreme Court in strict accordance with the Law: "On Public Associations."

And, fourth, the right of party ownership has been violated, since property that belongs to the party is being distrained from it without payment and is being nationalized. Meanwhile, the law allows the property of a liquidated public association to be transferred to state ownership without payment only by decision of a court. And there cannot even be any question of nationalizing the property of an association whose activity has been suspended temporarily, for such measures are not provided for in any USSR or RSFSR law.

But is this taken into account today? No! What is more, visitors to our editorial office have cited numerous cases where party committee buildings have been seized by various groups and where, during the first days after the putsch, when the atmosphere of moral terror was particularly strong, windows and signboards were being smashed in buildings and working people were being subjected to unauthorized searches and other humiliations. In many cases documents and personal belongings were thrown into sacks without any record being made and were taken away.

Igor Malyarov, a lecturer at Moscow State University and secretary of the Moscow committee of the "Communist Initiative" youth movement, cited some glaring instances. At the headquarters of this movement a door was broken down and a pogrom was perpetrated, and a note left behind contained crude threats. Vitaliy Timermanis, an 18-year-old supporter of "Communist Initiative," was summoned to the Latvian Prosecutor's Office as a witness. There the guy was arrested and thrown into jail on a totally trumped-up charge of preparing the putsch.

A real witch hunt has been mounted in many areas. And Communists are once again the chief target of this hunt. Thus, in Kemerovo Oblast a Prosecutor's Office investigation into the activity of the obkom [oblast party committee] was conducted under pressure from the local press. No data relating to involvement in the State Committee for the State of Emergency were established. Naturally, the investigation was ended. However, Malykhin, the RSFSR president's representative in the oblast, demanded that the investigation be reopened. Obviously, a compromising action [kompromat] was needed at all costs.

How are party workers being dismissed? Those same representatives of the Russian president are liquidating oblast, kray, city, and rayon party committees and writing in people's service records: So-and-so was dismissed in connection with the liquidation... In other areas this totally illegal action is being conducted by soviet workers. That is, administration heads and soviet organs are operating instead of party committees, taking over their functions with the help of fist law.

In a number of places (Chita, Ryazan, Yoshkar-Ola, Krasnodar, and others), despite the Russian leadership's ordinance, not even elementary conditions have been created for the work of obkom liquidation commissions—not even a single room has been allocated. Many soviet organs are not helping to find work for people and sometimes are even hindering this...

I asked members of the organizing committee to share their thoughts on the tasks of the association "In Defense of Communists' Rights." Here are brief extracts from their statements.

Doctor of Juridical Sciences Boris Kurashvili:

"We must make the voice of the public heard and make everyone realize that what is being undertaken today with regard to Communists in violation of legality could be perpetrated tomorrow against members of any other movements."

RSFSR People's Deputy Yuri Slobodkin:

"A group of deputies in the republic Supreme Soviet addressed an official letter to the Russian president listing a whole series of anticonstitutional measures against Communists. However, no reaction followed. This means that the public must act."

Doctor of Juridical Sciences Boris Khangeldyev:

"Let us state bluntly that the time has come when it is dangerous to be a Communist. Therefore, in conditions when no limit has been put on the suspension of the Communist Party's activity, the creation of our association is of a very principled nature."

Doctor of Juridical Sciences Viktor Vishnyakov:

"Not a single instance of lawlessness in respect of a Communist or, even more so, of a reprisal against him can go without an effective response from us. Only thus will we fulfill our role."

And so, the association "In Defense of Communists' Rights" is beginning its work...

From the Editorial Office. PRAVDA has already declared that it will oppose all lawlessness and violations of human rights. We are starting up our own "White Book," which we will bring to the notice of our public and the world public. All instances of people's victimization for their political convictions will be recorded in the book. Readers know our address. Mark the envelope: "PRAVDA's 'White Book.'"

Official Instructions for Photographing CPSU Members Reported

914B0442A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by V. Tseplyayev: "How to Correctly Photograph CPSU Members"]

[Text] This curious document was handed to me by the director of a Moscow photography studio. He did so entirely in confidence—I am afraid the authorities do not permit divulgence of official instructions devoted to the "specific requirements" of party card photos. They take up three pages of typed text. Everything is taken into consideration, down to the trifling details. "To prevent shadows, the individual being photographed should be positioned at a distance of one meter from the background..." "It is a strictly full-face photograph. The head of the individual being photographed is not permitted to be turned. "The person being photographed will look straight ahead. "There can be no loss of resolution on the neck, ears, or clothing. "A separate plate must be used for the photograph." Producing the facial image of a CPSU member is far from within the capability of every film. It is strongly recommended that 13x18 Shostka Chemical Combine film be used. "Use of other brands of film and film from other plants is permitted only upon coordination with the quality control branch." Developing the photograph of a communist is no less responsible a procedure. "Scales will be used in making up all solutions. Processing is conducted in separate vessels and trays. Special solutions are used and processing must take place separately from other orders." And here we see the short annotation—"Failure to adhere to the mix formula is prohibited." Now let us look at the section entitled

"Retouching." "Prints and negatives in party documents must be carefully retouched only in places where technical defects exist. A portrait must constitute an accurate likeness (apparently, with respect to "nonparty" physiognomies, one may violate this restriction—Author). Retouched prints must undergo a double check... The photographic reproduction must be crisp and precise.

Tasks of Social Committee 'For Defense of Communists' Rights'

914B0442B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 24 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Viktor Ukolov: "There Is Such a Party?..."]

[Text] A few days ago an old friend from Motovilikhki phoned me—Vasiliy Fedorovich Gryzan. He had defended the Motherland and now was working in a steel foundry. A dedicated communist. He asked me what was new, what he should do with his party card—hand it in or keep it as a souvenir? What was most important? Many CPSU members, like him, are in a state of disarray. And the press conference in the Central House of Journalists convened by the social committee "For the Defense of Communists' Rights" should have been able in theory to help them reorient themselves. Few people from the writing profession were there. We were acquainted with a declaration stating that the committee resolutely condemns those leading party functionaries who were in any way whatsoever mixed up with the adventurist antigovernment plot, or who aligned themselves with the notorious GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]. But at the same time—and herein lies the essence of the document—those acts by which the activity of the CPSU and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party has been suspended and placed factually outside the law comprise anticonstitutional and unlawful acts. What specifically are members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Communist Party Central Committee engaged in right now? We were given to understand from the response that they are doing everything they can to assist apparatus functionaries and technical services workers in finding jobs and resolving their financial problems. The people we were speaking with lashed out at the DPKR [Democratic Party of Communists of Russia] in particular, saying that it has no connection with communist ideals. At this point a representative of the "Marxist Platform" took the microphone. It turns out this faction is not wasting time either, and is organizing regional structures of the "Union of Communists" which it created—as legal successor to the CPSU. A final question—on the social committee's program of action. It has set for itself the task of putting an end to lawlessness with respect to the CPSU. In what manner? Perhaps through the parliament, which has CPSU representatives. And finally, through the courts. However, there have been no examples on this account. So it hardly seems necessary to beat the air and get carried away by empty conversations.

Unemployment of Former Party Workers Viewed; Calmness Urged

914B0406A Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 5 Sep 91
Single Edition p 1

[Article by Viktor Kozhemyako: "Go Wherever You Like..."; subtitled: "Where Are the Former Party Officials To Work?"]

[Text] For many people 23 August was cutoff day: following the ukase of the RSFSR president on a suspension of the activity of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, tens of thousands of party employees have been left without work. The same thing has happened in a number of other republics.

A new social problem and one that has come as a surprise to many people? Yes. But I am concerned about a problem which some people may perceive somewhat abstractly and regard as fate. First and foremost, I am convinced that this is not a reason for gloating, which certain publications are practicing.

Of course, in 35 years of work in party journalism I have had my fill of rudeness and arrogance and the most outright boorishness—in a word, of every kind of injustice—from my leaders from the "high houses." There have been blockheads and ignoramuses. There have been inveterate careerists. There have also been simple rogues, who should not have been admitted to work with people within cannon fire range.

There were all kinds. But I venture to maintain that it is not such people who constitute the majority of those assembled here. But now they must all find new jobs. I emphasize: in accordance with their knowledge and ability, in my view. But will society afford them such an opportunity?

I assume that the rogues will make out, they will not be done for—as always. I am sure of this even. I am worried about the honest and the injured, about those unable to adapt and wrest a fat morsel from the gullet of a neighbor.

I decided to visit the employment offices in several Moscow districts to familiarize myself with how the new serious problem is being tackled here.

The Frunzenskiy Rayon office. This is on Oruzheynny Street, near Pushkin Square. Inspector Valentina Mikhaylovna Goryacheva says that so far only two party employees have applied here. One, the former head of a party consulting room in an Army unit, has already been fixed up: in a cooperative, and with higher earnings, what is more. The other, also from a party consulting room, incidentally, but from an enterprise, has not yet picked a suitable position.

Five persons from the raykom [rayon committee], headed by the first secretary, came all together to the Sokolnicheskiy Rayon office. It may be said that the first consultations were held. Other offices, as far as I know,

also conduct preliminary conversations and an "ascertainment of attitudes." What can you offer and where might we apply our efforts to best advantage.

People have very many questions about the procedure of finding employment. They are resolved to some extent by the directive of the RSFSR Council of Ministers signed by I. Silayev of 28 August and published on 3 September in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. Although provision cannot be made for all specific situations in one directive, of course. There are and, most likely, will be questions, as before.

Igor Yefimovich Zaslavskiy, general director of the Moscow Municipal Employment Office, is reassuring: The main thing: no panic. All who have been dismissed will receive their wages for a month from the time of the edict, then, having signed on at the employment office, for a further month severance pay in this same amount, and if, after this, work has not been found, the same amount for a third month. Only then will the payment of unemployment benefit begin.

"But we will try to ensure that there remain as few unemployed as possible," Igor Yefimovich observes. "Yesterday, incidentally, a woman who had been a senior secretary in the CPSU Central Committee General Department applied to us. So we are taking her on ourselves. Four former raykom instructors are already working here."

"But will we not run into discrimination against former party employees and a kind of professional ban for our ideological beliefs?" I ask the question which has been particularly disturbing me.

"You know," Zaslavskiy replies, "this could happen. But not in accordance with the law (we do not, after all, have such a law!) but on the social level. A person who was at one time himself straining to get an appointment through the official party roster, say, but who did not make it, could at a plant somewhere say to his former comrade, who has become a functionary: 'We worked hard here, but you have been fixed up in offices....' But provision has been made here for these and other similar cases for an inspectorate for monitoring compliance with legislation and legality. I would ask that you apply there: It is at 8, Rozhdestvenka Street. I would emphasize that ours is not an organization of social enmity but of social peace."

Well, good words. Let us have confidence in them. PRAVDA also will place under its particular supervision the fate of honest former party employees and the communist rank and file.

Pavlov's Think Tank Establishes Ties With RSFSR Officials

914B0445A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Mikhail Leontyev: "The Phoenix of Provocation—Intending Now To Fly Off to New Masters"]

[Text] Sergey Kurginyan, "the mathematics political expert," president of the Experimental Creative Center

to which the majority of organizers of the August putsch owe their brilliant ideological and tactical training, never betrays his principles. This time he lied on the television program DVM [expansion unknown], declaring that NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA had printed a fictitious document of the Cabinet of Ministers on the terms of activity of his corporation. Not desiring to fatigue the reader with a facsimile reproduction of the original of this document, published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA No. 22, we wish to bring to mind the fact that the cabinet's draft resolution, signed by Pavlov on 12 February 1991, contained among other things amazing privileges for the strange commercial structure established by Kurginyan: the right to assign to the corporation high-ranking KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Defense officials to accomplish "special missions," the right to establish educational institutions, and sports and training centers for youth (something like a Soviet "Jungsturm"), and numerous tax and customs duty privileges as well. On the basis of an official annotation made by S. Assekritov, deputy chairman of the State Commission for Economic Reform, in which the document was characterized as inexpertly fashioned and the question raised as to the competence of those who endorsed it, the "inexpert" facets of the resolution were cleaned up. In other words, in the final version the "best" points of the original draft were moved to an appendix published as secret.

The Experimental Creative Center—the think tank of the "Soyuz" deputies group, Baltic Intermovements, and state traitors in Moscow—continues to function as it did before. And it would be extremely vexing were the new Russian and Union administration to decide to use the counsel of this prestigious institution. Especially since Kurginyan himself has already expressed this desire. Indeed, Russian Vice Premier Oleg Lobov found time on the very eve of the putsch to sign, upon presentation of Valentin Pavlov, Instructions No. 910-R on tax benefits for Kurginyan's department. It will be interesting to learn whether the new KGB leadership has recalled its personnel working in the Experimental Creative Center, in the environment of palace courtyard whisperings.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] First acquaintance with the drifts of Kurginyan in the Russian White House indicate that Lobov was led astray, by all appearances. Nikolay Malyshev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the RSFSR State Committee on Science and Higher Education, extended patronage to the "political expert." And so two "trainers of youth," so to speak, found a common language.

Officials Ill-Prepared To Meet Greater Foreign Travel Demand

914B0445B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Sep 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by I. Taburyanskaya: "On Order and Disorder in Applying for Travel Abroad"]

[Text] 15 Petrovka Street, 15 Bolshiye Kamenshchiki Street... Anyone who has traveled abroad even once

knows these addresses well—they are where the railroad ticket offices for international routings are located. From early-morning until evening hours these places are packed with people. Long lines form at the ticket windows with well more than an hour to wait. As I stood here somehow an entire day—without exaggeration—and listened to the unflattering retorts of passengers directed toward railways personnel and OVIR [Visa and Registration Department] employees, toward workers in other services and “people up above” in general, I had time to think—if the system for organizing citizen travel abroad is already malfunctioning, what will things be like in the future? We all eagerly awaited the Law: “On Procedure for Citizens Travelling Out of and Into the USSR” and were joyful at its adoption. All its articles will begin to be operative in less than two years... But is the country ready for this? Are transportation, customs, consular, and other services prepared for the likely increase in numbers of people desiring to leave its borders? Valeriy Shatayev, general director of the Association of International Passenger Transportation: “In 1990 more than 8,232,000 persons were transported over international routings. Unfortunately, no one can predict at this time how the passenger flow will change when the new law is implemented. We are proceeding from rough estimates we have made showing that, on average, taking into account unsatisfied demand, the number of individuals desiring to take trips abroad by 1995 will be two to three times greater than today, and will comprise 12 million people. “However, major problems are apparent even today and until these are resolved it will be impossible to further develop international passenger travel. First and foremost we will have to purchase 2,000 European-gauge passenger cars abroad (the so-called RIC used everywhere in Europe). This will require \$2 billion. And it cannot be done without modernization, construction, or technical reoutfitting of railway stations, terminals, and depots, or without opening up new routings. At least another 2.5 billion rubles will be required for this. Without a doubt, the Railways Ministry alone does not have the funds or resources to accomplish this. Union and republic budgets will have to be applied as well. And this should be done as soon as possible. Time is not standing still. “As far as organizing the sale of train tickets is concerned, I have news that will bring joy to passengers. Beginning next year, travel documents for international train travel will not be drawn up by hand, as is presently the case, but with the use of the “Express-2” rapid-response system. And there is more. New ticket offices recently opened up in Moscow for selling tickets for travel abroad—at 6 Griboyedov Street. It is proposed to open international travel offices on Leningrad Prospekt, Mozhayskiy Val Street, and Krasnoprudnaya Street.” Igor Khalevinskiy, first deputy director of the Consular Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: “In analyzing the dynamics of growth in numbers of those traveling, we may draw the conclusion that the ‘saturation point’ has presently reached its zenith. There will not be any sharp

increase in the next five years. Nonetheless, we are preparing for implementation of the law. The employee organizational charts of consular facilities will be expanded. Automation of reference and information services is underway. Preparation of machine-readable visa certificates is nearing completion... A sign of great progress would be the decision to introduce a single passport for use in the country, one which would be valid within the state as well as for trips abroad. But as yet we have only managed to repeal the Soviet authorization notation on date of departure from foreign countries for our diplomatic and official passports.

“I think we have to deal not only with the readiness of the country and certain services to implement the law, but also with that of the travelers themselves, many of whom do not have the most elementary knowledge. We are drawing up a mass of informational literature specially for them. Unfortunately, its circulation is inadequate—the information is sold out immediately.”

Nikolay Lyutov, chief of the Administration for Organization of Customs Control of the USSR Customs Committee:

“Today each passage control point on the border is intended to handle from 600 to 1,500 motor vehicles per day on the average, while in fact 3,000-6,000 pass through. There have been times when the vehicles lined up in front of the border measured 20 km in length. In order to rectify the situation, appropriate programs were developed in our department. We took under our purview almost all the motor vehicle passage control points on the Western border and intensively expanded them. At the same time, we embarked upon the construction of new ones, engaging foreign firms for the sake of time. In addition, we outfitted customs facilities with sophisticated technical means of inspection, equipped them with computers, and began the establishment of centers for collection of foreign economic statistics and customs laboratories conforming to world-model standards. The main effort was intended to be completed by 1993.

I speak about this in the past tense because the situation has changed unpredictably. The primary source of financing all these efforts was to be payment we imposed for customs procedures, money collected for storing items, and money obtained from the sale of confiscated goods. These were fairly impressive sums. The republics have recently declared their rights to this money, and now almost all funds, including currency, go to the republic budgets. It would be natural to expect that the republics will now also assume all the obligations connected with preparation for implementation of the Law on Entry and Exit. Whether or not they will do this...

Public Disclosure of Leaders' Health Urged

924B0006A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Sep 91 p 6

[Article by physician Andrey Leonov: “Radiculitis, Trembling Hands, and Politics, or What Seems To Be the Problem, Mr. President?”]

[Text]Dear Editor In Chief!

In my opinion, your newspaper is now firmly established as the number one publication in Moscow. Your materials show a well-functioning system of information input. Timeliness is its most attractive quality. Also noticeable is the high quality of analytical materials. It is good that each issue of the newspaper covers a wide area of human activities—from politics to arts. I hope that as the paper shifts to a five issues a week schedule next year it will retain its informational richness.

Unfortunately, I have not read all the issues of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; in those I did have a chance to peruse, though, I have not seen any articles on medical topics. I think that for a respectable publication, which NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA undoubtedly is, this is a regrettable omission. I would be good to introduce a weekly column (on Friday or Saturday) containing medical materials—not in a narrow, professional sense, but covering health care in a more general sense, including issues of a healthy lifestyle, the economics of health care, etc.

As a trial balloon I am offering you this material. Perhaps it will be of interest to you.

What do we know about the health of the country's leadership? Very little. This information is available to a very small circle of people. Does it need to be made public? Some may say that it constitutes an invasion of privacy, and that publishing such information is a gross violation of the principles of medical ethics. Recent events demonstrated, however, that the state of health of the top leaders of the state is a factor that can have a substantial impact on political life.

The fact that the populace remains uninformed permitted the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] members to remove from power the president of the country "in connection with inability to continue carrying out his duties for health reasons." Well, what did we know about the state of his health, indeed?

The entire history of our state since the 1917 revolution tells us that the health of the leadership has been one of the most closely held secrets. How else can one explain the creation—as early as February 1919—of a closed system of medical care for the high-level party and state bureaucracy—the so-called Kremlin Administration of Clinics and Sanitariums? This is a separate topic, however. During the first years of the Soviet power, at the time of V.I. Ulyanov's illness, information about his state of health was still being published in the newspapers. As the leader's personality cult started to develop, such information was no longer appearing in the newspapers, and when it did, it was for a quite understandable purpose. For instance, on 15 November 1927, in the article "V.I. Lenin's Brain," PRAVDA said: "...In comparing the samples of Lenin's brain (34,000 microscopic sections have been made from it) with samples from the brains of ordinary people, as demonstrated by Professor

Focht, a sharp difference between the structure of Lenin's brain and that of an ordinary brain can be clearly seen. Lenin's pyramidal cells were much more developed, and the connective (associative) fibers between them were much more developed. Professor Focht believed that this explained the specificities of Lenin's psyche." One can clearly see here a desire to emphasize the leader's special qualities that set him apart from ordinary people. During the years of "glasnost," when the restrictions have been loosened, interest in the history of Ulyanov's illness reemerged. Many publications came out with what appeared to be new information. Anybody interested in this topic, however, could have opened "Reminiscing About V.I. Lenin" (Moscow, Politizdat, 1957, Vol. 2) to pages 335-346 and find practically complete information on the illness of the Council of People's Commissars chairman. V.N. Rozanov, Lenin's attending physician during the last years of his life, wrote: "A colossal sclerosis of brain vessels, and only sclerosis. What was amazing was not the fact that his thought processes continued in a brain altered so much by sclerosis, but that he was able to live so long with such a brain."

The epoch of Stalin's dictatorship left us little information on I.V. Dzhugashvili's health. The leader's life was surrounded by secrecy. Only during the last few years did a discussion unfold in the press on the state of his psyche. The word "paranoia," allegedly used by V.M. Bekhterev, was mentioned again. There is still much that remains unclear about the dictator's death as well. For instance, there are considerable discrepancies in the description of the last days and hours of Stalin's life in the memoirs of S. Alliluyeva and those of N.S. Khrushchev. It is quite possible that documents will be discovered in the recently nationalized CPSU and KGB archives that will permit this issue to be closed definitively.

In subsequent years we could only make judgments on the health of our leaders from their appearance—far from great, by the way—and, indirectly, from their absence at certain ritual events. To conceal the true state of affairs, full-scale spectacles sometimes had to be staged. The sight of K.U. Chernenko casting a ballot in his room in the Central Clinical Hospital comes to mind. We learned only from the "medical certification on the illness and cause of death" that, for instance, L.I. Brezhnev "suffered from aortal atherosclerosis with a developed aneurysm of the abdominal part, stenosing atherosclerosis of the coronary vessels, ischemic heart condition with attendant arrhythmia, and scarred myocardial tissue as a result of prior infarcts," or that Yu.V. Andropov had "interstitial nephritis, nephrosclerosis, secondary hypertension, and diabetes aggravated by chronic renal insufficiency. He had been undergoing hemodialysis since February 1983." An ordinary citizen suffering from such ailments would definitely be given disability certification and relieved from work.

Has anything changed during the years of perestroika? Younger leaders replaced the "Kremlin gerontocracy"; their physical shape indicated, at least, the absence of

serious illnesses. Nevertheless, there has not been any objective information in this regard, and it is still not forthcoming. This was demonstrated once again during the course of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] presidential elections. We did learn about B.N. Yeltsin's health from an interview with his attending physician A. Grigoryev (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No. 20, 1991, p. 3). We also knew that N.I. Ryzhkov had a myocardial infarction and that before going on the ballot for the presidency of Russia he "had a physical and was assured that his health is completely restored" (IZVESTIYA, No. 106, 5 May 1991). The public did not have any valid information on the health of other presidential contenders. Nevertheless, there has been a noticeable shift in the mind of the public and politicians during the last few years. Questions about the state of health of contenders for high-level positions are being asked openly now. Recall, for instance, the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, 26 December 1990. A discussion of the candidate for the post of USSR vice president was underway. Let us quote the transcript: "E.Yu. Andreyev: 'Second question. When you were walking toward the podium I seem to have detected a certain sluggishness in your movements. Please, tell us, Gennadiy Ivanovich, how is your health? The vice president's health is of interest to us.' G.I. Yanayev: You know, my wife says my health is all right... (Laughter, applause in the audience.) I get all the illnesses real men get. A normal guy, I can assure you..." (IZVESTIYA, No. 361, 28 December 1991, p.7). It is probably not too difficult now to explain the peculiarities of G.I. Yanayev's gait that attracted Deputy Yu. Andreyev's attention, and the peculiarities of his behavior at the memorable press conference on 19 August 1991. It became known from many publications that the former vice president had a predilection for what usually goes into medical history under the heading of "harmful habits." It should be mentioned that during those three days in August we learned more about the health of the country's leadership than during all the preceding six years. It turned out that the president is suffering from radiculitis. The prime minister is prone to hypertensive crises, which can be expected given his constitution. His love for sweets—remember his television interview over a cup of tea—brought about this hazard. And we finally met on "Vzglyad" the president's physician, Doctor of Medical Sciences I.A. Borisov. Fortunately, all these events had a happy ending. M.S. Gorbachev turned out to be in good health and returned to his duties—thanks

to the principled position of the leadership of Russia. But are there guarantees that the same excuse ("for health reasons") will not be used again?

World experience shows that the populace must be informed on the health of the top leadership of the state. For instance, the White House staff publishes the results of the U.S. President's routine physicals. Remember the detailed coverage of R. Reagan's condition after the operation related to a large intestinal tumor? A more recent example. At the beginning of May 1991, G. Bush suffered a malfunction in heart rhythm—paroxysmic fibrillary arrhythmia. The President's illness became the number one topic in all the mass media. Our Soviet press covered it, too. I think that it was an unusual sight for many of our compatriots who were watching CNN during those days, to see leading U.S. cardiologists talk about the causes, development, potential complications, and treatment of this arrhythmia as if they were lecturing medical students. Press conferences given by the President's attending physicians were broadcast live from the Naval Hospital where the President was being treated. G. Bush's sudden illness not only prompted numerous prognostications on future U.S. policy but also affected activities on the New York Stock Exchange. This is evidence that the health of the national leader during the time he is carrying out his duties as such in a certain sense belongs not only to himself but to all society. What conclusions can we draw from this?

New elections for USSR president and other top leaders of the state are not far away. It is not too late for our legislators to work out a mechanism of making objective data on the contenders' health available to the populace. During the latest, extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet voices could already be heard in favor of such a decision. It is necessary for an independent expert commission to evaluate the health of those running for high-level positions and publish the results of the findings. Of course, making a specific diagnosis public would be a violation of the physician-patient privileged relationship; therefore, this document should be limited to a statement of the contender's ability to occupy the high-level position. Such a mechanism, let us hope, will cool the ardor of those striving for high positions if their physical or psychological condition does not meet the demands of such a high-level position.

Our leaders are facing a multitude of difficult undertakings. Let us wish them good health.

Kryuchkov's KGB Career Examined

91US0826A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Snegirev: "The Coup in Which Kryuchkov Participated Was Not the First in His Biography"]

[Text] When on 20 August my English friend, television journalist Rory Peck, suggested that we try to get an interview with the chairman of the USSR KGB, I must admit that I looked at him with great surprise. Are you in your right mind, fellow? To meet and talk with the chief of the secret service even in ordinary times seemed to me an almost hopeless case, and even more so at that time. It was the second, perhaps most dramatic, day of the putsch, and at that time no one could say how everything would turn out.

The day before, Rory Peck and I spent on the streets of Moscow, watching as the cloud of armor grew thicker. Sometime around midnight, Russian Vice President A. Tutskov granted us an interview in his office, which was filled with armed people. This interview consisted of very energetic expressions. As he was saying goodbye to us, the former combat pilot suddenly opened his jacket and showed us a Stechin-type pistol in a holster under his arm. "There are 20 rounds here," he explained knowledgeably. "Just let them try."

In the morning, the rumors of the impending assault on the Russian parliament became even more persistent. It seemed the air itself was charged that day with an acute premonition of trouble soon to come. This is when the Englishman brought me out of the depression which had gripped me: "Let's ask Kryuchkov whether or not there is going to be an attack on the 'White House'."

To tell the truth, I myself would never have dared to call up the chief director of the state security service. Alas, I still have that deep seated, accursed timidity which developed over the past years. There is still that repeatedly heard, menacing shout: "It is not permitted!" which is firmly entrenched in my memory. But my English colleague, clearly devoid of such prejudices and having made his unthinkable proposal, immediately handed me the phone: "Call."

Of course, the chairman himself did not answer the phone, but rather his assistant, by the name of Dyakov, who kindly listened to my request and, strangely enough, promised to immediately tell the chief about it. When after some time I again dialed the number of the KGB, the assistant answered politely: "Vladimir Aleksandrovich is extremely busy now, but he asked me to tell you that he will try to see you tomorrow."

Now we know why the chief of the state security service was so busy that day. Judging from the testimony of those close to him, Kryuchkov was giving orders about seizing the President of Russia and those around him. Obviously, he did not have time to give interviews then.

We had never met before, and it was unlikely that Kryuchkov had ever guessed of my existence. I, on the other hand, starting at a certain moment, had begun to watch this person closely, analyzing the information accessible to me, and trying to delve into the logic of his words and deeds. It sounds crazy, perhaps: The chief of the KGB is "under the scrutiny" of a journalist.

What is the reason for this unhealthy and, evidently, dangerous curiosity? The fact is that there is an episode in Vladimir Aleksandrovich's biography which is little known beyond the boundaries of the secret department, but which "by its caliber" fully corresponds to the recent August events. I affirm: 12 years ago he took part in a government coup and then, as now, he was among its leaders.

Nevertheless, first I will try to acquaint you more closely with the man who even yesterday headed up the mightiest secret service in the world, and who today is a prisoner in a detention center which the people have nicknamed "The Sailor's Quiet Harbor."

Having become in the mid-seventies the chief of the First Main Administration (PGU), i.e. the domestic secret service, the 50-year old general introduced the much-used expression "operative honesty." Evidently, things were not going too well with honesty among the secret service agents, since the new chief announced an all-out war against liars, bribe takers, and those who liked to drink. Veterans recall how one uninformed resident who was living abroad, out of persistent habit of trying to please the boss, sent a sizable gift to V.A. for his anniversary. That was it. That was the end of his career.

If someone returning from a business trip abroad showed up at the main administration with a suitcase full of souvenirs, this was immediately reported to the chief, and his wrath was terrible. He sternly eradicated drinking on the job (secret service men, like most other Soviet people, turned out to be susceptible to this sin). In short, on a personal plane Kryuchkov was without fault, as many happily affirm.

He was a self-made man. Having begun work as a plater in a factory during the war years, he very quickly moved up along the Komsomol [Communist Youth League] line, and in three years rose to the position of second secretary of the Stalingrad Gorkom [city committee]. He graduated from the law institute, and worked as an investigator and a procurator. After his studies at the Higher Diplomatic School, he was assigned to the position of third secretary in our embassy in Hungary, which at that time was headed up by Yu.V. Andropov. The meeting with the future secretary general defined the fate of the former Stalingrad resident forever. After Budapest, Andropov invited the hard-working, pedantic diplomat to work with him in the Central Committee. Reviewer, section head, deputy secretary—for almost the next 30 years, promotions came one after another in the channel of Yuriy Vladimirovich's career.

In 1967, having become the head of state security, Andropov took his assistant with him to Dzerzhinskiy Square and soon appointed him to the position of secretariat director. Professionals from the agencies know how much weight this position carried within the committee. Even deputy chairmen entered the office of the secretariat director with great respect. After four years, having fully accustomed himself to the corridors of power of the KGB empire, our hero was directed to the secret service—first as first deputy chief, and then as chief of the main administration.

I had occasion to hear certain state security workers express scorn about their chief: He is not a professional, they would say. In fact, Kryuchkov did not study at the intelligence school and did not begin his service in the capacity of junior operative. However, I am more inclined to trust the opinion of those of his colleagues from the First Main Administration who do justice to V.A.'s talents as an organizer, his gigantic work capacity, and his ability to correctly define strategic directions in that secret activity which, without exaggeration, has covered the entire face of the earth.

It was under him that the might of the First Main Administration grew huge and it acquired its own scientific-research institute, computer center, and the huge complex of buildings in the nearby Podmoskovye region. The volume of information obtained by domestic intelligence increased several times over. However, at the same time we may note something else: The quantitative indicators of service grew, but the professional level of the officers declined almost proportionately. Many rightfully reproach Kryuchkov for the fact that under his leadership, admission to the ranks of the secret service institute by the so-called method of party selection took on an unprecedented scope. In the elite department they do not like the former "apparatchiks" who, as often happened, managed to get ahead of the "pure" professional workers. Here, evidently, our hero's Tsekov-Andropov tempering and party-Komsomol upbringing became apparent. It is no wonder that the KGB chairman, until the very last, did not want to hear of any departyization of the agencies, and demanded that the "apostates" be dealt with mercilessly.

We might add that his struggle against one such home-grown "dissident," O. Kalugin, took place before the eyes of the entire world. They say that once, long ago, Oleg Danilovich, while sitting in a sauna, carelessly expressed his doubts about the professional abilities of his chief. The latter was immediately told about this—and there was no shortage of informers, you understand—and the young general very soon fell into disfavor. Rancor is another of Vladimir Aleksandrovich's traits. People who were independent, who were bold in their reasoning and had nontrivial views—he kept as far away as possible.

Then whom did he hold close? Oh, this is a remarkable thing. We see the style which is well known from the examples of other strong personalities who for some

reason prefer to surround themselves with spineless mediocrities. The appointments made by Kryuchkov after he took over as head of state security in 1988 shocked the entire committee. The main puzzle over which our "Shtierlitzes" [character in Russian spy movies] rack their brains is the following: Why did the chairman persistently promote three officers of the secret service who were in one way or another associated by their former service with double agent O. Gordiyevskiy, who in 1985 was able to outwit the KGB, escape surveillance, and flee to England? One of those who carefully nurtured the traitor, V. Grushko, became Kryuchkov's first deputy. Another mentor of the English spy, G. Titov, was promoted to chief of all counterintelligence and deputy chairman. V. Zhizhin was appointed director of the secretariat. The analysts of Western secret services probably cannot believe it to this day: What masters these Russians are—to cover their tracks so well!

However, according to one of the versions I heard, in doing this V.A. was simply saving himself. Having learned that Gordiyevskiy had sensed something wrong and become nervous, he gave the order to discontinue outside surveillance, after which the SIS [Secret Intelligence Service] agent, with the certification of KGB colonel in his pocket, successfully disappeared in an unknown direction, soon afterward providing the enemy with information on almost our entire European network.

All these years, Kryuchkov lived according to a very strict schedule: Early in the morning, no matter where he was, he did 40 minutes of exercise. Then until late at night, and sometimes even into the early morning hours—he worked. He had one day off a week. His coworkers noted that because he was always busy, he had practically no personal life. He had no friends. We know that he had a weakness for the theater: He was not indifferent to the Bolshoi, enjoyed "Sovremennik" and "Taganka", and during business trips abroad he devoted his free evenings to Melpomene [Greek muse of tragedy].

Thanks to his amazing speed-reading skills, he assimilated a huge amount of information, and even had excerpts from books, articles, and information reports which he particularly liked typed up onto individual cards. This dossier, which today numbers over 300,000 cards, he always kept close at hand.

In short, unlike some of his semi-drunkard fellow associates in the August plot, V.A. Kryuchkov appeared to me to be an extraordinary individual. And here are the opinions of other generals from the KGB, expressed, we might add, after V.A.'s arrest. "Smart, practical, goal-oriented." "A highly erudite intellectual." "A painstaking person. He seemed to me to be a kind and obliging person... I did not suspect that he was capable of such decisive actions."

Why is it that he nevertheless proved to be capable of them? What motivated him to participate in the putsch? I do not want to delve into the sphere of suppositions,

especially since an investigation which should provide the answer to this question is currently underway. However, I can agree with those who cite the main reason as the complete alienation of this cabinet secret service man from the realities of real life. He was turned with his face toward the totalitarian past. Reality and especially the future frightened him. They appeared as a change, and demanded some kind of decisive actions from him.

And so he acted—in accordance with his understanding of the situation, his understanding of good and evil. Moreover, we must not forget that V.A.'s biography includes Hungary in 1956, when he had already participated (although indirectly) in "bringing about order." And that experience, undoubtedly, became superimposed over his perception of the processes of sociopolitical life. Then there was Afghanistan, and particularly the events of the fateful year 1979.

Working for a long time on a book about the war in Afghanistan, its causes and consequences, its secret and obvious motivations, having become acquainted with many documents and having spoken with hundreds of people from various fields, I came to the following firm conclusion: 80 percent of the responsibility for our being drawn into that adventure belongs to people from the KGB. And one of the key figures, undoubtedly, was V.A. Kryuchkov.

He visited the capital of Afghanistan for the first time almost immediately after the April coup, accompanied by the chief of domestic counterintelligence for the First Main Administration, O. Kalugin. Today in the interviews which he generously grants, Oleg Danilovich, I believe, has never once mentioned the Afghan episodes of his service. Yet in the interests of truth we must say: What was, was. As trustworthy sources testify, in the course of their assignments abroad, there were two generals who were primarily responsible for the formulation of the new Afghan leadership. The "command" created with their participation had to jointly meet certain conditions: Complete loyalty to the USSR, an equal proportion of representatives from the "Khalq" and "Parcham" factions, and absence of compromise in regard to ties with Western special services.

Then, to their mutual pleasure, both sides agreed to the opening of a KGB representation in Kabul. This was something like a branch of "Lubyanka," and completely legal, unlike the secret residence which also continued its operations. After this, the director of the First Main Administration and the chief of his counterintelligence left to go back to the Homeland. Moreover, as eyewitnesses recall, Vladimir Aleksandrovich was so satisfied with his mission that after take-off he offered all those present to finish off a bottle of fine cognac. The very fact of drinking up this bottle contained nothing out of the ordinary, had not Kryuchkov been almost absolutely a nondrinker.

Perhaps he understood even then the full fateful importance of this assignment abroad, and felt the strong

embraces of Afghanistan, which from that moment on would become his everyday concern and would remain so until his arrest in August 1991? Perhaps... A fact remains a fact: It was specifically then that V.A. firmly tied himself to everything that was going on and that would go on beyond the Amurdarya.

While prior to April 1978 the residence of state security in Afghanistan did not differ from the others like it in terms of its numbers and the character of tasks performed, after the coup everything changed drastically. At times there were more than 10 KGB generals alone "beyond the river." Hundreds of KGB officers served on the staff of the Kabul representation, under the "roofs" of various departments and advisory sections, in special subsections throughout the entire country. Without their knowledge, the Afghans could not perform a single cadre appointment which was in any way notable. Military operations could not be implemented, national-economic facilities could not be built, and convoys with cargo could not be sent off. I do not want to say that these officers were all dullards, or that the orders which they issued were always distinguished by incompetence—not at all. I am simply stating a fact: For a number of years, almost all affairs in the neighboring countries were handled by V.A. Kryuchkov's men, and by him personally.

The "twinkling star" in the Afghan period of the chief secret service man's career is that which in our official historiography has subsequently been hazily referred to as "the beginning of the second stage of the April revolution," and in essence was a gross intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign state, the physical removal of the leader of this state, and the subsequent military incursion onto its territory. Those who are primarily guilty of this crime have been named: Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko. However, have we not been too hasty in writing off all the sins only onto the deceased?

Yes, the decision to remove Hafizulla Amin, who was not suitable to Moscow, from the arena and to find an acceptable replacement for him was made by the supreme political leadership of our country—that is an established fact. But it is unlikely that Brezhnev and his comrades burdened themselves with details: How to remove him and whom to place in his stead?.. The scenario of the December coup was composed in the First Main Administration under the direct leadership of the hero of our article. By that time, the chief of intelligence had already sought out B. Karmal, who was hiding from Amin's agents in Czechoslovakia, and whom a Kabul resident had recommended to the center as a possible leader. He transferred to Kabul and Gabram a team of officers specially trained to conduct secret operations. He surrounded H. Amin with his own people even more closely.

I was able to find out that, at the directive of leaders of the First Main Administration, various methods of eliminating the Afghan leader had been examined as early as

the fall of 1979. Specifically, the application of sniper weapons and special claymore mines with directed high capacity charges was not ruled out. But all this was rejected for various reasons, until finally they settled on the variant of the military operation scheduled for 27 December.

Historians and analysts have undoubtedly not yet fully evaluated this date and have not given full credit to the events which took place in the Afghan capital at that time, events which were directed from the Podmoskovye region.

On that day, an attempt was made to send H. Amin, along with the entire supreme leadership of Afghanistan, to the other world (or to put them to sleep?) with the aid of some kind of devil's drug which was placed in their food. In the afternoon, the guests who had gathered at the residence of the country's leader, having eaten the soup, fell off their chairs one after the other. The frightened Afghan maid urgently summoned Soviet doctors from the embassy and the Central Military Hospital. They conscientiously pumped the stomachs of all the leaders who were in a state of unconsciousness, which probably mixed up the cards of the coup organizers. In any case, by evening H. Amin had recovered to the point that when the attack began, he demanded to be given an automatic weapon.

A naive man... He died several minutes later from the fragments of Soviet grenades. So to the very end he never realized the treachery of the people whom he had always called his brothers. On that day and on the eve of it, Amin spoke by telephone with Gromyko and other Kremlin leaders, and met with our Army and Cheka generals. All of them in a chorus assured him of their friendship, were respectful and confirmed the fact that "the northern neighbor would not leave Afghanistan in trouble." Yet at the same time, airborne troops from the 103rd Division were surrounding the palace, the KGB special section had moved to the line of attack, and the president's death sentence had already been signed.

They say that at Andropov's order all the documents concerning the events of that day were destroyed immediately after the military incursion. However, my conversations with participants in the secret operation allow me to conclude that the order which they received from the leadership of the First Main Administration demanded that the supreme leader of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] be not imprisoned, not interned, but singularly—eliminated. The order was fulfilled, after which Afghan (was it really Afghan?) Radio cynically reported: The usurper and agent of the CIA was sentenced by a revolutionary court to death by firing squad, and the sentence has been carried out. ... And so I would like to ask Vladimir Aleksandrovich all kinds of questions. Let us suppose the leader of the neighboring state really was conducting his domestic policy other than as we would like. Let us suppose even that in his distant student years, while studying at an American university, he really did have some contacts with the

special services (although in regard to Amin, not a single shred of proof of his association with the CIA has ever been found to this day. They really wanted to find it, and they looked very very hard, but alas...). Let us now suppose the most terrible thing: As a result of his bad politics, as it seemed to us, a certain threat was created to the southern borders of our Homeland (in fact, as it turned out, there was no threat). So, does all this justify the bandit-style attack and the physical elimination of an objectionable leader?

I would also like to ask: Are you, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, not experiencing pangs of conscience regarding the act of terrorism which was performed, in the course of which the leader of Afghanistan and a number of persons close to him were eliminated, the palace guard was almost completely annihilated, a Soviet military doctor who was in the palace perished from our own bullets, and a colonel from the special service and several others who stormed the palace were killed? What was this blood spilled for? For the sake of what higher interests of the state?

I asked many people who participated in the tragic events of 1979 the following question: How do you explain the fact that the KGB decided upon an action so unprecedented in its boldness, associated with storming the Amin palace? At the same time, for the professionals I clarified: Why did we have to take war to the governmental residence, if its master, at the first call of his "older brother," would himself have raced to any place designated for him? Amin, according to the recollections of his friends and those close to him—and I questioned many of them—was a person not without significant shortcomings, but everyone noted his one virtue as being obvious: Unconditional devotion to the Soviet Union. Then why this bloody bacchanalia on the evening of 27 December?

One of the officers of the state security service, a participant in that operation, shared with me his explanation in the summer of last year. "The supreme political leadership of the USSR ordered that Amin be removed," he said. "And our departmental leaders decided to combine the inevitable with the useful, and at the same time to develop for the future a combat variant of occupying a well-guarded governmental residence."

At that time I listened to all this with extreme skepticism. Yet in the recent August days I recalled the words of my interlocutor from last year. The "White House" on Krasnopresnenskiy Street was to be taken according to exactly the same scheme by which the palace of H. Amin was attacked 12 years ago on the outskirts of Kabul. One on one. At that time the rehearsal, as we know, was successful. The same arranger-conductor has now raised his baton once again...

Closer to evening on 21 August, I again telephoned the chairman's office. "Vladimir Aleksandrovich has left." "And when will he be back?" There was a heavy sigh at the other end: "Not soon, I am afraid!"

Debate Over KGB Archives Continues

92US0015A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by D. Babich: "Will All Be Remembered by Name?: Arguments Over the KGB Archives Continue"]

[Text] The veil of secrecy over the contents of the Moscow KGB archives has been somewhat lifted to allow access to members of the deputy commission to appropriate and systematize the KGB and CPSU archives, created by special decree of the Moscow mayor. The main argument centers on which papers should be transferred to the state archives and which should be designated operational materials and left in the hands of the KGB.

As commission member Arseniy Roginskiy reported to the commission meeting at the Russian University for Humanities, the Moscow KGB archives contain 3,500 (three thousand five hundred) files of Moscow KGB secret informers. All of them are sorted by the agent's code names (for example, Philatelist, Professor, etc.).

These papers are all kept in the operational affairs section, where the so-called DOU (operational records)—files on suspicious citizens, those apparently suspected not only of espionage or crimes against the state, and also dissidents or any people whose opinions are too independent—are kept. Perhaps something can be found on you and me in the approximately 10,000 DOU's.

Staff members of the Moscow KGB Administration insist that these documents should fully and unconditionally remain under the jurisdiction of the KGB since they represent "operational documentation." Some commission members propose—for the purpose of eliminating secret informing as an institution—to confiscate the lists of secret agents from the KGB and put them into special storage departments of the state archives. No unauthorized person will be able to get to them there, but neither will anybody be able then to blackmail these people over their "agent's past," including the KGB itself. Neither is destruction of the DOU permissible (these documents have a retention period indicated on them and the date when they may be destroyed). These documents must be shown to dissidents and other honest people who are the subjects of these files.

The second section, which the KGB Administration staff would like to keep for themselves, are the personnel files of former employees (about 20,000 files). They do not even want to share the biographies of the MChK [Moscow Extraordinary Commission] leadership of the 1920's.

It is proposed to transfer the third section of secret files (the documents of KGB subunits—counterintelligence, and the ideological department) with the limitation of actions observed. Also proposed for transfer to the state archives are archival-investigative files and so-called

filtration and captured materials (cards filled out by German prisoners of war during World War II). At this point, it is hard to tell whether the KGB staff and the members of the deputy commission will reach a compromise.

By the Way

According to Rudolf Pikhoya, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers Archives Committee, notes by the well-known political figure Sergey Kurginyan have been discovered among the papers on Staraya Square; these notes contained a scenario for the conduct of a state coup.

Physicist Proposes Steps in KGB Reorganization

91US0831A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 6

[Article by physicist Vladimir Nikitin: "How Can We Reform the KGB: A Few Propositions for Candid Discussion"]

[Text] Throughout the past six years, within the context of the "kitchen debates" that are so common in Russia, I have discussed the problems of the KGB a great deal with several friends who worked there and still do. The interest in the agency stemmed from its hypertrophied role in our life. As a result, I have developed some sort of coherent idea about the organization's possible evolution. From my viewpoint, the reorganization of the KGB should become the subject of broad debate today. We must not permit the preservation or recreation on a different basis of a power apparatus that is, in essence, unconstitutional and not subject to the people's authority.

This debate should involve people with the most diverse points of view and diverse political experience, including KGB employees themselves who have maintained loyalty to the apparatus until the very last moment, and not just "KGB dissidents," the attitude toward whom among the bulk of employees is highly mixed. In order to get things started, I can put forward several proposals. They represent nothing more than the author's viewpoint, which that is obviously debatable, but the questions must be raised.

First. The functions and spheres of activity of the special services must be radically reduced. For example, the system of "drawers" and first departments in state organizations should be eliminated. To this day every defense plant and research institution literally gives off the air of a special, closed institution, starting with the degrading entry-pass and special-regime system, and ending with the management's complete dependence on people who have no relation whatsoever to production. The system for guarding defense enterprises has long since turned into a special reserve for idlers of the most diverse sort, who often earn more than the people who do the actual work.

At the same time, it is necessary to perform a number of guard functions that at present no one is really performing, although citizens' security suffers more from this than from the threat of foreign invasion. Examples are the operation of nuclear power plants and construction in seismically hazardous regions. It for some reason seems to me that environmental crimes are no less dangerous than political crimes, and an equally powerful and independent agency ought to be involved in preventing them. Consequently, the sphere of activity of the security services should simply be redefined on the basis of today's realities. The larger part of these services should work openly. What is important is not secrecy but independence from changing political conditions and local authorities, and a high level of professionalism.

Second. We need to set up a system of independent services along functional lines. It should include redundancy, or more precisely, the mutual covering of functions, without which no security system is possible. The list of services (undoubtedly partly incomplete and partly excessive) would be as follows (some of the services could be republic services):

Union services:

- a service for protection of the Constitution. It would include the special-departments services of the Army and Ministry of Internal Affairs;
- a service for the protection of defense and state secrets and oversight over raw materials and goods placed on a list of state resources. It would issue licenses for the production and exportation of natural resources, gold and other nonreplaceable resources or resources with a lengthy replacement cycle. It should partially duplicate the functions of the service for guarding borders and facilities, in order to obtain independent assessments of the effectiveness of the latter's activities;
- a service for combating corruption among employees of the state apparatus;
- a service for guarding the borders and facilities. (Facilities would include enterprises producing types of armaments, munitions and complete weapons systems, as well as facilities, such as nuclear power plants, at which accidents and acts of terrorism could have disastrous results.) This service should include a large corps of technical specialists and a service for licensing environmental hazardous production facilities;
- a counterespionage service (territorial services and services responsible for specific fields);
- an army intelligence service. It would be desirable to have a system consisting of several intelligence services—possibly not right away, but this would be the best means of ensuring reliability;
- an administration for training centers and support services (the development of, placement of orders for, and procurement and production of, using its own enterprises and firms or those belonging partially to the administration, of equipment, gear, weapons and munitions, and supplies).

Republic services:

- national guard security services;
- services for the protection of top officials.

The all-Union services should be united by a single administrative agency whose members would be the executives of those services and a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Oversight over its activities should be carried out by the president (possibly through his representative) and a special parliamentary commission.

That agency's functions would also include the issuing of licenses to guard, investigative, and other nonstate organizations performing the functions of protecting citizens, organizations, and property. This is not to propose the mandatory licensing of such services by that agency, but the existence of such a license would signify a high degree of confidence in the private organization on the part of state protection agencies. Individually, organizations of that sort that had distinguished themselves could be issued authorizations for the use of the training centers and support services on a commercial basis (without going too far with prices; the goal here would not be profits but quality in the performance of protection functions). On the basis of such organizations, a reserve corps for the special services would be created, which would allow them to flexibly build up their forces for the performance of protection tasks.

Third. The personnel question. Although it is obvious that the core of the new services should consist of experienced professionals, sole reliance must not be placed on persons who have previously served in the KGB. It would be foolish to entrust, without supervision, the protection of democracy to persons among whom the very word "democracy" has just recently been regarded as a profanity. They are not to blame for the fact that from the very beginning they underwent extremely powerful ideological indoctrination, but that is the way it was. The imposition of restrictions through parliamentary oversight and the appointment to top offices of politicians with distinguished records is essential but insufficient. Measures are needed to create within the new special services a core of personnel who have no connections with the former repressive apparatus. Moreover, people who have themselves been the targets of the KGB's work should not be used. The new personnel should undergo fairly serious training; we must not forget the past experience whereby persons were transferred to the KGB from the party and Komsomol nomenklatura who had received no proper special training but nonetheless advanced their careers faster than the specialists.

All this presupposes a fairly lengthy process of transition from the former structures to new ones. In particular, the

complete dismissal of all KGB employees should be carried out, even though this process might be spread out over a period of time. This is necessary in order to form new collectives with new tasks, rather than preserving the old agencies of suppression under new nameplates. Moreover, this process would make it easier to attain the necessary degree of personnel reductions and replacements without offending people whose fault consists solely in the fact that no suitable job is found for them in the new structures. This principle, like any other, cannot be implemented with complete consistency (for example, it is hardly applicable to Army intelligence agencies), but this should be a goal. Another reason it will be difficult to sustain this principle is that it is necessary to preserve continuity in the handling of investigative cases and the performance of other functions in areas of work that will be preserved in the new structures. It will be necessary to take special measures to reduce such cases and functions to a minimum and accept the fact that for a certain time parallel structures of the "old" and "new" agencies will exist.

Fourth, and last. With regard to covert agents' work. Lately a great deal has been said in the press about the immorality of covert agents' work as such. The people's disdainful attitude toward informants is understandable and justifiable. But we must recognize that it is based on the fact that secret agents served, in principle, the suppressive apparatus. I would like to ask one question: Should the actions of agents of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet or KGB who were working on the putshchists' apparatus and constantly supplying the [Russian] White House with information about the state of affairs "in the enemy camp" also be condemned as "informing"? Specialists will say that in countering covert activities the work of covert agents is the most effective, and often the only possible, means of gathering information. Banning it means depriving the protection services of the possibility of combating the most dangerous crimes. But it is also necessary to erect barriers to the creation of a total system of encouraging informing.

It is necessary to draw up a statute on work with covert agents that would be binding on all special services and agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This statute must stipulate criminal liability for the use of information received through covert agents outside the context of the performance of work, or in violation of established regulations. All petty cases in which information obtained from covert agents is made public, or "the wrong" information is gathered, etc. should be heard in an officer's court of honor. Access to covert agents' information should be open only to the officers directly working on a case, and in extreme cases, to inspectors, and should be closed to everyone else, including management at the next level. Responsibility for the reliability of information obtained from covert agents should be borne by the officer who has received that information, and for the most part everything should end with him. We must remember that the people who present, for example, covert agents' information on

organized crime are subject to serious risk. The question of the rules for working with covert agents should also be the object of discussion, and there is no other means of ridding ourselves of the virus of informing that has become embedded in our life, and of the fear of that virus.

And so, if one really takes a serious approach to the question of the KGB, it is clear that there is an enormous amount of work to be done here. It will be possible to "breathe freely" in five years, and no sooner, but without this work breathing freely at all may become problematical.

Procedure for Appointing General Procurator Attacked

91US0800A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Sep 91 p 2

[Report by Georgiy Tyurin, former procurator: "The Holy Seat Does Not Go Unfilled"]

[Text] Every general procurator of the Union of SSR's has his own "special assignment." Upon executing it, he is free. The "procedure" for cadre appointment to the higher echelons of power remains if not top secret to this day, then not even subject to logic, to be precise.

It has been several months now that N. Trubin has watched over lawfulness, having relieved A. Sukharev at this combat post. During all these months, the voice of the new general procurator was not heard, even though far from all was in order in the country as regards lawfulness. Yet suddenly his voice broke through as soon as it was necessary to defend the honor and dignity of the USSR President from MGU [Moscow State University] student Yelena Andreyeva and RSFSR People's Deputy Artem Tarasov, in addition to investigating what kind of "enemy of the people" it was who wanted to exchange 140 billion "wooden" rubles for USD8 billion. A special assignment?

If that is the case, it is being executed most unprofessionally. There seems to be a recollection that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet declined (!) the recommendation of the new general procurator to hold Artem Tarasov criminally responsible, as it was so trumped-up and senseless.

It would not be inappropriate to look back into the not-so-distant past in order to cast light on the "procedure" for procuracy appointments....

The president's recommendation to release USSR General Prosecutor A. Sukharev in connection with his retirement came as a bolt from the blue. In his speech, Aleksandr Yakovlevich boldly explained: "I overestimated my strength and underestimated the volume of the work suddenly piled upon me." He was let go even more quickly and unanimously than he was appointed.

But it is a pity! Our former general procurator could have been asked many interesting questions. For example,

who personally in the system proposed that he transfer to the chair of the country's general procurator. What actual orders has he received from high dignitaries? Which of these did he not fulfill, and pay for with his chair?

It could be supposed that Sukharev's overly hasty retirement was conducted because a USSR Supreme Soviet commissions was checking the procuracy's work at that time.

Having fallen into the party-nomenklatura elite, Sukharev was confirmed in the position of department deputy chief of administrative organs of the CPSU Central Committee by Brezhnev himself, and he held the party's political policy in all the law enforcement organs. And the MVD, KGB, and the procuracy only fulfilled the directions from higher up. Aleksandr Yakovlevich was summoned to service in the USSR Procuracy during the height of perestroika. So with what assignments was he sent there?

And what purpose did N. Trubin have, having instigated a late criminal case over the event of the state coup, and sending his own people to "assist" republic investigators? Isn't this why Kruchina, CPSU Central Committee head of affairs, and Marshal Akhromeyev departed this life voluntarily, without even having been summoned for a first interrogation?

Yet even more terrifying is the fact that a rout of the opposition in the procuracy itself was begun with Sukharev's arrival.

Sukharev departed, Trubin arrived. But the bellicose deputies of Aleksandr Yakovlevich remained, always ready to fulfill and overfulfill any task of the Communist Party and even the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]: Vasilyev, central player in the rout of the "Kremlin affair," Abramov, the general whose signature is on many indictment decisions in cases of so-called dissidents.

Traditions are alive, and no resolutions nor ukases will change anything.

"The cadres decide everything." This phrase does not cease to be topical because it was uttered by a criminal. It is necessary to remove the nonprofessionals, even if their labor tenure extends into decades. Those obedient to someone else's will, and ready for anything for the sake of their position must be removed. Otherwise, there will take place the same thing that happened in 1917: a tornado of crime will sweep over everything, and it will have to be fought by the army, if it maintains its combat readiness to that time, as well as notorious "troikas," tribunals with the right to impose the death sentence, and implement it swiftly.

...Right before his resignation, Sukharev left for his last official trip abroad. Trubin was also abroad during the putsch.

Amnesty Unlikely for 127,000 Convicted of Economic Crimes

92US0013A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Sep 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by M. Krashinskiy: "Amnesty Being Prepared: But Unlikely To Affect Persons Convicted of Economic Crimes"]

[Text] Now serving time in Soviet prisons and camps are 127,000 persons convicted of economic crimes in accordance with long-obsolete articles of the Stalinist period. This tally was made by specialists from the Society for the Protection of Rights of Persons Convicted of Economic Crimes and for Economic Freedoms, based on official data from the Ministry of Justice. In the words of Viktor Sokirko, the chairman of this society, the Russian parliament is finishing up the preparation of a decree granting amnesty for many types of crimes, but the "economic" articles are virtually untouched in this document.

"We just cannot stir up the members of parliament even to examine the matter of putting an end to criminal repressions against free economic activity. How is it possible to talk about making the transition to a market-type system, about entrepreneurship, and—at the very same time—we continue to beat up the entrepreneurs...?"

Viktor Sokirko considers that our country is a violator of the concluding document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, which it signed in April of last year. Because, after all, we are among the 35 signatory-states which pledged at that time to protect and defend all types of property, including private property, as well as to guarantee the individual's economic freedom in our country.

How little these promises have in common with everyday, practical life is well known, for example, by Oleg Yefimov, a former kolkhoz chairman in Kurgansk Oblast who is serving a 10-year sentence of incarceration for utilizing the services of some so-called "moonlighters." This is also known by Ivan Gogol from Nikolayevo, Nikolay Moroz from Kamchatka, Avraam Gekhman from Kiev, and thousands of other "moonlighters," who came or did not come within the field of vision of Viktor Gekhman and his colleagues. Decrees adopted by the USSR Supreme Court have long removed the "moonlighter" from the sphere where punitive measures are in effect, but in real life everything has remained the same as it was in the "old days." To an equal extent, this is experienced by citizens who have been subjected to repressions as persons involved in plundering, bribery, and "speculation." Down to the present time the Criminal Code provides stricter punishment for legal violations of this kind than it does for homicide.

The Society for the Protection of Rights of Persons Convicted of Economic Crimes and for Economic Freedoms was officially registered in October of last year. Operating within its framework on public principles are

several dozen persons, including such experienced lawyers as Lev Ivanov from the Institute of State and Law, and Oleg Sokolskiy. They view their task as not only to provide legal protection and defense of specific persons, but also to work on legislation which would measure up to the demands of making the transition to a market-type system. The society's achievements, however, have not been too great: during the past year it has succeeded in bringing about the release of only a few persons from under guard. It is affected by the virtual absence of any material base. A few days ago the following report flashed in the press: The communists have created a substantial committee for the defense of their own rights. Is it really possible that the persons of the future—the entrepreneurs—will prove to be, in this sense, less organized than the persons of the past?

Here is the requisite banking information of the society which we have been discussing: Their current account is 700402, MFO 201832, Moscow Branch, Moscow Business Bank. I think that people who are not so poor in this country would be able to support their own poor defenders.

In Viktor Sokirko's opinion, it would be more equitable nowadays to bring up the issue not of amnesty, but of the complete rehabilitation of most of those persons convicted in accordance with the "economic" articles. But the almost ready or finished document could speed up the release of many of them. It would be a great shame to "miss the train" again.

Statistics Detail Increase in Crime

92US0026A Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI
in Russian Aug 91 pp 64-67

[Unattributed article: "On Criminality and Crime Records in the Country"]

[Text] The population's worsened living conditions, interethnic conflicts, and, overall, the social tension in the country contributed to the increase in criminality. A total of 2.8 million crimes were recorded in the country in 1990, or 13.2 percent more than in 1989.

The highest level of criminality over a period of many years was recorded in 1990. The number of recorded crimes is characterized by the following data:

	Thousands		1990 in Percent of 1989	Per 100,000 Population	
	1989	1990		1989	1990
USSR	2461.7	2786.6	113.2	856	963
RSFSR	1619.2	1839.5	113.6	1096	1241
Ukrainian SSR	322.3	369.8	114.7	623	713
Belorussian SSR	66.5	75.7	113.8	650	737
Uzbek SSR	84.5	88.2	104.4	420	429
Kazakh SSR	135.3	148.1	109.4	815	884
Republic of Georgia	17.6	19.7	111.7	324	361
Republic of Azerbaijan	15.0	15.4	102.9	212	216
Lithuanian Republic	31.2	37.1	118.6	843	993
Moldavian Republic	40.9	43.0	105.3	940	985
Latvian Republic	29.7	34.7	116.9	1106	1290
Kyrgyz Republic	25.5	29.7	116.1	590	673
Tadzhik SSR	16.4	16.9	103.0	317	317
Republic of Armenia	8.4	12.1	143.9	256	365
Turkmen SSR	17.3	18.6	107.8	483	507
Republic of Estonia	19.1	23.8	134.4	1213	1504

The number of grave crimes increased. There were 422,600 such crimes recorded in 1990, or 15 percent above the 1989 figure. They accounted for one-seventh of the total number of crimes and for one-sixth in the RSFSR, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia; for one-fifth in Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, and for one-quarter in Armenia. In these republics, in 1989 the percentage of all grave crimes was above the national average.

The level of solved crimes is declining. A total of 1.2 million crimes (36 percent of proceedings) have remained unsolved, or 25 percent more than in 1989. One out of each nine murders and rapes, one out of four cases of inflicted heavy bodily damage, one out of three robberies, about one-half of all thefts, and more than one-half of larceny cases remained unsolved.

The number of the individual types of recorded crimes follows:

	Thousands		1990 in Percent of 1989	Per 100,000 Population	
	1989	1990		1989	1990
Total crimes	2461.7	2786.6	113.2	856	963
Of these:					
Against the life, health, freedom, and dignity of the individual	193.9	211.6	109.1	67	73
Against property	1463.4	1723.2	117.8	509	596
Of these, against the private property of citizens	1017.2	1180.0	116.0	354	408
Economic and office	148.9	158.7	106.6	52	55
Against public safety, public order, and the health of the population	566.9	600.6	106.0	197	208

Crime cost the lives of 72,000 people in 1990 as against 66,600 in 1989, or an increase of 8.1 percent. According to the USSR MVD, material damages assessed at 878.2 million rubles were caused, or an increase of one-third over 1989.

The USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and USSR Prosecutor's Office have exposed 1.4 million criminals, or 6.1 percent more than in 1989. The following data characterize changes in the social structure of criminals:

	1989		1990	
	Thousands	In Percentage of Total	Thousands	In Percentage of Total
Total exposed	1304.0	100.0	1383.6	100.0
Of these:				
Women	191.6	14.7	191.0	13.8
Minors	212.5	16.7	221.4	16.0
Workers	689.5	52.9	723.8	52.3
Employees	113.5	8.7	108.7	7.9
Kolkhoz members	74.8	5.7	79.5	5.7
Fit individuals who neither work nor attend school	208.3	16.8	238.7	18.1

In 1990, the number of participants in group crimes increased from 382,200 to 412,200, or by 7.8 percent. The increase was even higher in Lithuania (by 19.3 percent), Kazakhstan (15.4 percent), and Belorussia (14.8 percent), where their share was higher than the average for the Union (respectively 32.8, 30.2, and 31.6 percent as compared to 29.7 percent for the USSR). Group crime accounts on an average for one out of each five crimes; one-third of all rapes, theft of firearms and ammunition, robberies, ordinary thefts, and thefts of automotive vehicles, and one-half of all robbery attacks.

Organized groups accounted for 7,000 crimes, or 0.4 percent less than in 1989; of these, groups of corrupt individuals accounted for 226 crimes. In 1990 the USSR MVD organs exposed 1,600 criminal groups, 902 of which consisting of three or fewer members; 644 of between four and 10 criminals, and 81 of more than 10 criminals. Nineteen groups which had operated for more than five years were exposed.

Material harm resulting from crimes committed by organized groups totaled 26.3 million rubles (higher than in

1989 by a factor of 2.2). A total of 13.4 million rubles were confiscated or reimbursed voluntarily (an increase by a factor of 1.3).

Among those sentenced for crimes, members of criminal groups accounted for one-third of the total (about 300,000 people in 1990).

The number of crimes committed in a state of drunkenness and under the influence of drugs is continuing to increase. A total of 470,900 people committed crimes while intoxicated, or 8.2 percent more than in 1989. As in the past, the portion of this category of criminals of the total number of criminals remains high. It was 38-41 percent in the Baltic states, 38 percent in the RSFSR, and 35 percent in Belorussia (34 percent for the USSR).

Drunkenness is a more frequent basis for the commission of crimes, accounting for 60 to 70 percent of all murders, aggravated assaults, rapes, robbery attacks, and hooliganism.

Among minors, crimes committed while drunk totaled 37,800, or 7.3 percent more than in 1989. They accounted for 17.1 percent of all crimes committed by juveniles (16.6 percent in 1989).

At the same time, the number of recorded cases of moonshine dropped by 22 percent, totaling 6,600; 72.4 percent of these were for commercial purposes (66.7 percent in 1989). According to the USSR State Committee for Statistics, in 1990 the population made 150 million decaliters of sugar-based moonshine (three-quarters of the total amount of the sale of vodka and hard liquor), as compared to 125 million in 1989.

Only 6,000 people (15 percent fewer than in 1989) were prosecuted for criminally punishable black marketeering in alcoholic beverages; one out of four were prosecuted for black market operations on a large and especially large scale. No more than one-tenth of all individuals accused of black market sales of alcoholic beverages were employed in the trade system; one out of five, however, was a retiree or a housewife. The number of criminally prosecuted individuals for repeated violations of rules governing trade in alcoholic beverages declined by 216 people, or 38 percent.

A total of 3,200 crimes were committed under the influence of drugs, or 19.1 percent more than in 1989. A higher rate of such crimes was recorded in Georgia, by a factor of 1.5, and in Tadzhikistan and the Ukraine, by a factor of 1.3. In these republics the share of such crimes was above the national average. It was 0.5-0.4 percent (compared to 0.2 percent for the USSR). One out of every six individuals who committed crimes under the influence of drugs was a minor (one out of five in 1989).

Drug addicts committed 43 murders, 33 aggravated assaults, 36 rapes, 84 robbery attacks, 99 thefts, more than 1,000 larcenies, 36 cases of fraud, 89 cases of hooliganism, and 44 car thefts.

In 1990 912,400 people were criminally prosecuted, or 15 percent more than in 1989. The number of sentenced individuals rose by 20 percent, totaling 820,500; they accounted for 25.3 percent or 8,600 in Kyrgyzstan, 23 percent or 537,500 in the RSFSR, and 22.9 percent or 29,800 in Belorussia. In four republics, although the number of crimes increased, there was a reduction in the number of sentenced individuals: by one percent in Azerbaijan, 3.7 percent in Latvia, 11.1 percent in Armenia, and 11.4 percent in Georgia.

Violent crime is increasing in the country. About one-half of all individuals sentenced for premeditated murder and aggravated assault were between the ages of 30 and 49. Individuals guilty of rape are mainly under 30

years of age. They account for 84 percent of the total; one third of them are minors. One-half of all individuals sentenced for such grave crimes are recidivists (they average, for all crimes, about one-third). One out of four of all individuals sentenced for such crimes, are people with expunged or uncanceled convictions (one-fifth in 1989), tried for the same type of crimes (special recidivism); the number of recidivists with three or more crimes on their record increased by 17.7 percent (their share is between 25.7 and 26.9 percent).

The worsening of inflationary processes and the unbalanced nature of the consumer market have resulted in a significant increase in mercenary crimes. In one year their number increased by 17.5 percent, totaling 1.9 million.

Speculation, above all in durable goods, has become particularly widespread. According to a study made by the USSR State Committee for Statistics, overpayments by the population purchasing such goods on the black market, increased by a factor of 2.8 within one year. The BKhSS [Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] authorities have exposed 48,400 black marketeers subject to criminal prosecution, or 13 percent more than in 1989.

Mercenary crimes are particularly typical of young criminals. More than one-half of all individuals sentenced for theft of state and public property, and three-quarters of those sentenced for crimes against the property of private citizens were under 30; of them, one out of three was a minor.

The number of individuals sentenced for economic and job-related crimes rose from 34,700 to 36,600 in one year, or 5.6 percent. Women are frequently prosecuted for swindling customers and suppliers: 59 percent of individuals sentenced for this crime, and 63 percent for making moonshine are women. Women account for one-third of all individuals sentenced for black marketeering, bribery, and other job-related crimes (an average of 8.8 percent for all crimes).

Two-thirds of all individuals sentenced for account padding and bookkeeping irregularities were in rural areas; more than one-half were sentenced for moonshine brewing and about one-half (a one-third average for all crimes) were for negligence, abuse and misuse of power, forgery, and violation of traffic safety rules and rules governing the operation of transportation vehicles.

Changes in the structure of sentences confirm the increase in penal sanctions, as seen in the following data (in percent):

	1989	1990
Total sentenced	100.0	100.0
Including:		
To deprivation of freedom	35.8	36.2
To probation with mandatory employment	6.8	7.3
To deprivation of freedom with reprieved execution of the sentence	13.1	13.8
To corrective labor without deprivation of freedom	23.7	22.0
To parole or corrective labor	7.3	7.7
To a fine	12.7	12.4
To other punitive measures	0.6	0.6

Judges imposed stricter punishments compared to 1989 for crimes, such as premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and rape. The share of individuals deprived of freedom for such crimes rose from 88.8 percent in 1989 to 89.2 percent in 1990; the respective figures for minors were 83.5 and 84.4 percent.

Furthermore, one out of nine sentenced individuals was deprived of the right to hold certain jobs or engage in certain activities and the property of one out of eight was confiscated.

A total of 119,400 people, i.e., one out of each 12 individuals who have committed crimes were able to

avoid investigations, examinations, and trials; compared with 1989 this marks an increase of 19.8 percent. By the end of 1990 a search was being conducted for 38,100 people, or 35.3 percent more than by the end of the previous year; in the case of one-half of them the search was being conducted by Union authorities.

One out of three individuals who had committed a crime was exempt from criminal liability but subject to measures of social influence. More frequently than the national average, defendants were freed from criminal liability in Latvia, the Ukraine, and Azerbaijan.

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Grachev Cited on How He Sees Presidential Press Service

*PM0210110191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Sep 91 Single Edition p 2*

[S. Oganyev report: "Grachev's Opening Gambit Has Been Played. Is It Stankevich's Move?"]

[Text] At the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday 50-year-old Andrey Grachev held his first briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists in the capacity of new leader of the USSR President's Press Service.

The president's press secretary himself worked in journalism in the past. He has a command of English, French, Spanish, and Vietnamese. He worked in the Worldwide Federation of Democratic Youth, and recently he was deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. He is a graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.

Before the briefing began we contacted A. Grachev and inquired whether he intends to reorganize the USSR President's Press Service. I do not intend to change much, Andrey Grachev said, there should be continuity in work, especially in view of the fact many procedures have become established and are fully acceptable. I would like our service to be the source of up-to-date, timely, and extensive information about the policy of the USSR president and our state structures, A. Grachev continued. I want the press service to become a two-way channel between the president and the country's public, through which the most varied and reliable information should reach the leader of the state, A. Grachev stressed.

I also asked a question about reports that have appeared about the appointment of S. Stankevich as USSR ambassador to the United States. I can neither confirm nor deny these rumors, A. Grachev said, I have no additional information.

IZVESTIYA Account of 1 Oct Grachev Briefing

*PM0310114591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Oct 91 Union Edition p 2*

[G. Alimov report: "USSR and Russian Leadership Present New Draft Union Treaty"]

[Text] Work has resumed on the new version of the Union Treaty, which seemed to have been canceled and postponed indefinitely as a result of the August coup. The modest silence on the Union Treaty has fortified many people of late in their belief that there would be no return to it. At least in the foreseeable future. There has been more talk of an economic union as the most likely and—it cannot be denied—the only way out of the situation that has developed. And it is more than attractive for an entity like the USSR. Citizens seem to have become confused as to what country they live in and of which state they are citizens. Everything indicates that another attempt is now being made, obviously the last, to scale the height known as the "Union Treaty."

Andrey Grachev, head of the USSR Presidential Press Service, said at a briefing 1 October that work on the Union Treaty is being carried out at the same time as discussing and coordinating the draft Treaty on Economic Community and is to a considerable extent synchronized with it. Over the next few days the new draft Union Treaty is, by general agreement with the other republics, to be submitted for them to discuss in conjunction with the USSR and Russian leadership. In the opinion of M. Gorbachev's official spokesman, the process of finally coordinating both documents may be completed in October.

Moscow Accepts the Challenge

The USSR president has ordered the appropriate state organs to formulate within a week a serious of answering actions and counterproposals to G. Bush's nuclear disarmament initiative. As is well known, the U.S. President has put forward a radical program for cuts in the nuclear stockpiles. Andrey Grachev noted that, on the USSR side, it may be a question of a coordinated counterprogram of measures. He said that M.S. Gorbachev has set up a group to liaise with the U.S. Administration on this subject. "The Soviet Union intends to accept the challenge in the nuclear disarmament sphere," A. Grachev said.

M. Gorbachev's New Book

It was announced at the briefing that the president has given the NOVOSTI Publishing House the manuscript of his new book, "The August Putsch: Reasons and Consequences." The book is 74 pages long. It also contains the article on which the USSR President was working during his vacation in the Crimea, considering a counterrevolutionary putsch as one hypothetical way for the situation in the Soviet Union to develop.

IZVESTIYA's correspondent succeeded in obtaining the text of M.S. Gorbachev's preface to readers. He says, in particular, that the events of August are still receiving heightened attention from the public in our country and worldwide. Considerable attempts are being made to analyze the reasons for and consequences of what happened. Regrettably there also other attempts—to turn these events into a subject of superficial speculation so as to arouse vile feelings and unhealthy sentiments. Irrespective of the intentions of those doing this, it is damaging to the tendency toward the consolidation of society.

Postcoup Closure of Party Papers Affects Local Press

Renamed Krasnodar Party Paper Retains Former Staff, Style

*914B0417A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 4*

[Article by V. Logvinov, a Krasnodar journalist, under the rubric: "The Press: Do as You Please?"]

[Text] For the third week now, a situation that has developed with respect to the former party newspaper

SOVETSKAYA KUBAN [SOVIET KUBAN] has been disturbing Krasnodar journalists.

The situation, in brief, is as follows.

By decree of V. Dyakonov, the Krasnodar Kray Chief of Administration appointed by the RSFSR President, in the very first days after the unsuccessful state coup, this newspaper's publication was suspended "as having compromised itself by supporting the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency]." This had been evident in the release of, not only junta documents, but also its own reactions and commentaries.

What was the amazement of readers and journalists when the newspaper was successfully published, literally on the day after the suspension, under another name: "VOLNAYA KUBAN [FREE KUBAN]—Krasnodar Kray's independent mass newspaper." At the same time, it was announced that the paper's one-time founder—the CPSU Kraykom [Kray Committee]—had voluntarily relinquished its rights, although it is unclear how the kraykom could have done this under the circumstances, when the RSFSR KP's [Communist Party's] activity had, in fact, been suspended. VOLNAYA KUBAN was published without having been registered with anyone, having preempted the old SOVETSKAYA KUBAN's next serial number, and, of course, with the same editorial staff members and the same chief editor—V. Lameykin.

After this, a whole series of releases protesting such a metamorphosis appeared in the newspapers KOMSO-MOLETS KUBANI and KRASNODARSKIYE IZVESTIYA, which had become democratic publications, not after 21 August, but considerably earlier. The journalists cannot agree with the fact that the newspaper, which heaped defamation on B. Yeltsin, O. Kalugin, and the democratic movement in general, especially in Krasnodar, over the course of many months, having suddenly disguised itself, and now cynically criticizing its former masters from the CPSU Kraykom, retains the right to the highest-capacity publishing plant, which is subject to nationalization according to the well-known ukase, and the most widely circulated publication in the kray, while the other, truly democratic, publications are experiencing a great number of material and technical difficulties.

A distinctive detail: The authors of all those releases are former SOVETSKAYA KUBAN associates. Some of them left its editorial office as early as the end of last year because of disagreement with the CPSU Kraykom's appointment of V. Lameykin as the newspaper's editor. The others, having worked with him for several months and become convinced that the newspaper had taken extreme right positions, left the editorial office later. In all, about 30 associates left SOVETSKAYA KUBAN.

It is most remarkable that the newspaper which lately has acquired the worst reputation, the newspaper that a great number of subscribers has abandoned, and which was burned in protest before the kraysovet [Kray Soviet

of People's Deputies] building back in the spring, having dusted itself off and put up new facades, is now lecturing its former colleagues, and some, really "smearing all over the wall" [tearing down]. Here are just some expressions from the latest opus published by VOLNAYA KUBAN and signed by V. Lameykin: "the hasty hack writers of various mass information media," "Hands off, pipsqueaks," "You are hypocrites," "You are double-crossers," etc.

These, let me repeat, were addressed to former colleagues now working at democratic publications, who, at least, did not compromise themselves in any way during the putsch.

So, what is going on? First, there is a violation of the Law on the Press, inasmuch as an unregistered newspaper is being published. Second, a violation of the Ukase on the Nationalization of Party Property, which the party newspaper's property and publishing plant are, is taking place. Third, the discrediting of a new, democratic authority appointed by the Russian President is occurring, inasmuch as the chief of administration's first decree turned out to be unexecuted, and there was nothing for him to do but rescind it, having acknowledged that it had been just "a measure for moral warning of the collective." One may only guess how V. Lameykin succeeded in so quickly winning over the new administrator, together with whom, it is true, he worked "in the Komsomol" in youthful years.

In the final analysis, all of this is a spit in the face to journalists and to any notions of honesty and decency in this medium.

Suspension of Party Papers Eliminates Competition in Samara

914B0417B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Babenkov, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent, in the column "Glasnost: What Is Wrong With It?: They Have Decided To Eliminate Competing Publications in Samara With Just a Stroke of the Pen"]

[Text] A brisk competitive struggle for the subscriber has developed in Samara. However, some journalistic collectives are trying to capture the reader, and not by illuminative releases, sensational materials, profound articles, or skillful formatting work.

Having taken advantage of the former party publications' temporary suspension, the editorial staffs of the Oblast and Samara City Soviets of People's Deputies' newspapers SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA and SAMARSKAYA GAZETA, in close cooperation with A. Baryshev, the chief defense attorney for all who write and broadcast—the chairman of the oblast journalists organization who, at the same time, also is chairman of the

Oblsovet [Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies] Commission on Culture, Morality, and Oblsovet Mass Information Media—appealed to the chairman of the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies with an utterly specific request. They proposed "to ensure the right of VOLZHSKAYA KOMMUNA and VOLZHSKAYA ZARYA (these are suspended newspapers) subscribers and readers to information by increasing the content and circulations of the publications established by the Oblast and City Soviets of People's Deputies." Let us explain to those who are not well-versed in the language of Aesop: Implementation of this appeal would put competing publications, which, by the way, have twice the circulation and the richest history, out of the way by a stroke of the pen.

It might be all right if we were talking about the several dozens of journalists: Perhaps they would find work somewhere. But how "ensure the right" of the shutdown newspapers' readers to information? Are they to be turned over by law, or what?

Fortunately, this proposal did not find support at a recently convened plenum of the oblast journalists organization and a meeting of the Oblsovet commission.

Bryansk Paper Target of 'Witch Hunt'

914B0417C Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 14 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by Eduard Mokhorov, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA staff correspondent for Bryansk Oblast, in the column "Glasnost: What Is Wrong With It?": "A Den of 'Witches' in BRYANSKIY RABOCHIY"]

[Text] In a wave of anticommunist hysteria, the witch hunt is continuing in Bryansk. As before, BRYANSKIY RABOCHIY, the most widely circulated newspaper in the oblast, remains the hunt's object.

As everyone knows, the journalistic collective had been thrown out onto the street without trial or investigation, the newspaper's publication had been forbidden by decree of the local authorities, and all manner of self-styled agents were already about to begin expropriating the property produced by many generations of Bryansk newspapermen's labor in the name of the Russian President.

After numerous protests of readers and the public, unequivocal instructions about the inadmissibility of repressive measures against BRYANSKIY RABOCHIY and other publications arrived from the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Information Media. The newspaper was published again, and its collective elected new leadership and announced that it would follow a course independent of any levels of party authority.

It would seem that all the "i's" had been dotted. However, the local expropriators decided to be holier than the Roman Pope. Taking issue with the Russian authorities' instructions, Fedor Gosporyan, an RSFSR Supreme

Soviet Commission on Glasnost and the Mass Information Media representative, and a party functionary in the recent past, announced in the press that the newspaper's resumption of publishing is illegal. "I see a procuracy [prosecutorial agency] oversight in its (i.e., the newspaper's) having again been published without a court decision, and, indeed, the situation (?) does not permit of delays"—These words are from an interview with RSFSR People's Deputy F. Gosporyan clearly and unequivocally published in one of the local newspapers.

Apparently these words became a directive for action. The Bryansk Oblast Procuracy immediately began interrogations of the communist editors who published the notorious GKChP's [State Committee for the State of Emergency's] decrees transmitted through official TASS channels during the well-known August days.

Among those interrogated are BRYANSKIY RABOCHIY former editor A. Kuznetsov and his deputy, as well as V. Kornya, chairman of the Oblast Committee on Radiobroadcasting and Television.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Defends Scrutiny, Criticism of Yeltsin's Policies

914B0444A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA chief editor Vitaliy Tretyakov: "Has NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Become an Anti-Yeltsin Newspaper?"]

[Text] It is not in the habit of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA to offer explanations to anybody in regard to our professional policy; nevertheless, we cannot ignore the discontent on the part of some of our readers. Of course, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA does not intend to change its line: There are enough weather cocks in domestic journalism, and we are not tempted by their laurels. Still, we need to remove a certain misunderstanding that has emerged here.

As is customary in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, I will express my own point of view. Probably not all journalists in the newspaper share it in all details. But we do not gag anybody and do not censor out the lines if their contents do not coincide with the chief editor's opinion. Therefore, a different view on this problem—should it be presented by a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA staff writer or author—will find a place in its pages.

There are not too many among those who currently heap praises on Boris Yeltsin's policy who had been just as courageous and uncompromising before the coup. At that time, many called NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA a "Yeltsin" newspaper; some derided us for it, while others envied that we were writing and saying what was on our mind. Not too many understood, however, that the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA position has never been mindlessly pro-Yeltsin. We have criticized many aspects

of Boris Yeltsin's policy, and offered harsh judgments on some or other of his actions that, in our view, were incorrect.

Before the putsch, the watershed in the Soviet press went along this line—if we simplify the situation for brevity sake: for Gorbachev's policy or against it (leaving aside so-called "patriotic" publications, the latter almost automatically meant supporting Yeltsin's position). Today the picture has changed only in that the central figure around which arguments are being waged is Boris Yeltsin. This is understandable: Gorbachev does not have much real power, and to swear allegiance to him now is unfashionable and unprofitable. The central political figure has changed; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's position has remained the same.

Greater attention is obviously now being paid to the policy of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who has transcended from the number two—and oppositionist, at that—figure in the Soviet political spectrum to the number one position. Now his actions determine the main elements of the national domestic policy. His achievements move the country forward; his mistakes slow down or complicate this progress. In this sense, what seem to be (I repeat that this is my own assessment) the most crucial mistakes in Boris Yeltsin's policy today?

First and foremost, I have a question about the real meaning of the Yeltsin-Gorbachev alliance, which is being propagandized by the official Russian press and some of the now "independent" central press as real, solid, mutually acceptable, and mutually beneficial. I rather doubt all these definitions; as to the mutual benefits, I think that in reality it only means that tactical interests of the two presidents currently coincide. But is this alliance beneficial for the country? I, for one, think it is not. In my view, keeping Mikhail Gorbachev as USSR president makes the implementation of needed radical and economic reforms more difficult rather than speeding them up. Whether I am right or wrong is another matter. What we do not hear, however, are sufficiently convincing explanations in this regard from Boris Yeltsin himself. Therefore, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will be analyzing this problem on its pages even if in the process it reveals some "secrets" that some people today try to keep secret.

A great number of questions come up in regard to the structure of the new power in Russia. It is obvious to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that not only a political but also a personal struggle for power in Russia (at various levels) is going on. We will subject to minute scrutiny each of Yeltsin's unfortunate—as well as fortunate—steps along this path.

The problem of economic reforms is one NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has written about many times. So far, the Yeltsin government does not seem to have a clear economic program; besides, of whom does this government consist, and who orders the economic tune, and in what key? There are questions and questions—and not a

single clear answer. It was, however, exactly in the mine field of the economy (coupled with the problem of interethnic strife) that Gorbachev's policy of compromises "was blown up." If Yeltsin intends to take the same road, he will inevitably be criticized—at least, by us.

The interethnic strife is the second stumbling block against which Gorbachev's positive image was smashed. Where is full political, tactical, and strategic clarity in Yeltsin's line in this respect? So far, there is no such clarity (or perhaps I am simply unable to grasp it).

The problem of the Union and of the new Union Treaty. Personally, I believe—and I have already written about it—that there is no idea today that is more harmful and that would distract us more from solving the real problems. It is understandable why Gorbachev is clinging to it. But why does Boris Yeltsin continue to hold on to it? Because of opportunistic considerations (including the ability to maintain his still needed alliance with Gorbachev) or for other reasons? Does Yeltsin himself—or his advisers, those who develop for him the policy of inter-republic relations—see what is happening in the Central Asian republics of the Union? Do they understand that the majority of these republics are drifting very fast from communism to Islamic fundamentalism? Is a state union possible—even in theory—between by-and-large European democratic institutions of the new Russia and by-and-large non-European political institutions that are emerging from the ruins (?) of communism in Soviet Central Asia?

All of the above should not be understood as my saying that these problems are not being discussed and worked out in the "brain centers" of the new power in Russia. But if they are indeed being discussed and worked out, it is being hidden from the public eye the same way it was done in the past in the bowels of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR president's apparatus. As a result of this secrecy, we have already had a putsch and the current chaotic disintegration of the empire, and we will have even more distant and more dangerous consequences of both the former and the latter.

For me, at least, the diplomatic activity in Moscow around human rights seems inappropriate at a time when the touching unity of the two presidents in front of the West coincides with the increase of bloody conflicts in the southern part of the country and of Russia. I will say once again: **Inside the country**, Gorbachev's policy, which brought him a Nobel Prize, was a total failure. I do not want the same to happen to Yeltsin's policy, whose shape is only now beginning to acquire a tangible form. Therefore, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writers, while expressing their own point of view, will be in opposition to this policy to the degree in which they see it as fallacious, and will be loyal to this policy to the degree in which they see it as correct. Who will be wrong in this? It is quite possible that the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writers will be wrong. But even in this case it will be the lesser of two evils, since then Boris Yeltsin

will turn out to be right, and thus peace and happiness will reign in the country with the only disturbance provided by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA.

No, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has not become an anti-Yeltsin newspaper, just as it had not been anti-Gorbachev before the putsch. Concrete political figures, by whose name some policies or other are sanctified, are the least of our concerns. Our concern is the policy itself. This, and only this, is the subject of our analysis. Independent analysis. For professionally we value most of all the reputation of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA reflected in its name given to this newspaper at the time when the word "independent" elicited either silly or malicious smirks. It is the fruits of this silliness and this malice that we are reaping today.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's New Editor To Maintain 'Democratic Traditions'

914B0444B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 38, 25 Sep 91 p 1

[Editorial report: "We Have Elected and Editor In Chief"]

[Text] Our readers certainly know by now about the changing of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief. The electronic press and the daily newspapers supply us in a timely fashion with rumors and facts.

First, there were reports about F. Burlatskiy's resignation. Then there were rumors about the reasons that caused it, about the underlying causes of the conflict in the editorial offices, and about potential successors. Various names were mentioned, including some candidates from Russians living abroad. Now the rumors have been laid to rest.

On 19-20 September at the general meeting of the labor collective, Arkadiy Petrovich Udaltsov was elected editor in chief by an overwhelming majority vote. He is 54. He is a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA native, having worked for over 17 years as a deputy editor in chief in the department of ethics, law, economics, and science. Before that, he had been editor in chief of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS for six years. Together with his colleagues, the new LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief has lived through both joyful and difficult days in the newspaper's past.

The result of the secret ballot: "for"—165, "against"—11.

Now LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is headed by a professional journalist. This should not be perceived as a change in the newspaper's course, however. It remains a writers' newspaper and will unfailingly maintain and develop contacts with literary figures and participate in the life of writers' organizations.

The main alternative to A. Udaltsov in the elections was Yevgeniy Sidorov—one of the secretaries of the USSR

Union of Writers, director of the Institute of Literature, and a well-known literary critic. He had a very solid showing during the preliminary round, and was included by the general meeting on the secret ballot list. Alas, at the final stage, the contender removed his candidacy on his own. Speaking before the collective, he said:

"LITERATURNAYA GAZETA is dear to me, for it is there that I grew and developed as a critic and a journalist. Therefore, I accepted with natural gratitude my nomination by a group of newspaper staff members and writers for the post of editor in chief. Upon brief contemplation, however, I have to decline this honor, since I do not plan to leave the Institute of Literature in the near future."

We also want to report that the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff is currently seeing off to a new job Yu.D. Poroykov, former first deputy of the editor in chief. He has been appointed first deputy director-general of TASS.

Thus, we have a change on the captain's bridge. The newspaper will keep its present face, however, the democratic traditions, and humanistic leaning. Let us believe in, and hope for, the support of our readers.

RIA-NOVOSTI Director on Agency's Plans

924B0017A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Oct 91 p 5

[Interview with A.G. Vinogradov, general manager of RIA-NOVOSTI, by N. Shevtsov; place and date not given: "To Tell Only the Truth (Is What the RIA-NOVOSTI General Manager Thinks)"]

[Text] He is 36. In 1979, after his graduation from Karlov University in Prague, Andrey Georgiyevich Vinogradov came to work for APN. In later years he worked as the agency correspondent in Czechoslovakia. Last year he took charge of the RUSSIAN INFORMATION AGENCY [RIA] joint-stock company. This year, at the end of August, he was appointed general manager of NOVOSTI INFORMATION AGENCY (IAN). It is RIA-NOVOSTI now. Today he is answering some questions asked by the TRUD correspondent.

[Vinogradov] First of all, this agency has to deal with information and news and not indulge in propaganda. I do not see any need in providing a "positive image" of anything in the world that might be ugly by nature. Our main goal is to relay information and facts, to enable people to come up with their own analysis of the events and thus make their own political and moral choice. The agency still remains an organization which uses enormous sums from the budget or, in other words, from the taxpayers. Can we continue feeding like parasites on the people, most of whom are destitute? The agency is running up such losses that one is scared to even mention them. So, the only solution, I think, is to transform this government monster into an independent—in the economic sense primarily—information corporation.

Unfortunately, economic incompetence usually leads to unscrupulousness. IAN was no exception. The taxpayers' money was spent on days of stoppages, on holidays; most often no accounting for it was done at all. Can you imagine an agency with its entire personnel idling two days a week? RIA-NOVOSTI is going to work around the clock for seven days a week.

[Shevtsov] Together with the representatives of special services? Will they continue to work in the agency?

[Vinogradov] No, they will not. Our reorganization plans to free the agency from those fetters too.

[Shevtsov] Your agency has become a Russian one. How can this fact affect its work?

[Vinogradov] Our top priority will be to prepare and broadcast information, not our interpretation of the events but real information. It will be about Russia and for Russians. The same information will be offered to our foreign subscribers also.

[Shevtsov] Will there be any changes in the journalistic network?

[Vinogradov] Definitely. Now we do not have any at all. What we have are trade-propaganda-diplomatic missions, not without exceptions, of course. At the same time RIA-NOVOSTI has a need for correspondents who will be free in the ideological sense, who will be mobile and have a good grasp of the events in the country. We will involve our foreign colleagues for work in their countries and regions. They have their own understanding of problems, which we are practically devoid of at present. APN-IAN foreign publications will be suspended but that should not mean that any interested domestic or foreign organization will not be able to revive them on a joint-stock or any other basis or transform them into economic and other newspapers and magazines. We are considering the idea of handing over to union-subordinate structures SOVIET LIFE magazine which is now published in the United States in accordance with an intergovernment agreement. I might be mistaken, but this is not the time to advertise ourselves. Let Russia be advertised through complete, reliable and up-to-date information.

[Shevtsov] Are you suggesting that the budget financing be withdrawn?

[Vinogradov] That is our goal. But the agency cannot exist without any help from the government. Another question arises here: What kind of help is it? Is it a subsidy or a state order? Is it charity or financing for one or another program? I must admit that there is a restriction in the list of programs. The agency should not do any propaganda programs. I personally would prefer bankruptcy. However, I believe that is what the Russian Government wants to have—a powerful and independent agency.

[Shevtsov] What else can you say about the new agency? Its form is completely clear, but what about its concept?

[Vinogradov] RIA-NOVOSTI should become a non-party, "roundtable" type agency which has room for anyone supporting "his" Russia, the new Russia, the right to have a place for his own ideas and plans in our sociopolitical life. In other words, we should reflect life the way it is: with democrats, monarchists, sexual minorities, etc.; with all of its diversity and conflicts.

[Shevtsov] Do you encounter any obstacles in reorganizing the agency?

[Vinogradov] Naturally, we do. We have a psychological atmosphere among IAN personnel that I call "a riot of defensive tendencies." There are attempts to apply "the telephone rule" to personnel decisions which is a result of that same "riot." There is the people's habit of dividing their incomes into the "left" and "right" ones. The latter fact, by the way, is not their fault, it is rather a predicament of the country where nothing is available, where the government structure cannot and does not want to interest people in the prosperity of a firm. Unfortunately, no decree can enforce the concept "if my firm is rich, I am rich also." Another concern is the problem of assets which now belong to Russia. The Ukraine, for instance, simply expropriated the agency assets. They even fired our people there. I would like to believe that any elements of such extremism will be short-lived in the practice of intergovernment relations.

[Shevtsov] Will your agency issue any new publications?

[Vinogradov] Yes, of course it will. They are NOVAYA NIVA magazine—which we would like to see as a successor of the formerly famous NIVA, the PREODOLENIYE magazine touching upon the problems of the invalids. But it seems to me, however, that the agency should participate in setting up magazines rather than have them in its structure.

[Shevtsov] Will the agency keep its philanthropic programs?

[Vinogradov] We have a great desire to preserve them but a moral issue arises here. We do not have even a whiff of a profit. In other words, we seem to process the taxpayers' money from the budget and then return it to the same taxpayers. It might seem a better and a more honest thing to make the agency profitable and thus relieve the budget and then develop our charity programs from the money we earn and not from the money given to us by the Ministry of Finance, might it not?

Future Changes at MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Discussed

92US0006A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Sep 91 p 8

[Interview with the editor in chief of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, Len Karpinskiy, by S. Aleksandrov; place and date not given: "News for Intelligent People"]

[Text] [Aleksandrov] The newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has a new editor in chief, political commentator Len Karpinskiy. What future does he see for this political weekly at a time when the common view is that the people are tired of politics?

[Karpinskiy] The people are tired of politicking rather than of politics. It is the natural desire of every independent thinking man—or any man who strives to think independently—to have information that is as complete as possible about events and trends in the political, economic, and social life of society. This is precisely the kind of reader we cater to. Our sources of information are directly linked to the cabinets of Yeltsin and Gorbachev, presidents of the republics, organizational committees of parties and movements. Leading politicians, scholars, lawyers, writers, and essayists are among the founders of the newspaper. Therefore, our analysis of the situation is based on facts, which unfortunately are still little known to the general public on occasion, rather than rumors and fantasies. Incidentally, the appointment of Yegor Yakovlev to the position of chairman of the State Television and Radio Company reinforces the information base of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI still more because the former editor in chief has simultaneously become a member of the political consultative council of the USSR president and a cochairman of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Founders Council.

[Aleksandrov] Therefore, no changes in the orientation of the newspaper are expected?

[Karpinskiy] There will be changes, and quite substantial changes at that. We will attempt to get rid of politics in the narrow sense, the kind of politics that is bottled up in the corridors of power. We will strive to return to the life of ordinary people and to decode the human dimension of politics and economics. In general, an expansion of the topical scope of our newspaper is inevitable because in the coming year MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI will be published on 24 rather than 16 pages. New topical pages will appear: Morals and Manners, Lifestyle, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Investigation...

Radio Mayak To Soon Compete Against New Commercial Station

LD0510183191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0430 GMT 4 Oct 91

[Text] Mayak will soon have a competitor. The new daily commercial radio station "Radio 21" is expected to go on the air for the first time next month. The main subjects of its broadcasts will be culture, commerce, and travel. The radio station project has been worked out by MOSCOW NEWS together with three American firms which are supplying the equipment and preparing the musical programs. The station will broadcast on the so-called European band of 103.7 MHz on which not a single radio station is yet operating. This band is only found on imported receivers so you can imagine who will have the opportunity to listen to that radio station. Along with two hours of Russian programs daily, the

radio station will broadcast in English for foreigners who are in Moscow. Beginning next year, following the capital, residents of St. Petersburg, Kharkov, Kiev, Alma-Ata, and Minsk will be able to listen to "Radio 21."

Conflict in TV News Department Continues

924B0019A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Oct 91
Single Edition p 2

[Article by T. Martynova: "They Do Not Pour Yogurt Into Champagne Glasses, or What They Do 'in the Name of the People'"]

[Text] In the article "Let Us Slap 'Vremya' With Democracy" published on 19 August, we reported on a conflict which flared up on television, promising to discuss details in the subsequent issues. However, in all honesty, we counted on reason prevailing and the incident soon ending in a good finale. However, a confrontation from which the audience suffers continues.

...The chairman of the VTRK [All-Union Television and Radio Company] was late for a meeting of the collective of the Studio of Information Programs of Central Television scheduled for 1000 hours on 18 September. However, as is known, bosses are never late, they are delayed. Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev got delayed by approximately half an hour. Hundreds of his subordinates, as well as outside journalists who converged in response to the news about yet another incident in the TV establishment, waited for him patiently all this time. However, as it turned out, the outside journalists were not universally welcome.

Yakovlev responded with a harsh ultimatum to a timid proposal from the floor to let the invited colleagues attend: "If this is a business conference then the issue is closed. If you are holding a press conference you may do as you please." This suggested that he himself was not going to take part in the press conference.

A general pause followed, after which the "outsiders" left.

I stayed, confident of being right in doing precisely this. After all, when the Russian democrats closed PRAVDA down and our collective discussed the internal issues of our future life we resolved, having had our doubts: Let everybody be present at our "business conference." This is why I interpreted Yakovlev's "Authorized Personnel Only" message as "Welcome" with the tacit approval of the surrounding TV personnel.

The employees of Central Television assembled in conjunction with the suggestion made by the current head of the Television and Radio Company that Olvar Kakuchaya, editor in chief of the Studio of Information Programs, leave the post to which the collective had elected him unanimously a year ago. I will recall that officially the whole mess began because of a combative report by A. Denisov which was aired as an afterword to "Vremya" on 15 September. On one hand, this was a

retrospective of socialist competition, while on the other, it was the point of view of Denisov (actually, of the entire editorial office) on the competition foisted on them "from above." Had it not been for the fact that Yegor Yakovlev blew up right away upon seeing this episode, and had his wrath not spawned repressive measures, all of us would have thought, like the well known journalist V. Kobyshev, that a brilliant move had been discovered to "squirm out" of the existing situation. After all, anybody can end up in a mess; the main point is how he gets out of it. Alas, "the father of Russian democracy" (this is what they called Yakovlev in one of the articles in the departmental publication SEM DNEY) was not "on the level." At the conference, i.e., three days later, he was equally intransigent, saying that this "episode is the last straw in our incompatibility which has mounted..."

Incidentally, the incompatibility thesis was heard in the "throne" speech of the chairman as an obsessive tautology. As he sees it, the collective of the "Vremya" program and the young people he brought back to TV, are primarily incompatible. Yakovlev stated on behalf of the people: "The audience trusts them." The opinion of the people was still to become known several days later. However, the new head of the company apparently prefers to use other sources. As far as we are concerned, we will wait for the results of sociological surveys, and will discuss what we would like our main information program to be in our next article.

As I listened to the VTRK chief, I was at a loss: Actually, what kind of incompatibility is this, given that producers, audio engineers, and other employees of the "Vremya" program worked on broadcasts anchored by the representatives of the competing camp during the competition period? Incidentally, this collective had every reason to harbor a grudge against the same Tanya Mitkova and Dmitriy Kiselev who, having left the editorial office to assume the roles of oppositionists, later leveled charges against virtually everyone. Meanwhile, criticism against them within the editorial office was not leveled on the principle "democrats vs. conservatives," but rather along the lines of professionalism and the degree of responsibility for what is being said on the air. The victorious oppositionists who have now been returned to Central Television by an arbitrary decision of Ye. Yakovlev have encountered, perhaps for the first time, the pressing need to give up the faultfinding, which was characteristic of them in the past, and offer something constructive.

One more point. T. Mitkova and D. Kiselev began their careers at one time, learned all the intricacies of the craft, and had their "trial runs" (making names for themselves in the process) precisely under the leadership of Olvar Kakuchaya. He was specifically the one who gave Oleg Dobrodeyev the opportunity to display his talent as an editor. Dobrodeyev moved on up to the position of deputy editor in chief in the Office of Information Programs of Central Television, and subsequently left

for Russian television. Dobrodeyev has now been tapped by the management of the company to take Kakuchaya's place.

Therefore, they did manage to foist incompatibility, about which a thesis was driven home at the conference, on the Studio of Information Programs—from the outside, that is. This incompatibility is being magnified more and more, despite the fact that the employees, to a man, rose to defend their editor in chief.

At one time Ye. Yakovlev, editor in chief of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, discussed the proposal to leave his post made to him by the supreme leader of the state on the program "Before and After Midnight" (which was anchored for all of its four and a half years by O. Kakuchaya). Yegor Vladimirovich responded to this: "Let my collective decide this."

At present, O. Kakuchaya is finding himself in a similar situation. However, his collective is being denied this right.

We also recall a second precedent on the same program. In a January episode, Ye. Yakovlev, the future leader of the TV company, allowed himself an undisguised attack against L. Kravchenko, the chief of the radio and television company at the time. However, Leonid Petrovich who was never called "the father of Russian democracy" but rather its "suppressor," did not allow himself any reprisals against either Kakuchaya or anchorman V. Molchanov.

So, history has now been replicated in a new cycle of life. The characters are almost the same. Aleksey Denisov has been added. Incidentally, in the January episode it was precisely his videotape that was tied to presentations by Kravchenko's detractors as links in the same chain. However, this time, the quite innocent, though brilliant as always, piece by Denisov had a different outcome. The following retort was heard from the lips of one of the new VTRK leaders: "Such an episode could be made about two months ago..." meaning: under Kravchenko. In plainer words, the hint was that he who is not with us is against us.

We have been through that quite a few times! Under any rigid power structure, they segregate the people into "devoted" and "those not yet." They try to get rid of those not devoted right away. By all signs, the "machine" for getting rid of the undesirables at Central Television has been cranked up. Ruling out any debate, the chairman announced at the conference that "'Vremya' is gone!" However, it appears that nobody was inclined to engage in a debate on this issue: Everybody understood that the program was in need of serious changes. However, few people understood something else before this meeting with Yakovlev: That he will brook no objections or dissent. In general, the VTRK employees who will be retained should get ready: Now they will have to be an obedient instrument for implementing the plans, convictions, and ambitions of "the father of Russian democracy" who has turned out to be a tough

boss. Clearly, the purge was to begin with the main information program of the country...

We have now approached the issue which is paramount for all revolutions, whether with or without quotes.

"Vremya" is the most powerful means of influence in our country in terms of the size of its audience. There are many newspapers, but there is one Central Television. Certainly, only a team devoted to the boss can own this channel. If we take a somewhat detached view of the cataclysm to which program No. 1 has now been subjected, it will appear to be a power struggle which is usual in the years of historic changes and great turnarounds.

The employees of the editorial office were drawn into this struggle through no desire of their own. At the meeting in question, Yakovlev rebuked them: Supposedly, they talk about anything at all—who is whose man, who is scheming against whom, who will take which position—anything but journalism. Really, this is an absurd rebuke. Indeed, are they to engage in creative discourse at the time when they first meet the chairman (only for 1 hour and 20 minutes), when structural and cadre changes loom like a sword of Damocles? Incidentally, the common anxiety was not without grounds. The employees of the studio understood that they were pawns in a big game, which is what one or another of the VTRK managers who were with the platform party blurted out unwittingly.

In the greater scheme of things, this certainly does not have to do with the sharp piece by Denisov; it is just that this piece happened to be a catalyst. This has to do with the position held by O. Kakuchaya, rather than O. Kakuchaya personally. It is just that this has now turned out to be a key position. However, when what was believed to be a "pliable" editorial office behaved in a surprisingly monolithic manner, despite all attempts to split it along political and generational lines, the bosses had nothing else to do but go for broke. "The editorial office is not going to exist in this form. The decision has been made to set up an information agency"—the statement by Yegor Yakovlev, who had been in office for just three weeks before making this fundamental decision, sounded as a shot.

The management of the company needed legal grounds for a serious cadre reshuffle. They did find such a basis. All employees, from typists and assistant producers to the editor in chief inclusive, would be removed from the staff [vyvedeny za shtat]. It is easy to surmise on the basis of what criteria the new staff is going to be selected. At any rate, Kakuchaya was not included in the working group that was instructed to prepare the draft for the future agency.

Therefore, an idea was proclaimed. However, it was not easy to find a creative justification for the new structural change. After all, what is any agency, be it TASS or REUTERS... They only "sell" news. What kind of

agency are they trying to create at our Central Television? Will it produce, "sell," and consume all by itself? Is this a new Bolshevik experiment?

However, the pattern for accomplishing transformations remained the same: in the name of the people! Allegedly, the people believe "Vremya" program to be a stronghold of reactionaries, and believe that those who work there have besmirched themselves politically. Allegedly, the people do not want to see the announcers and commentators whose faces, in their view, conjure up the old regime. Allegedly, the people dreamed about T. Mitkova and D. Kiselev going back on camera...

By all signs, the people keep their silence when it comes to A. Denisov. After all, when Aleksey yelled "from the gallery": "But I am young too... I am only 27" during a philippic by the chairman about the young ones "whom the viewers trust," the chairman pretended not to hear him.

Incidentally, many employees of the Studio of Information Programs of Central Television got the impression that they were not heard, and in general, that there was no desire to listen to them. Perhaps this is precisely why "Vremya" journalists began to file requests to quit even before the announcement on the results of surveys (in the integrity of which they do not exactly believe), without waiting for the "deaf" bosses to start deciding their fate. The most frightening aspect is that professionals who do not intend to be subjected to the humiliations which are in store for them intend to leave the editorial office, and Tatyana Komarova is among them. They do not particularly count on the USSR Union of Journalists coming to the defense of their rights. After all, the head of this union, Eduard Sagalayev is also No. 2 in the television and radio company to which he was returned by Yakovlev.

The most vexing point is that the new VTRK leaders do not at all consider an "echelon" such as TV viewers. Otherwise, they would not have brought about the sad condition and the creative and technical decline of program No. 1 which has been the case in the past two weeks. Generally, so many comical, strange and absurd things have happened at Central Television in recent months, things which look like splashes of yogurt being poured into a crystal champagne glass, that it boggles your mind!

...No, I did a very wise thing after all when I did not leave the business conference of the studio. Had I left, I would have perhaps continued to have illusions regarding Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev, as many of my colleagues from other publications do. They view his appointment to the TV and radio company as a fateful rather than just a wise solution. I for one, doubt this strongly at present.

Such is our "Soviet-style" tradition: To curse the chiefs who are gone, and curse them harshly. Perhaps, Leonid Kravchenko was the only exception among Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] chairmen. They began to curse him right away. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI... yes indeed, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI was the first to do so.

Yakovlev has now entered "the defeated territory." It is understood that he came there with a preconceived psychological attitude, with the ambitions of a victor.

Perhaps, it is worthwhile for the new leader to heed what is already being said in the collective and in the press rather than act impatiently and in an authoritarian manner? Perhaps, they will curse him less when he is gone in this case?

Future of Safety Oversight in Dangerous Industries Questioned

91WN0734A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Sep 91 Union Edition p 7

[Article by A. Illesh: "With the Disintegration of the Union Dangerous Production Units Are Becoming Super Dangerous"; first two paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] During the first broadcast of the very popular television program "Vzglyad" to appear on screens after the expulsion from Central Television, Anatoliy Chernyayev, an aide to Mikhail Gorbachev, was telling the detective story of the USSR President's captivity in Foros, and he reported what, in my opinion, was an extremely curious and moreover a telling detail. When the group of unexpected committee members and GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] people announced themselves at Gorbachev's dacha, this person, who was close to the very highest circles thought: Obviously there has been another accident at a nuclear power plant. Another Chernobyl! That is what first came to a presidential aide's mind during this unusual situation.

It is true that the post-Chernobyl syndrome in the USSR is enormous. And, in general, how dangerous are those dangerous production units, which are "scattered" across the country in enormous numbers? And what should be done with them now that the USSR is rapidly disintegrating?

For a start let us take a look at the sad statistics. In the first six months there were 300 significant (first and second category) accidents at facilities which come under the republic supervisory organs and USSR Gospromatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in Industry and Atomic Power Industry] (not counting accidents on railways and at bread-product enterprises). The number of people who lost their lives is high: 553.

V. Ryabov, deputy chairman of the country's Gospromatomnadzor, reports: in six months more than 392,000 investigations were carried out; 2.4 million (!) violations were discovered, and the operation of facilities was halted 150,000 times! Fines were levied against 36,000 people for infractions of all kinds. In 850 cases the materials were handed over to the investigative organs.

And S. Adamchik, deputy head of the Main Administration of USSR Gospromatomnadzor, thinks that the use of potentially dangerous facilities and wares throughout the economy and the defense complex, as well as the annual increases in the quantities which are being used with unregulated operational procedures are creating a situation which in the end may lead us to self destruction. Moreover, it is already leading us to it. But in this area, alas, fundamental measures are not being taken to prevent emergency situations. As soon as another tragedy befalls us, there are specialists trying to convince the government that what happened was only the result

of a series of accidental events which happened to coincide. Let us recall the terrible accident near Ufa in which 1,224 people in two train cars were killed or injured. There was only one accidental factor here: two trains ended up at the same point at the same time. But a defect in a pipeline is something to be expected. And it is something to be expected in contrast to a natural disaster. It is a matter that rests with human hands.

How many tragedies must still occur before the correct conclusions are drawn from all this? What awaits us tomorrow? The specialist is convinced that the impasse results from the lack of a system for regulating the social relations which ensure safety. It is a fact that this kind of system was not carefully established when all property was concentrated in the hands of the state and one could carry out this process using administrative-command methods. And what will happen after privatization? The disintegration of the country, which is an objective process, makes this question even more urgent. How can one live and work calmly when all these potential "mines" fall into different hands? After all, every entrepreneur and every enterprise will decide questions of safety, based on their own understanding of "safety."

Imagine this picture: all the nuclear and chemical weapons have been distributed to various enterprises as well as to the population, and they have been told: "Act!" Maybe this is an exaggeration, but something similar is now emerging in industry. The following are already in the hands of nonprofessionals: sources of ionizing radiation, toxic substances, chemical preparations, explosives, etc. The government and legislators must understand that all of this may be found with various forms of property (including state ownership) and there is only one condition under which they will not threaten the life or health of the population and environment, and that is if there is strict regulation of the safety issue. And it is the state which must regulate this activity. Alas, just as there was no order in this area before, there is none now.

Specialists in the West claim that safety is an economic concept. If we want to have a safe production unit, it is essential to invest more money in designing the facility, in improving equipment and in training specialists, etc. The entrepreneur will never undertake these expenditures by himself. In order to force him to do so, the state acts by means of laws and specially-created state regulatory bodies.

Let us recall how the question was formulated even quite recently: plans for industrial enterprises were supposed to cost as little as possible. Up to now the main way to make projects cheaper has been to economize on safety. The state never had an independent expert committee on the safety of enterprises. As a rule the inspectors and experts served the agency which had responsibility for putting enterprises on stream rapidly. The existing state expert commission which comes under USSR Gosplan and USSR Gosstroy was again largely oriented toward reducing the cost of the project.

Out of all the state organs which exist today, it is the following which must concern themselves with this complex problem: USSR Gospromatomnadzor and to a significant degree the Main Fire Protection Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Public Health Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Health. But... S. Adamchik claims that in our country the necessary significance has never been given to the work of these organs. There are the residual principles of financing, the low technical level of equipment, the lack of the necessary scientific support... And above all there is the lack of any legislative basis for their work, which makes it impossible for them to be effective.

An inspectorate for technical safety is, in essence, a public prosecutor's office for technical matters, which must ensure the citizens' right to live safely in proximity to potentially dangerous production units. There must be clear, round-the-clock control, regardless of a change in government or even the appearance of a State Committee for the State of Emergency, which in our country, as recent events have shown, is becoming a common phenomenon. Given any (federative or confederative) "dismantling" of the country, it is necessary to have an appropriate interrepublic organ to, fulfill the coordinating functions of a regulatory agency.

Otherwise, we will have to count on an increase in the number of disasters and lost lives—in each republic as well as throughout the country.

Former Director Advocates Closure of Chernobyl Nuclear Plant

91WN0741A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov, former Chernobyl nuclear plant director, conducted by V. Naumov: "Confession: It Would Be Best To Shut Down the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Completely"]

[Text] [Naumov] First of all, Viktor Petrovich, congratulations on your ahead-of-schedule return. Please tell us a little bit about the conditions under which you were released...

[Bryukhanov] I served most of my sentence in a special regime camp. I lived in a barracks with triple bunk beds. This "dormitory" and its adjoining small courtyard were surrounded by an additional barbed-wire fence, so that the various barracks could not communicate with each other. Various kinds of people were serving time there, but generally it was the run-of-the-mill criminal element. People who were neither ruined for life nor broken comprised just five-seven percent, no more than that.

[Naumov] And that was the circle you moved in? Did you ever run into the people who were sentenced along with you?

[Bryukhanov] No. Immediately after our arrest we were separated from each other, and after the trial we were sent to different camps. It is still unclear what the point

of that was. Subsequently I was transferred to a forced labor camp, working in so-called "chemistry," and my location was about three hours' drive from Kiev. There I could see my family often, listen to the radio and read a lot. Then a few days ago the court decided for legal reasons to release me upon completion of one-half of my sentence.

[Naumov] They say that you were irradiated during the first days following the accident and that you became seriously ill. Were you treated?

[Bryukhanov] It was determined that I got a dose of about 200 rems, far in excess of the maximum allowable limit. I have not experienced any specific health problems.

[Naumov] Today, now that a fair amount of time has passed, has your view of your own guilt in connection with the Chernobyl accident changed?

[Bryukhanov] I was repeatedly asked by the court prior to my release whether I still considered myself to blame, and I replied affirmatively, because my official position made me responsible for actions by the personnel on duty at the plant. One of the reasons for the accident cited by the government commission was a failing on the part of the plant operating crew: reduction of the reactivity margin in the control protection system. That means that I was partially to blame there as well.

[Naumov] I recall that another of the commission's findings was that the tragedy was the result of an extremely rare coincidence of unfavorable circumstances, something like that...

[Bryukhanov] Yes, that was the gist of it. But I would say that that point was explained by later studies. If one takes a look at the document subsequently compiled by an independent commission from the State Committee for Atomic Energy Supervision, one finds that at the time of the accident the reactor was in violation of 32 nuclear safety regulations. And if the regulations are mandatory for the operating crew, then they are probably equally mandatory for the designers. However, for some reason the reactor's design flaws are being kept quiet nowadays.

It was those flaws which made possible the coincidence of unfortunate circumstances which the government commission wrote about.

True, insofar as I am aware the reactors currently in operation have undergone a major rebuild. Perhaps they are still not up to international standards, but they have to a certain extent been able to bring them in line with strict Soviet safety regulations.

The problem lies elsewhere. In the fact that those efforts were made after the fact. We were not even aware of the reactor's design flaws. We were completely confident that the worst thing that we could do to the reactor was leave it without coolant water and cause what metallurgists call a "bear." We were not able to imagine anything

worse. Not a single training manual, not a single regulatory document or set of instructions contained any warning about anything more serious than that. The only thing I knew, and that only by hearsay, was that the RBMK-type reactor did not meet international standards and was not used anywhere else in the world for power generation.

Of course, reduction of the reactivity margin did not solve anything. After completion of the inspection the button was pushed to shut down the reactor. After that a gradual damping process should have taken place. Instead there was a quick succession of nuclear decay which ended with an explosion. It was as if you were driving along in your car, came to an obstacle and pressed the brake pedal, but instead of stopping the car leaped ahead...

When the issue of who was to blame for this terrible accident came up I had no illusions; I was well aware of who would be the fall guy. Soviet science could not be put on trial, nor could the mighty academicians or the at that time still all-powerful Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The mechanism of justice is well known: in the event something goes wrong the first administrator is the first to be accused. And that person is guaranteed of going to jail. This judicial practice is backed up by "telephone law"; I felt the influence of that on my life right up to the last day.

[Naumov] After the reactor explosion the accident area was examined by an International Atomic Energy Agency commission. That commission reached a conclusion which did not reflect the true scale of the tragedy. What, in your opinion, was the reason for that?

[Bryukhanov] Both the first report by the international commission and its second report, an amended version, reflected the same short-sighted approach that our own experts' conclusions did. Add to that another fact: in order to uncover the extent and magnitude of the disaster and to bring about change it was necessary first to have at least an approximate idea of where to look, of where to begin those efforts. That was where a general lack of preparedness became evident: experts underestimated the extent of radioactive contamination. The radius within which measurements were conducted was gradually widened. Only then were the most distant areas with elevated radioactive background levels detected.

For the sake of truth I feel that we must pose one more question: what was the radioactive background level in those places prior to the Chernobyl accident? Unfortunately, we do not know anything about that. Yet it is possible that if studies had been done previously, if there were baseline data for all the contaminated regions, some benchmarks to go by, then I think that the whole picture and the cause-and-effect relation might look different!

The political struggle, in which the Chernobyl tragedy is being used as a means toward certain ends, is not helping uncover the truth.

[Naumov] Viktor Petrovich, you were in fact director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant when it was under construction. Did you have sufficiently reliable control over all aspects of the project to be certain that poor workmanship or deviations from specifications did not occur, and thus that no "time bombs" were built in at the time the plant was built?

[Bryukhanov] Sufficiently. Within, of course, the constraints under which the director of any facility under construction is forced to work. What do I mean by that? A project for me has the force of law; I am obligated to follow it to the letter. That includes the materials required for the project, and other elements of it. But in reality events force us to maneuver every step of the way. The project called for use of fireproof cable coverings starting with the very first unit. But there was none of that available; it was not even delivered by the end of the job. How did we get around this? We asked the planners, and they agreed to change the project specifications, permitting us to use ordinary cable, i.e. with a flammable covering. The exact same situation was repeated with the flammable roof over the turbine room. And so on.

There were other things as well. Both during the construction phase and later, as director of an operating plant, I felt the weight of a very heavy burden: I carried de facto responsibility for a city of 50,000. I got instructions, sometimes from the gorispolkom, sometimes from the party gorkom: allocate workers, set aside funding and materials... Now for this, now for that. A swimming pool 25 meters long was built, but that was not enough, the gorkom got all excited about building another one 50 meters long. No one listened to our objections, and they exerted tremendous pressure on us. The plant administration was also responsible for five schools, 15 kindergartens, street cleaning, communications system maintenance, etc. The present plant director fortunately does not have to worry about all that, but all the things I had to do! This "second front" was naturally to the detriment of safety.

[Naumov] The nuclear power plant accident was a major blow to your life. Have you become an opponent of further nuclear energy development as a result?

[Bryukhanov] I do not feel that there is any reason for that. Today only dilettantes or people who are engaging in pure politics can continue to focus solely on thermal or hydroelectric power plants. Our country's coal reserves are nearing exhaustion, hydroelectric power resources are not boundless, either, and they are subject to weather-related and seasonal fluctuations. No, I respect the "green" movement, but its current victories are in some places already going beyond the bounds of common sense: the development of nuclear energy in this country has been virtually brought to a halt. Since it is so fashionable to cite the civilized world, then it seems

to me that now is the time to recall its experience as well. There is not a single developed country today which can get along without relying on nuclear power plants.

I do not know what can be done to ensure that Chernobyl will truly serve as a lesson. I only know that it should not be perceived just with emotions, but with the intellect as well. Otherwise we will spend additional tens of billions stumbling around in the dark. Our foreseeable future is linked with nuclear energy, but safe nuclear energy, of course. Research is underway in other directions as well, but I do not think that other options will become practical anytime soon.

[Naumov] One last question. Imagine that you are in the place of the present director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. What would be the first thing you would do based on your past experience?

[Bryukhanov] Hard to say... If it were possible, I would recruit personnel.

[Naumov] Explain that, please.

[Bryukhanov] You know, even though we have been accused of incompetence I remain convinced that our people were the most reliable and best trained. At one time they came here to serve a new cause. Everything was new: this equipment, the plant, the city. A collective of like thinkers took shape, bound together by more than just money. What happened was an especially terrible disaster for them. I am not talking about the fact that some of them died and others got radiation poisoning. The people who bore the first blow of the accident, who were in no way to blame, are told: you let something like that happen, how can you work here now? That is very difficult to bear; that is something that is difficult to live with. They have scattered now, but who has replaced them? People were hurriedly brought in from all corners of the country. I do not wish to insult anyone, but can there be any real order where the "long ruble" rules and where the crews rotate in and out? That is fine for loggers, and maybe for oil workers... But not for a nuclear power plant. Under these circumstances I feel that the best thing to do would be to shut down the plant. Otherwise at a facility like that...

[Naumov] Another accident could happen?

[Bryukhanov] Yes.

Extensive Pollution of Ukraine's Lvov Oblast Outlined

91WN0555A Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU
in Ukrainian 8 May 91 p 2

[Article by Mikola Kopach, junior scientific associate, Lvov branch, Economics Institute, AN USSR [UKSSR Academy of Sciences], under the "Ecology" rubric: "Degradation"]

[Text] Lvivshchiyna [the Lvov oblast] is the most polluted oblast in the Western Ukraine. This has happened

because our earth bowels are rich in minerals that have all-Union and sometimes world importance - in particular, potassium and table salts and sulfur deposits. There are also significant reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, construction materials, mineral water and forestry. Another reason is the excess of labor resources and availability of skilled work force; the colonial status of the Ukraine is the third reason. The result is a colonial structure of the national economy, when a territory is a raw materials appendage, with barbaric utilization of the those materials. The availability of an excellent (for the USSR) transportation network, which supports effective export of resources, is also an important factor of the current ecological situation. But the administrative-command system, for which ecological laws are something out of the UFO sphere, has become the main factor. All these factors have led to the current ecological crisis, whose consequences it is impossible to foresee.

According to our calculations, 17 percent of the oblast territory, with over 60 percent of the population (approximately 1.68 million people) is polluted with effluents of industrial enterprises. There are 420 settlements here, including all cities and towns and the majority of town-type settlements. Polluted are the majority of historical and cultural monuments, which accelerates their destruction, and a large number of environmental protection objects (69 all in all) with the total area of 158.1 hectares. The effect of pollution on environmental protection objects is especially harmful, because it actually reduces to zero their preserve status.

An alarming fact is that pollution of atmospheric air at resorts, such as Truskavets, Nemirov, Shklo, Velykyy Lyubin, substantially exceeds the maximum allowable levels, which makes doubtful the effect of medical treatment. Barring immediate and radical measures, we can lose the resorts forever. The majority of harmful effluents is produced by enterprises of Union subordination (Yavorov and Rozdol production associations "Sulfur", the Stebnik Potassium Combine, industrial enterprises in Lvov, Drohobych and Stryi, the Nikolayev Cement Plant etc.). They are creating a continuous belt of polluted territory that stretches from the border with Poland in the Yavorov rayon through Lvov, Nikolayev and Novyy Razdyel to Drohobych, Truskavets and Stebnik. Outside this territory there are substantial sources of pollution in the Sokalsk (Krasnograd and Sokal), Kamenny Bug (Dobrotvor), Busk and Brody (Ozhidov) rayons. The Dashava Technical Carbon Plant causes great environmental harm. Sources of pollution have even appeared in the Carpathians - Borislav, Turka, Skole and Slavskoye.

The situation with open water reservoirs is not much better. We have virtually no nonpolluted rivers anymore - even Carpathian brooks are being constantly polluted, to a larger or smaller degree. After the accident at the tailings storage of the Stebnik Potassium Combine we have lost what has been until quite recently the cleanest European river - the Dniester. Even today we can see the results of this crime - unusual fauna that is typical for flat

country rivers has appeared in the upper (mountaneous) reaches of the Dniester. The Poltva, Mlynivka, Tysmenytsya, Vereshchytsya, Svinya and other rivers have become sewage collectors. Badly polluted are the Zapadnyy Bug and lower reaches of the Stryy, Rata and Solokiya. And all this is taking place in spite of insufficient water supplies for the Ukraine as a whole and the Lvov oblast in particular.

Ill-conceived land reclamation projects, which for some reason are understood here mainly as only drainage and irrigation, are causing great harm.

It is well known that our oblast is located on both sides of the Main European Divide - the flow of a large number of the Ukraine, Poland and Moldova rivers is formed here, therefore, it is a crime to conduct drainage on the scale it is being done even now. However, strange as it is, nobody pays attention to this. As a result of this activity there are hundreds of destroyed rivers, and the ones that are left have turned into anemic straight canals (Gnilaya Lipa, Zolotaya Lipa, Zolochivka, the upper reaches of the Zapadnyy Bug etc.) with water that is harmful if consumed. The situation with pollution of soil and underground water (whose studies must be started immediately) is the same.

In recent years certain steps are being taken toward improving the ecological situation. At the Department of Ecologo-Economic Problems of the Western Region, Economics Institute, AN USSR, under the direction of Mr. Kravtsiv, methodologies for exacting financial penalties for polluting water and atmospheric air with harmful effluents were developed. These developments have been implemented in the Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk and Volin oblasts and the cities of Lvov and Ternopol. They have already yielded significant economic benefits, but radical changes are still a long way off. Unfortunately, leaders of certain oblasts, including the Ternopol oblast, not understanding the importance of this matter, are in no hurry to implement at their oblasts the mechanisms for payments for pollution, which makes the situation worse by the day, and not just in their oblasts, but also in neighboring ones, because with these problems a joint effort is necessary.

The published draft of the Ukrainian SSR law: "On Environmental Protection", very much needed albeit not absolutely perfect, imparts certain optimism.

Summarizing the above, we are coming to an unconsoling conclusion of the threat to the existence of the population in Lvovshchina, as in the Ukraine in general. Even now we have one of the highest children's mortality rates in the world, natural population growth has dropped sharply, and in the majority of the oblast's rayons the size of the population has diminished in absolute numbers. The number of pathological deviations in the newborn has sharply increased.

Pollution caused by chemical enterprises, which Lvovshchina is especially rich in, is utterly dangerous. The effect

of many chemical compounds is not observed immediately - they gradually accumulate in an organism. In the end, irreversible changes occur in the organism; they are transferred genetically, which leads to the appearance of mutants, infertility in women and men and lifespan reduction, and all in all it threatens a nation's degradation. Thus, one can talk about ecological genocide against the entire people. And here there is no difference with respect to the national, confessional or class affiliation - ecological laws act uniformly.

The situation is extremely serious, and if one does not resort to radical measures, Ukrainians, as well as the entire population of the Republic, could simply die out. And no renewed and patched up Unions will help them in this - the far-away center does not care about us all. There is only one way out - an independent State, where we, the masters of our land, will be solving our problems ourselves.

Scientist Advocates Aral, Caspian Sea Link

91WN0742A Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 8

[Interview with Magomed Mogutdinovich Alklychev, senior scientific associate, VNIPIgeoterm, by V. Naumov: "The Aral Is Falling Into the Caspian Sea! Scientist Magomed Alklychev Explains a Cause of the Ecological Catastrophe"]

[Text] The events of a strained political life have somehow drawn society's attention away from the natural disaster that has befallen the residents of the Aral area, as well as from the catastrophic rise in the level of the Caspian Sea. Thousands and thousands of families have been forced to abandon flooded homes, enterprises are closing down, port facilities are going out of commission, the petroleum industry is in a desperate situation, and gigantic areas of fields have been inundated with salt water. Without regard for social problems and economic damage, the Caspian is overflowing even further. On the other hand, the unfortunate Aral continues to dry up; the water continues to recede from settlements and cities which were once on its banks. Life in the desert, once the bottom of a sea, is dying out, and boats that no one needs any more are rusting.

Scientists explain the perfidious tricks of the one and the other reservoir variously. However, rather pessimistic prospects follow from their "diagnoses." The idea of redirecting Northern rivers, alas, is revived again and again as a method of "treatment." This idea, besides a loss of billions, threatens global ecological consequences in the future. M. Alklychev, senior scientific associate at VNIPIgeoterm, has looked at the sources of the "disease" in a new way. Our TRUD special correspondent talks to him:

[Naumov] Your version, Magomed Mogutdinovich, reduces to the fact that an underground flow of water opened up between the Aral and the Caspian several years ago, and both catastrophes are explained by this one cause...

[Alklychev] There may be many causes. At the conference on the Caspian, held in Baku this year, many very likely hypotheses were advanced, and I would not try to refute any of them. For instance, it was stated that the Volga has become fuller, and I cannot deny this factor, although it is also obvious that Europe's largest river itself has not changed so much in recent years, that the Caspian, enormous in area, should overflow its banks. Rather, this is one of the "drops" which overfilled the "cup." Similarly, we should not disregard the mismanaged utilization of the waters of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, which feed the Aral Sea. We should not simply absolutize one or another reason, including the one that I suggested. However, this reason, in my opinion, explains both tragedies well. The rise in the level of the Caspian and the almost complete disappearance of the Aral, I think, are interrelated.

[Naumov] The two seas were isolated for thousands of years. There would have to be a serious cause, in order for an underground river to suddenly appear...

[Alklychev] Well, for everything related to a sea, to land, to the bowels of the earth, a millennium is just an instant. It has been proven that both the Caspian and the Aral, in times that mankind does not remember, were parts of one body of water, the ancient Sarmatian Sea. Mighty layers of bottom deposits of both organic and mineral origin lie beneath the desert sands. These alluviums make up a "partition" between the seas. Porous, eaten away by caves, and rich in spongy "collectors" (hence the oil wealth of these places), these layers (not a rock monolith at all) comprise a "dam" between the Aral and the Caspian. Collapses of drilling rigs into empty cavities have even occurred in Guryev Oblast. That is the "isolation" here. In this regard, the mirror of the Aral is elevated more than 70 meters above the Caspian! This column of water constantly gropes for an exit and is ready to rush for freedom at the slightest leak. It is surprising not that the Aral is flowing away now, but that this wonder of nature has been preserved to this day...

Now, about that which might cause the formation of a water flow within the "dam." If we look at a geological map, the unstable base becomes apparent, on which that which we have conditionally called a dam is founded. It is known that the Earth's "armor," the upper part of its crust, is "paved" with plates which are in motion. Like broken ice on water, they vibrate, separate and shift. So, the gap between the Aral and the Caspian lies directly on a break in the lithospheric plates. Like gigantic clamps, they first squeeze, then release the porous mass of the sedimentary layers: They are "chewing" it. Even a barely noticeable shift may cause the most diverse and unpredictable changes in the depths of the earth, including the formation of such cracks, which would suddenly join two seas and make them into connecting vessels. The surprising similarity in the chemical composition of the waters of the two seas indicates that such contact also arose in the past, possibly more than once. It is hard to explain this only by the common origin of the Aral and the Caspian, or even by the existence in not so distant

times of the Uzba River, which connected the two seas, just as the Neva connects Ladoga to the Bay of Finland. Really, the level of the Caspian Sea in the course of millennia has risen and fallen many times already (which is in no way explained by man's economic activities). Most unfortunately, no information whatsoever has been preserved about fluctuations in the level of the Aral Sea. However, analysis of the geological situation shows that the seas, in all likelihood, do share an ancient interconnection.

[Naumov] To be honest, it is hard to get used to the idea that so much in our earthly fate is predetermined by nature. For decades we have boasted that "the frozen pole and the vault of blue" are under our mastery. Yet, it turns out that one sea is pouring into another, the water is crowding people out, and we are powerless to correct it.

[Alklychev] Well, that is not quite so...

[Naumov] You have suggestions concerning this?

[Alklychev] We must look for the flow itself. This is task number one, and it is entirely within the abilities of geologists and geophysicists. If the underground stream is a reality and it is found, we should arrange a gentle shaking up. For instance, we could drill a number of shallow wells and blast an explosive placed within them. I am certain that a slight mixing of the layers is sufficient to close the passage, which spontaneously appeared, for a century. You ask: Will this end the problem? I would say: Rather, the processes will lose their catastrophic nature, and this is quite important. I think that right now at least half of the Caspian's excess water is coming from the Aral.

Although other factors are operating, most of them are either temporary or can be eliminated. For instance, according to some data, a tremendous amount of the water that feeds the Aral Sea is lost due to the disorderly drilling of geothermal and artesian wells: The state ought to have its say here. For instance, as far as intensified solar activity, which influences the water balance, is concerned, this is a transient matter. If we eliminate the root of the problem, the situation will gradually normalize and the Caspian and Aral will return to their usual banks.

EDITORS' NOTE: TRUD will return again to the social and economic problems of the Caspian and Aral.

'Iceberg' Concept for Saving Aral Sea Viewed

91WN0742B Moscow ROSSISKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by correspondent Vadim Ogurtsov: "Engineer Groman's 'Iceberg' Able To Water the Country's Dry Regions"]

[Text] USSR Goskompriroda and the jury of an all-Union competition, announced by it, have named a technical

proposal by a group of specialists, based on many years of "private" research by Rostov engineers D. Groman, A. Bakalova, and V. Bakalov, among the best concepts for saving the Aral.

We are sitting in the apartment of the former chief specialist of the Rostov Department of the "Teploelek-troproyekt" Institute, Dmitriy Sergeyevich Groman. He went on pension long ago, but to this day considers himself an engineer in the old sense of the word, when the title meant more a capability for technical strategy, than a readiness for the impassive, albeit competent, execution of someone's ideas.

This aspect of his nature doomed him to a thorny path. No one could force him to give up his convictions. From childhood, the man was accustomed to believing in his own reason, since the year 1920, when Moscow Cheka member Sergey Groman adopted and raised the four-year-old orphan. For many years now, he has unselfishly, if we speak of money, been working on an idea which he and wife Antonina Grigoryevna Bakalova call "ice thermics." Signs of an ancient irrigation system, found in Dzhugarskiy Alatau, suggested this idea to them back in 1943. It seemed that in the winter, water rolling down for no purpose, unneeded in the foothills, was diverted by this canal from the upper reaches of the river to a so-called command point. Here it became an artificial iceberg which, with the thaw in the summer, generously irrigated the dry fields of the foothills.

From here, it was not far to the idea of ice-thermic regulation and control [LRU]: Collect the excess flow from rivers and reservoirs, not needed for the national economy in the winter, freeze it for future use using the atmospheric cold and a plant, and systematically melt it in the summer in the necessary quantities.

Years passed. The idea became surrounded with questions and forced them to seek the answers in the layers of several mixed sciences at once. Until that degree of clarity, when the slightest of the questions disappeared, crossed out by profound and reliable knowledge... Once again let us open the stenographic record of a January day in 1975, when the idea's authors and representatives of academic and sectorial science met at the USSR GKNT [State Committee for Science and Technology] in order seriously to examine all this. Without going into particulars, it is possible to say that from the very start, the needle of the scale began to lean obviously toward "highly promising." That is, until the chief specialist of the All-Union Thermotechnical Institute, doctor of sciences L. Berman, put his argument in the other pan of the scale. He found a foreign publication which at once reduced to naught the entire practical meaning of the venture of A. Bakalova and D. Groman, engineers without a higher degree, and of their son Valeriy Bakalov, who was included in the work. At that time, how could they know that L. Berman had only "inexplicably trusted in" an article in an American journal, in which the cost of similar experiments in the state of Pennsylvania had been raised tenfold. He also translated

the coefficient of efficiency incorrectly, having lowered it several-fold. These borrowed "arguments" were a heavy stone around the idea's neck.

However, the GKNT conference accepted this article as an axiom and its attitude toward D. Groman's idea was reduced to vague good wishes, such as "it is worthwhile to continue the search." Of course, this would be on his own, just as he had already done for 40 years in a row...

We are bending over a large-scale map of the country's high mountain regions, where ancient glaciers crawl as blue tongues in canyons, and from each extends a light blue thread of a beginning river. D. Groman repeats some "grammar school arithmetic" for me:

[Groman] The area of the glaciers is not really so large. Somewhat more than 19 square km. At the same time, they store 2,000 cubic km of water. The summer thaw gives about 20-25 cubic km annually, up to 40 percent of the summer flow of rivers of these regions. The center of the European part of the country, the Donbass, the Don River basin, the North Caucasus, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan are experiencing the most acute shortage of fresh water. Of the 140 million hectares suitable for irrigation, only 30 are actually supported.

The first practical attempts to control the thawing of glaciers (essentially the point was simply to accelerate it) were dictated by the knowledge of those years and the experience of the past war: by using smoke-screens and blackening powders. The methods turned out to be ecologically unsound and very expensive, and threatened the irrevocable eating away of the ages-old ices.

With the help of LRU, as the authors assert, it is possible in general to influence many natural processes and industrial technologies, which directly or indirectly are related to the circulation of water or shortage of water resources. The need for many expensive water reservoirs, dams, and other installations that regulate flow disappears. It is entirely permissible to place masses of ice on the most inconvenient and unsuitable lands. In mountain regions it is possible to artificially intensify snowfalls and avalanche flurries.

In the winter, it is worthwhile to freeze a man-made iceberg around a station, since in the summer the ice water will not only replenish its overall reserves, but will also increase the efficiency of the turbines by four-five percent. A. Bakalova and D. Groman developed the theory and technology for creating such ice storehouses, having defended them in 1971 for the author's certificate.

So, the idea was entered on the state register of inventions long ago. So long ago, that one does not ask why it is this way, and not demanded for practice. In 1979, a council for the study of production forces under USSR Gosplan seriously examined it, basically approved it, and recommended publication of the documents and their examination in the scientific council on the comprehensive use and safeguarding of water resources. The

council in turn transferred responsibility for conclusions onto the shoulders of academic institutes. At that time, Goskomizobreteniy issued the authors yet another certificate in 1981—for an installation for the layered freezing of ice under natural conditions. No longer hoping for foreign thermal isolators, promised by someone, they are already on the verge of inventing an "ice storehouse, concealed from solar radiation by artificial, nontoxic refractory ice." Then, a reviewer from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Water Problems, candidate of sciences V. Debolskiy, having made... a thousand-fold arithmetic mistake (?!), accused the authors of maliciously exaggerating the effectiveness of the proposed installation. In truth, to lay the blame on someone else...

For many decades this idea has forced its way through the self-serving resistance of official institutes, committees, and ministries, lazy or unconscientious reviewers, and envious scientists. Recognition has begun to dawn only now. Last year, Gidrometeoizdat finally published the monograph, "Systematic Regulation of Mountain Glaciers and the Flow of Rivers" (authors V.D. Bakalov, D.S. Groman, M.Ch. Zalikhanov, and V.D. Panov). A journalistic essay on the idea's thorny fate was released by a Rostov publishing house. Now, USSR Goskompiroda is looking at LRU with great attention. Who knows, possibly, we will live until the first serious experiments, until a time when the waters of the high mountains will finally water the parched fields of our southern regions.

Internal Migration Legislation Urged

91US0824A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Sep 91
Single Edition p 2

[Article by USSR People's Deputy D. Kerimov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the rubric: "Life As It Is: The Wall Facing Refugees"]

[Text] Yesterday PRAVDA published a selection of materials on the refugee situation in our country. Today we provide a commentary written by USSR People's Deputy D. Kerimov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Continuing the Subject

Among the multitude of people whose rights and freedoms were and are being violated there is one category of the abused that should be put near the top of the list. This category is refugees. They include people who had to leave their homes because of intolerable living conditions, because of persecution and lack of confidence in their future. As they become homeless, as they lose their customary living conditions, these people add to the army of the unemployed; they lose every way of earning a living. They find themselves in a situation where every basic foundation of their life and sociopolitical and social status is destroyed.

It is not that only some individual rights are violated in the case of refugees, but it is almost the entire complex of rights including such basic ones as the right to work, the right to have a home, the right to education, etc. We should also remember that the movement of our republics toward independence, which process is definitely quite progressive in its essence, is nevertheless quite capable of further exacerbating the problem of refugees.

The Declaration on Human Rights and Freedoms that was passed by the Fifth Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies could become the legal basis for allowing government and political regulation of the problem in question. The declaration solemnly proclaims the highest values of our society—personal freedom, personal honor, and dignity; among other things it also states that every person possesses natural, unalienable, and inviolable rights and freedoms; it says that all people have equal right to be defended by the law whatever their ethnic or social origin, language, sex, political or other opinions, religion, place of residence, financial situation, or any other circumstances may be; it says that no direct or indirect curtailment of one's rights and no bias due to race or ethnic reasons may be allowed. The declaration also describes many other human rights and freedoms.

Unfortunately, all these wonderful provisions and norms have not the slightest thing in common with the refugees. They are defenseless, they seem to exist outside of all laws. We probably need a special law on refugees. Incidentally, the issue of creating such a law has also

been raised within the framework of international law because the 1951 convention on the status of refugees is considerably outdated and can hardly be applied to a present-day situation.

The law on refugees should define a refugee; it should formulate their rights including the right to a temporary shelter, to favorable conditions for life and work created for them at a new place of residence, to their return to their homeland, readaption, etc. In other word, we need a legal mechanism which would embrace the entire range of problems dealing with the social protection of refugees.

To ensure that this law does not remain unenforced either, it would be reasonable to establish oversight committees for refugee law enforcement within the new USSR Supreme Soviet and in the republic parliaments (incidentally, I want to mention that there is the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees among international humane organizations). We will also need to involve our people in applying the law to practice. It is the only way for us to ease the heavy burden borne by refugees.

Correspondents Report on Refugee Problems Around Country

91US0819A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Sep 91
pp 1-2

[Article by Ye. Kazmina, et al.: "No Longer a Motherland, Not Yet a Foreign Land"]

[Text] Today PRAVDA is publishing a series of items devoted to problems of the refugees in our country. The newspaper's correspondents sent the editorial office their reports from today's "hot spots"—Baku, Yerevan, Tskhinvali, Kishinev... Incidentally, these questions are also very critical today in the capital also, because tens of thousands of people who have left their hometowns have come to Moscow and to the Moscow suburbs not willingly, but after being forced to do so! This topic is an extremely acute and painful one that cannot be ignored. And it is one that must be resolved in a joint manner in the renewed Union, and, obviously, as one of the very first questions, the most painful one.

We Are Studying the Problem

Moscow, Ye. Kazmina

First a few figures. In our country there are currently 1.5 million "internal refugees" and "displaced persons": in Russia, 150,000 and in Moscow Oblast, 10,000-12,000. The figures, of course, are not completely accurate, but, after all, the process is apparently developing...

Imagine for one minute that you were chased out of your home by the butt of a semiautomatic weapon or to the accompaniment of the mocking cries of a crowd. With nowhere to run... Everything else will seem like a minor matter. So please don't rush to make a squeamish face

when you see agitated people holding posters in front of the front entrances of buildings.

In the endless stream of neologisms in our language, the word "refugees" has shielded the broad backs of the "consensuses" and "alternatives. The people who stand behind this bitter word apparently have also been shifted into the shades. Various conferences are being held—conferences dealing with some kind of human dimension, conferences dealing with the problems of the national minorities and refugees, but still the people are being ignored. Just consider how many organizations engaged in the new problem have been created: the Human Rights Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Council; the Refugee Affairs Commission of Mossovet; the Ministry for Labor and Social Questions; and the Russian Refugees Committees. In addition there are about a dozen other public organizations to protect unfortunate individuals. But what have the results been?

"The first people we found housing for were the refugees," A. Melnikov, chairman of the Refugee Affairs Commission of Mossovet, says. "We put them in 47 rest homes, boarding houses, sanatoriums, and pioneer camps in the Moscow area. How many people can live 'temporarily'? Also, the local administration is 'on strike'—it turns off the lighting, gas, and water. Things are also temporary with jobs. Every two months you request a document from Mossovet stating that you are a refugee. Incidentally, it is also necessary to prove that you actually are a refugee."

"What about the children? The ones who are supposed to go to a day care center or to school?"

"They can go there, but, once again, it's necessary to have a document."

People are thankful that they have been issued a lump-sum grant in aid—about 150 rubles—plus second-hand items. The Soviet Children's Foundation and the World Fund have loosened their purse-strings. Garri Kasparov gave pensioners and disabled persons 10 million.

Nevertheless, without refugee status, a residence permit, and legally guaranteed rights, it will be impossible to resolve this bitter problem. Nor will other things help—the guest registration of acquaintances and relatives for housing, pink visiting cards, or the coveted packages from overseas. Because the state is incapable of guaranteeing absolutely all the humanitarian rights for these people. Therefore—and this is definitely not being said as justification—they sometimes attempt to use illegal ways to get income or simply to get out of the country. At first the migration services wanted to resolve this question by finding them temporary housing and jobs, but that did not work out.

Currently the previously mentioned committees and commissions are making attempts to guarantee the refugees' rights and to monitor the manner in which they are observed, and to provide interesting information. However, the basic hopes are still being placed on

financial aid in large amounts and on agreements with various regions to find housing for the refugees, without taking into consideration the impatiently awaited "manna from heaven" in the form of legislative acts from the Supreme Council.

Meanwhile the reregistration is proceeding, and the unfortunate individuals are being counted again for the fifth time. These are exhausted, tired people. I spoke with many of them and I was astonished: where were they getting their strength from? But they definitely did not try to cry on anyone's shoulder. Instead, they simply shared their misfortunes in a very human way.

Recently, speaking on television, Vasilii Peskov described the situation in our country in this way: "We are all living in a building that is undergoing major repair." I might add that the construction workers are so inept that very frequently the bricks are falling on our heads.

During the days when I was collecting the material for this item, I realized that the refugee phenomenon is immoral, and it is also the natural result of the irresponsibility and indifference on the part of the authorities...

Vladikavkaz, TASS correspondent V. Shanayev, for PRAVDA

There has been a renewed intensification of the stream of refugees from the trans-Caucasus to Northern Ossetia. After leaving their hometowns, they hurry through Rokskiy Pass in search of a better fate and for comfort with their "northern brothers." But here too the situation is not entirely hopeful.

"The events in the trans-Caucasus," Major-General G. Kantemirov, minister of internal affairs of the Northern Ossetian SSR, says, "have also had a negative effect on the situation in our republic, and in the entire North Caucasian region. In Vladikavkaz, which already is living under emergency conditions, approximately 80,000 refugees from Southern Ossetia and other regions in Georgia have been registered.

"In Northern Ossetia the problem of finding housing and jobs for the refugees has become extremely acute. The republic leadership is doing everything to resolve the problem, but, obviously, Northern Ossetia by itself is incapable of coping with it. It is a nationwide problem, and what we need is immediate assistance from the government of Russia."

Here is another point of view concerning the problem of the refugees from Southern Ossetia. It is shared by the chairman of the "Hussar-Tsagat" (South-North) Ossetian national movement, K. Byazarti, candidate of philosophical sciences, and assistant professor at the North Caucasus Mining and Metallurgical Institute.

"This is yet another postponement of the discussion of the refugee problem at the Supreme Council of North Ossetian SSR," he says. "The republic leadership wants simply to get rid of them by using various pretexts. In

July and August they forcibly evicted women, children, and old men from dormitories and boarding houses. The reason: the refugees had to return to Southern Ossetia. That is absolutely true—"there's no place like home." But a war is in progress on the territory of the autonomous oblast..."

In Northern Ossetia there are thousands of refugees who, unable to find any refuge, leave for other republics. Thus the manpower of the Ossetian nation is wandering all over the world.

In the villages of the republic there is a shortage of working hands, but the refugees are not being given any help. At the same time, in a suburb of Vladikavkaz the construction of an entire settlement has begun. It is being built on the basis of European standards for families of military personnel coming from Germany. The increase in the population by 10,000 persons in the most densely populated republic, which is already burdened by tens of thousands of refugees, will sharply aggravate the situation in the region. In a word, in resolving the refugees' problems the leadership of Northern Ossetia is not taking any specific steps.

As has become known, in the near future a session of the Supreme Council of North Ossetian SSR will consider the question on the problems of the refugees from South Ossetia.

Kishinev, PRAVDA correspondent A. Pasechkik

Recent events (both in the country and here in Moldova) have intensified the exodus from the republic of the nonindigenous population, especially the Russian population. Certain of the problems in this very complicated process are discussed by Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Belopotapov, cochairman of the Center for Russian Culture in Kishinev.

"Data from various sources," he says, "attests to the fact that from one-third to one-half of all the Russians living on the right bank would like to leave Moldova immediately. For the most part these are skilled specialists and workers, scientists, physicians, and other categories of people. But the basic problem here is housing. A measure that has been called upon to resolve that problem to the best of our abilities is the so-called 'P' program—"P" for 'pereyezd' [move] to other regions of the country.

"Recently, for example, I returned from Voronezh, where an agreement was reached with the city authorities concerning the allocation of a plot of land for the purpose of constructing housing for our migrants. Similar plots of land exist near Belgorod and in a number of other places. But one might ask: what funds are being used for construction, and what materials are being used? This question, for times such as we are living in now, is extremely complicated. But it too can be overcome if the desire is strong enough. Why not, for example, allow here in Kishinev the potential migrants to purchase their present housing from the state so that they will be able subsequently to sell it at auction, and to

use the proceeds to construct cooperative housing, say, at Belgorod? There is also no problem with the construction capacities. We had a discussion about this with the government of Russia. The fact of the matter is that in Moldova, with increasing frequency, the home-building combines are standing idle because of the lack of raw and other materials. The Russians could send here whatever is lacking, and receive in exchange the finished structures for installation at the construction sites that have been set aside."

Vilnius, PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Stroganov

There are no refugees from Lithuania. One can discuss only the people who want to leave Lithuania for various reasons, including political ones. Official statistics confirms that the average number of people leaving Vilnius, for example, every month by swapping their apartments is 50, and the same number of people arrive here. The fact that it is no easy matter to swap an apartment is another question. But no one is abandoning housing.

Thus one cannot speak of refugees from Lithuania. True, the arising of the problem is not precluded, but on a somewhat different plane. It is possible and necessary to talk about the psychological and material aspect of a possible mass exodus. But for the time being that does not exist. People here are planning soon to decide the conditions for compensating those who would like to leave Lithuania because of a change in the political situation. The treaty governing the principles of inter-governmental relations between the Lithuanian Republic and the RSFSR, in particular, states, "The high contracting parties, by special agreements, will define the procedure and conditions for resettling citizens who move in conformity with their free choice from the territory of one of the contracting parties to the territory of the other contracting party, as well as the mutual pledges to render material and other assistance to them."

In addition, a law governing migration is supposed to be enacted soon in Lithuania.

Baku, PRAVDA correspondent Z. Kadymbekov

Today there are probably few people who remember the precise birthdate of that very painful shame of our time that is associated with the bitter word "refugees." But that date does exist—22 February 1988. It was precisely on that day that hundreds of Azerbaijanis who had been evicted from Kafanskiy Rayon in Armenia became our country's first victims of arbitrary action and violence. But at that time, completely confused in the face of the misfortune that had occurred and unable to discontinue the evil, we did not even suspect what genie had been released from the bottle.

Today in Armenia not a single person remains from the population of 200,000 Azerbaijanis. The inhabitants of all 172 Azerbaijani villages situated on the territory of Armenia have been deported. This entire flood of many thousands of people has surged into Azerbaijan.

"To put it in precise terms," Shakir Kerimov, chairman of the republic's Refugees Committee, explains, "238,524 refugees came to our republic. This constitutes 51,224 families. They, including approximately 45,000 Meskhetian Turks from Central Asia, have been given housing chiefly in the major cities—Baku, Sumgait, Gyandzh—and in a number of rural rayons. They have been given approximately 9000 plots of land for the construction of homes. Almost 4000 families have been given a loan for the construction of housing. As early as 1989, almost 90,000 refugees received a three-month lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of 45,000 rubles. We received practically no assistance from the center. The entire load was borne by the republic's budget.

"However, despite the efforts that were undertaken, the problem of finding housing and jobs for people, especially in rural localities, continues to be a critical one. For example, out of 107,673 able-bodied refugees, 74,907 have been provided with jobs. Twenty-five percent of the refugees continue to have no permanent roof over their heads. A republic that already is experiencing a critical shortage of housing, and where there is a large excess of labor resources, obviously cannot resolve this problem independently. It must be resolved by joint efforts!"

Yerevan, PRAVDA correspondent A. Khanbabayan

The flood of refugees into Armenia that began after the notorious Sumgait pogrom in February 1988 is continuing for its fourth year, alternatively rising and then slightly falling. During that time more than 350,000 Armenians have left Azerbaijan. But only 260,000 are currently in Armenia. The others have dispersed across the vast expanses of the country, and some of them have gone abroad.

The statistics provided by the Committee for Refugee Questions, under the Armenian Council of Ministers, are dry. However, one can read behind every line a long-lasting human misfortune, the pain of dashed hopes, the tragedies of broken lives. I would like to give only a few figures.

Until now, only one-third of the refugees have residence permits. The others are living in hotels, at camp grounds, or in condemned buildings, or are forced to crowd in with relatives.

Armenia, of course, is helping its new citizens in any way that it can. But that's the rub: these opportunities are extremely limited. True, every refugee has been paid a modest lump-sum grant in aid, and during the current year 10 million rubles have been allocated from the republic's budget to find housing and obs for them. Five thousand families have received a loan for housing construction. Charitable organizations have also been making their contribution.

But all of this is only a drop in the bucket, especially if one considers that, in the earthquake zone, hundreds of

thousands of people also continue to lack housing, and, for many reasons, the construction has been proceeding at only a middling rate.

Editor's note. Obviously, it will scarcely be possible within the foreseeable future to resolve the refugee problem on a countrywide scale. This is why. While denying the very possibility of the peaceful, democratic reconsideration of the administrative boundaries which at one time were drawn arbitrarily, we thus are knowingly planning a change in the ethnic boundaries that developed naturally, and, as it were, we are "programming" future streams of migrants. Therefore it is necessary, in our opinion, to have a procedure in accordance with which the republics will assume the financial responsibility for finding new housing and jobs for people who were forced to leave their own territory. Obviously, this condition must be included in the text of the future treaty signed by the sovereign states..."

Continuing Psychiatric Abuses Reported

92US0001A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 24 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by correspondent B. Vishnevskiy: "Not All Have Been Discharged From Ward No. 6: Former Victims of Psychiatric Terror Seek Justice"]

[Text] Cheboksary—The hunt for Kvasov was carried out according to all the regulations. Surveillance, the raid, apprehension. He had slipped right out of the "trap" several times. Then it was back to the beginning. Until, in the center of Cheboksary, in plain view of random gawkers, four policemen tied him up and shoved him into a police vehicle. True, they took Kvasov not to a detention center, not to see the prosecutor, but to the republic psychiatric hospital.

His career as a party-appointed official of a department of the former State Farm Machinery Committee was shattered overnight. Had he signed the document saying that the planned facility had been commissioned and was in operation, he would doubtless have worked his way "up to the top." But Kvasov stood his ground: To put the rayon machinery maintenance center into operation without treatment equipment would be to do in the entire rayon with emissions. First two deputy chairmen tried to persuade him. Comrade No. 1 himself was interested in the project. Without that lousy station, the annual construction plan would go down the tubes. And with it—bonuses, banners, and orders. What are you, Kvasov, an enemy of your own republic?

Then he was fired. All 47 subdivisions received telegrams signed by Chairman Morozov: "Kvasov's directives are not to be accepted. Any requests he might make are to be regarded as nonobligatory." At this point the recalcitrant official should have come to his senses and prostrated himself at his boss's feet. But Kvasov, an eccentric fellow, became even more determined: He began dashing off "signals." About bribes and report

padding, about machinations involving centrally allocated materials and the free repair of automobiles belonging to relatives and close friends. Telegrams with the directive "investigate" were sent from Moscow to Cheboksary and prompted filed in the "dossier."

In time the dossier was "activated." Kvasov threw the first notice from the "nut house" into the trash can. When the second one came, he telephoned chief physician A. Shiptsov: "What examination? I'm absolutely healthy!" To which he heard the reply: "We'll see about that." Then six men in white jackets showed up on the grounds of the packaging plant where he had obtained a job as a foreman. On seeing the ambulance with the "psychiatric brigade," Kvasov took off through the gate. That evening, the ambulance was sitting outside his home. He spent the night in the garage. He took up "residence" on a river dock where he unloaded barges. He left the city. Kvasov was apprehended when he returned for his things.

From there, things went according to the book: tablets, injections, blackmail. A trip to the Serbskiy Institute under escort. A "sanction" from the capital depriving him of his rights. An escape. Then back to the oblast psychiatric hospital. His family was pressured to keep quiet. Such was the turn taken by the life of the former "party appointee" and now unemployed, homeless vagrant Vladimir Kvasov.

Kvasov is number 30 on a list of "victims of psychiatric terror" that I brought back from Cheboksary. After him come another 22 names. They are all "formers": a police sergeant, a school teacher, a senior designer, a savings bank accountant, a certified driver, an outstanding nurse. Each of these victims of the pre-perestroika and perestroika era could be the subject of an angry expose abounding with symbolic details. For example, about how psychiatrist T. Vlasova, a former children's home employee, was seized while making her morning rounds—seized as if she were some kind of animal. They bound her legs with an alternating red banner that had stood in the corner, and her arms with a towel hanging over the sink. The police officer was assisted by the chief physician from the tuberculosis ward—a well-known youth counselor whose counseling work had been the subject of a letter that the young specialist T. Vlasova had written to the newspaper TRUD a few days before. Bound in that flag, she was taken to the "violent ward." Mind-altering substances were prescribed. And when they were convinced that the client was not going to be entering into criminal correspondence with any other publication, they released her with some fancy scientific-sounding diagnosis. A category two handicapped person with a minuscule pension, T. Vlasova lives with that diagnosis to this day.

Or take the following incident, which is hardly worse. Pavel Aleksandrovich Chubukov had carried out a directive from the party. Back in the 1940's he was sent to agrarian Chuvashia to set up an industrial base. He personally took part in commissioning the first 10

plants—plants producing equipment, machinery, electrical instruments, textiles... He personally set up the most sophisticated pieces of machinery. And then he suddenly discovered that officials were concerned only with net output and were ignoring normatives and state standards. And everything went as if according to order. It never occurred to him that that order had come from the very "top." And so the old "industrial guardsman" waged his struggle against report padding—until, having been demoted to an engineer who was assigned the dirty work, he failed to show up for a cross examination. Inside the oblast party committee building was the familiar "troyka": an instructor, the republic deputy prosecutor, and, quiet as a mouse, the psychiatrist. Then came an anonymous, visual "examination." Naturally, all Chubukov's subsequent appeals—from rayon courts to party congresses—were neutralized by his "diagnosis."

In fact, one can discern a clear scenario. Truth-seekers, who are subsequently labeled "litigious, paranoid fault-finders," report irregularities. They ruin the production figures. In the first stage, the response is harassment in the collective. If that does not help, a piece of stationary bearing the logo "Proletarians of all countries, unite! Communist Party of the Soviet Union" is used to send a message to the chief physician of the local hospital. It follows from the text that such-and-such rayon or city CPSU committee "requests you to provide a written finding regarding the psychiatric health of..." Then comes the name of the victim, his address, and the signature of the official making the request. In this way, the chief physician, who is naturally a member of the aforementioned party, is enlisted in carrying out a party directive. If a problem arises, a second order is sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It must be said, however, that evidence in the form of signed documents was left only by amateurs. Such as L. Matveyeva, chairman of the Poretskiy Rayon CPSU Committee, whose message to chief physician G. Baranova I cited above. Professionals never made such a blunder. Their weapon was verbal directives, in particular verbal directives issued by telephone, which leave no traces and are therefore more effective.

And why should this come as any surprise? For the tragedy of our system (and the Cheboksary incident is but a mirror reflection of it) consists in that for decades the system was built on a foundation that suppressed human initiative. Under it, not just specific individuals but entire social institutions were reduced to the role of serflike servants. Lenin once offered theoretical justification of the need for such terror (see his letter to People's Commissar of Justice D. Kurskiy, Complete Collected Works, Volume 45, p. 190). Then Stalin implemented it in practice. Subsequently, with each new round of repressions against the people, more and more executive levers were enlisted: the gulags, research institutes, special schools, psychiatric hospitals. The suppression of dissent permeated the entire system and became the prime condition for its viability.

Consider the following incident, for example. I read a resolution of the Collegium of the Chuvash SSR Ministry of Health in which it called on the republic KGB and procuracy to investigate the activities of a certain physician by the name of P. Makarov. It is unbelievable! The high-ranking docs denounced the surgeon from the medical air service. And why? The Ministry of Health was disturbed by "information leaks...concerning the supposed use of psychiatric terror in Chuvashia." A report, or, more precisely, a commentary on the notorious list had been broadcast by Radio Liberty.

It must be said that Petr Filippovich knew what he was doing. A candidate of medicine and gifted surgeon, he once headed a section of the republic cardiological health center. Five years ago, he pointedly repudiated spurious extra earnings under an "economic contract." He became persona non grata. But unlike dozens of professionals who had been methodically forced out of the department, he did not go anywhere. Just how Makarov was persecuted is a special discussion. Things reached the point where First Secretary Prokopyev personally called for an "investigation" of his son, also a doctor, from the podium of a party and economic aktiv meeting. And an investigation was conducted. A "bribery case" was put together—a hurried and implausible one. But who would try to look into it—after all, an order had been issued! The idea was simple: While the younger Makarov served his time in the local colony, his father would hold his tongue.

But the opposite happened. Petr Filippovich, a very quiet man in some ways reminiscent of Chekhov's country doctors, went on the offensive. There probably was not a single deputy session, conference, meeting or other forum that he did not penetrate in one way or another and make his way to the microphone. In the late 1980's the republic permitted pluralism, rallies and noisy "dialogues" were held with top officials, and the frightening word "psychoterror" was heard on every corner. But little good it did! Late into the night, after performing exhaustive operations in the air, Makarov wrote to Moscow's democrats, to local and Moscow journalists, and to Comrades Yeltsin and Gorbachev personally. In Moscow, he managed to get an appointment at Krasnopresnenskaya. But his pleas fell on deaf ears. From the heights of big-time politics, little people from the provinces simply do not stand out very much.

After having coffee in the office of Chuvashia Health Minister and RSFSR People's Deputy N. Grigoryev, I decided to conduct an experiment. Why don't you and I, Nikolay Grigoryevich, carry out a joint inspection? An open, democratic one. After all, rumors are flying everywhere. Let's meet with the medical staff of the psychiatric hospital, let's talk with the patients and look at the documents. Your side will be represented by your comrades, and our side by the following "duly empowered agents": G. Petrushov, a consultant and neuropsychiatrist well known for his critical articles in the local press; P. Makarov, chairman of the Union of Repressed Physicians; and I. Toreyev, executive committee cochairman

for human rights and international cooperation. We will commit ourselves to preserving medical confidentiality and will not delve into the subtleties of diagnoses without authorization. After all, we are interested in something else. For example, how is the outward appearance of treatment created for those "patients" who knew nothing of their "illness"? What kinds of entries are to be found in their case histories and on their medical charts? Is it true that some of them have mysteriously disappeared?

The reason for the unfailing politeness with which the minister sanctioned our undertaking became clear the very next day, when everything we had planned the night before was turned into a tragicomic farce. In the office of psychiatric hospital chief physician A. Shigilchev, we were pinned down. The defensive positions were manned by First Deputy Minister Yu. Maksimov; Ministry of Health Chief Psychiatrist G. Volkov, who had been called back from vacation; the occupant of the office; and V. Lisov, his deputy for medical services. They took turns making lofty pronouncements about "defending the honor and dignity of the patients," whom the people in white jackets looked after day and night, on the basis of USSR legislative acts, article 16, and the draft USSR law on psychiatric care in the USSR, article nine, paragraphs one and eight. They were simply magnificent. I cannot help recalling the story about how they buried former chief physician A. Shiptsov. They said dozens of official Volga sedans accompanied him on his final journey. Their owners had maintained their composure for years.

Finally, a kind of compromise was reached. The three of us had to leave. But G. Petrushov, after being warned of his special liability, was allowed to glance at the documents. In general, the first attempt to take information "by storm" had some success. G. Petrushov later shared his impressions: "One is surprised by the abundant inquiries from oblast and city CPSU committees and from officials of various ranks in the medical documents. In effect, the doctors were carrying out administrative orders from the party. As for patients who, under the stress caused by the conflicts with their superiors, had turned to the doctors for help, this was later used against them as compromising material. (That is how medical confidentiality was observed!—B.V) Within the limits of the examination I was allowed to make and a subsequent discussion, I detected no signs of 'chronic illnesses.' It would be more correct to speak of distinctive character traits, including some related purely to world views: These people were in difficult straits."

Prostitution on Rise in St Petersburg

91US0799A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 91
Single p 2

[Article by Correspondent N. Volynskiy: "Under a Red Light"]

[Text] Four girls, 14 to 15 years old, gaily chatted in the corner of the trolleybus. As the trolley neared its stop, the

girls began primping, peering into the mirrors of their powder cases.

"Where are you off to, little ones," a tipsy passenger asked playfully.

"To work!" the girls replied with a laugh.

And here's "work" for them: the Probaltiyskaya Hotel, citadel of Leningrad prostitution and homosexuality. But wait a minute. There's nothing for those girls to do there. That market is cornered. And the level there is different. The hotel prostitutes there usually have a higher education, speak foreign languages, and pretend to be artists or poetesses.

But I'm wrong. Without going up to the hotel, the girls get into a taxi. They whisper something to the driver. He drives them to a second car, from which two foreigners have just emerged. Two of the girls take their places. As we see, then, demand is shifting to "fledglings"—schoolgirls. And that demand is apparently going to increase.

Yes, prostitution has always existed in St. Petersburg. But it has probably never been carried on as openly as today, having become a kind of city attraction on a par with the Bronze Horseman. And the blame lies with films, literature, and the newspapers, which, wittingly or unwittingly, have greatly publicized the vice, making it attractive. It can be said that the level of prostitution rises in times of social unrest—during revolutions and crises, when there suddenly arises a powerful demand for the "good life" on the part of those who are adept at making money from social ills.

On the other hand, disorder, unemployment, and a general sense of instability and the illusoriness of life are prompting hundreds of young girls to walk the streets. In one way or another, we are now becoming a consumer society. And that being the case, the market is increasing drawing in such a unique commodity as the female body. This happens most easily in a society that has lost its moral points of reference and in which the notion of the social and moral prestige of the individual is disappearing.

Just who is being sold at the Pribaltiyskaya? There are three basic categories. The first and largest consists of Russian streetwalkers who are trying to marry foreigners. Many achieve their objective. And foreign guests are happy to take Russians. One Dutchman told me:

"A Russian woman in the home is a real boon. She does the work of three—and she has no choice, either. If not, her husband will toss her onto the street, and she won't even object, like some swine that can't even talk."

The second category tries to get rich quick and then disappear from the market. Few succeed in this. Therefore, most of them move over to the third—criminal—category, falling into the hands of pimps and racketeers and making a good deal of money for them. And from there there's no turning back.

And so behind the giggling and smirking over the subject of prostitution stands not just a vice, but a vice surrounded by a criminal network. Not to mention the corrupting influence that prostitutes have on young people, as the older ones seek to bring fresh blood into the profession. And not to mention the spread of venereal and gynecological diseases. Combating this phenomenon in our country, which lacks both the legislation and explicit legal criteria, is virtually impossible.

To treat an abscess you have to lance it. What should be done about prostitution, in my opinion? Honestly speaking, I don't know. But I think that even brothels might be more becoming (if one can use the word in this context) than the orgy of immorality and vice we see today. Better to have the vice out in the open, under the watch of a morals police, than to drive it deep inside the body of society, where no medicines can reach it and where it will poison and corrupt society without hindrance.

Patriarch Aleksey Visits Egypt

92P50003A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
1 Oct 91 p 1

[Unattributed report under rubric: "The Country: a Chronicle of the Day" (as reported by SELSKAYA ZHIZN and TASS correspondents)]

[Text] Aleksey II Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russian departed Moscow for Egypt to make an official visit to His Holiness Parfeniy III Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria and All-Africa.

Patriarch Aleksey will then visit Syria and Lebanon from 3 to 7 October. He will make an official visit to His Holiness Ignatius IV Patriarch of Great Antioch and All the East. He intends to meet with the heads of churches in Damascus and Beirut and with statesmen of both countries.

Cost to Public of Muslims' Hajj Queried

91US0795A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 91
Single Edition p 2

[Article by Anatoliy Grachev: "Who Aspires to Mecca and Why?"]

[Text] Makhachkala—Pilgrims of Dagestan who had been to Mecca returned home long since, but talk about this sensational journey has not subsided in the republic to this day.

Articles have appeared in the local press with the eloquent headings: "Ignorance Beneath the Canopy of the Green Flag," "Truth About the Hajj," "Worshipping or Profiting" and others. Believers who did not make it to Mecca are particularly upset at what happened. They are saying: "We were disgraced by our own brothers."

What happened? Prior to the memorable trip, believers assembled in Makhachkala outside the building of the republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet for an unsanctioned mass meeting and presented the ultimatum: "All who desire or none at all should go to Mecca. The cost of the trip should be no more than R3,000, like last year." But they were not taking into account the fact that at that time all expenses (excluding the cost of transport) had been assumed by Saudi Arabia. In addition, there has been a sharp rise in the dollar exchange rate.

The organizers of the meeting impressed upon those assembled that their demands could be achieved if they acted with "more determination." The crowd did so and rushed the government building with the aim of seizing it. But it was repulsed by the guardians of order and pushed back. Then stones were thrown at the windows. Shots were heard. There were injuries on both sides. Fortunately, there were no fatalities.

The crude pressure of the crowd resulted in the trip costing the pilgrims less. Did the leadership of Dagestan take fright? No, it was simply that the government of the Union and Saudi Arabia assumed a greater proportion of the expenses. And this trip cost the republic a pretty penny. Several hundred thousand rubles were lost. The point being that the government had made ready 40 buses, which were taken off passenger routes and which remained at a standstill for a week in order to additionally dispatch 1,200 pilgrims. The organizers of the mass meeting thwarted the bus trip and deceived the people taking part in the mass meeting, who remained in the square until a "victorious outcome." Other people entirely went to Mecca instead of them.

Some 2,500 pilgrims altogether went from the USSR to Mecca this year. The lion's share—889 places—was wrested by believers from Dagestan, mainly from four districts, although the republic has 45, not counting the city of Makhachkala. As it transpired, many were visiting Mecca for a second time, several persons coming from the same families. In a word, injustice on all sides....

While profoundly respecting the feelings of believers, the following needs to be said, nonetheless. True hajjis make the pilgrimage to Mecca on foot, and if transport is used, it is only with their own personal money earned by honest labor. Only then does Allah appreciate the zeal.

What happened in practice does not fit any framework. Sooner or later, believers should realize that they are employing unsuitable methods.

Inhabitants of Dagestan are disturbed by the question of whether next year also pilgrims will take the government by the throat and of why their profoundly personal business should be paid for by all working people out of their own pockets.

Concern for Fate of Pension Fund Reported

92US0009A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Sep 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by T. Khudyakova: "They Are Asking the Pensioners Not To Worry?"]

[Text] The fate of the USSR Pension Fund, as well as other all-Union structures, has been placed in question. And this worries not only the associates of the fund. Millions of elderly people, invalids, and families with children receive pensions and benefits from the special accounts of the Pension Fund.

"For now, we do not know what will become of us," says Vladimir Bodrov, first deputy chairman of the fund's governing board. "We are waiting for proposals from the republics, although initially we were created as an inter-republic organization. The governing board includes representatives from republic sections of the fund and from social security ministries. The decisions are made jointly, with consideration for the interests of each region. Evidently, now each sovereign state will adopt its own pension laws, and our departments will become their property. We are proposing that the Union Pension Fund be transformed into a reserve fund for financing general social programs (aid to the Chernobyl residents), and paying pensions and subsidies in the case of natural disasters and catastrophes. We could become a large investor, earning money for the republics through commercial activity."

We must understand that the pensioners are being asked not to worry. The money due them will be paid out under any circumstances. God willing. However, many problems still remain outside the picture, and the former Soviet republics will have to resolve them in a joint manner.

First of all, there is the remaining question of paying off 10 billion in credit issued to the USSR Pension Fund for paying pensions and benefits at the beginning of this year, when the insurance premiums were coming in sporadically. Around 7 billion rubles [R] have already been used, but the republics are in no hurry to return the debt. They have no money.

Furthermore, a unified economic space presupposes mobility of the workforce and free movement of workers. Consequently, we will need agreements on mutual recording of seniority, as well as agreements on paying incentive pensions. We are speaking primarily of northerners, oil industry workers, and seamen. This question also still remains open.

As does that of recording seniority, granting pensions to workers of interrepublic organizations (modeled after the type used for UN international workers), and paying pensions to citizens who have left the USSR and established permanent residence in other countries, and to foreigners whose permanent residence is in the USSR.

In short, the operation of dividing up the unified Pension Fund, which seems simple at first glance, exposes many hidden obstacles which the lawmakers and jurists will encounter. Of course, there are no insoluble situations, and in time everything will be settled. But what we will all undoubtedly lose is the possibility of changing over in the near future to civilized personal accounting of pension insurance contributions. For this we need a computer network, special programs, and a unified information base.

Having lost this segment, we are putting off to an indefinite time the prospect of changing over to pension insurance. Yet we already have some proposals on this question. Crediting insurance contributions to personal accounts would make it possible to compute pensions in the future based not only on length of service and

earnings, but also on the sums of insurance accumulations and length of insurance participation. The commercial application of the insurance sums would allow our pensioners to acquire decent fortunes and to live comfortably—just as their “colleagues” in the developed countries live.

In this case, the consequences of inflation and growth of retail prices would not be so catastrophic for unemployed citizens. They would not have to wait once again for a review of the pension legislation, and the state would not have to feverishly seek out sources for financing increased pensions and benefits.

So, just guess: Should the pensioners worry or not? Today they will receive their small amount of money. Yet it might not be out of place for those who are assuming the responsibility for our future to stop and think about tomorrow.

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